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Summary 
In visual attention research, a current topic of debate is to what extent visual attention is 
biased by bottom-up factors (e.g., stimulus saliency), and by top-down factors (e.g., goal 
contingent orienting). The present work centers on the specific factor of expectation discrepancy, 
which likewise attracts attention, but does not fit clearly into either of the two categories. The 
effect of expectation discrepancy is usually tested by first familiarizing participants with a 
number of search displays containing color homogeneous stimuli, such that they expect the 
continuous presentation of the stimulus features also for the following trials. If then a single 
stimulus with a novel color (a “singleton”) is shown unannounced and for the first time in a 
surprise trial, it captures visual attention and the gaze. Over the course of three studies, the present 
work demonstrates that a novel feature must not necessarily be presented by means of a novel 
singleton to attract attention; that is, feature novelty alone is sufficient. The first study shows that 
a task irrelevant color singleton that was shown in every search trial strongly captured the gaze 
if it was presented unannounced with a novel color. Furthermore, the study tested an alternative 
explanation, being that surprise solely interrupts attentional control settings, which causes a 
reorientation towards perceptual saliency. However, results showed that such an effect does not 
contribute substantially to surprise capture. The second study yields evidence that surprise 
capture of the gaze by a novel color covaries with expectation narrowness of the familiar color. 
It was assumed that an expectation about a color becomes narrower with lower previously 
perceived color variability and with an increasing number of sampling occasions. Thus, 
expectation discrepancy of a novel singleton color should be high with a narrow color expectation 
and low with a broad color expectation. Experiments using a similar paradigm as the first study 
demonstrated that higher color variability of an irrelevant singleton and fewer familiarization 
trials reduced surprise capture of the gaze as an indicator for expectation discrepancy. An 
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approach to mathematically model the emergence of an expectation was proposed. The third 
study shows that novelty can compete with saliency for attentional prioritization. More precisely, 
it was demonstrated that gaze capture of a novel color singleton in a surprise trial is attenuated if 
the remaining non-singletons likewise have a novel color, which in turn receive increased 
attention. The data pattern can be predicted by assuming novelty as an additional source of 
activation in a noisy priority map for visual attention. Together, the three studies contribute to a 
more precise specification of the mechanisms that link expectation discrepancy with visual 
attention. 
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1  Introduction 
Every day we conduct a high number of visual searches. Some searches are fast, like the 
search for a coffee mug in an assorted cabinet, whereas the search for our keys on a messy desk 
can take longer. When driving, we are constantly seeking out any hazards on the road, allowing 
us to accurately react to any signs of danger. While we are awake, there is hardly a time when 
we are not searching and sometimes we find things, even though we might not have had an 
intention to search for them. For instance, if our partner has decided to secretly exchange the 
antique ceiling lamp for a spacy green one, we would probably detect the novel object 
immediately when we enter the room for the first time. One cognitive mechanism that guides our 
searches, such that we can orient efficiently through our environment, is visual attention. 
Our visual system cannot effectively process every stimulus that is mapped by the retinas 
of our eyes, such that we become aware to all of them at the same time. Attention is the 
mechanism that selects a smaller subset of objects for further processing. However, previous 
research shows that attention allocation is not always voluntary with only focusing on objects in 
a goal orientated manner. For instance, sometimes we can quickly react to an approaching 
snowball, even though we have not yet realized that we got into a snowball fight and should 
search for or attend to snowballs. In scientific literature, such phenomena are described as 
attention capture effects, which occur automatically or involuntarily (e.g., Jonides, 1981; 
Theeuwes, 1992, 2010). Often, attention capture is categorized into stimulus driven and goal 
driven effects. 
 
1.1  Saliency capture  
Stimulus driven attention capture is postulated to depend on the physical characteristics 
of a stimulus. The most decisive factor for stimulus driven attention capture is the saliency of a 
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stimulus, which is high when a stimulus has a high feature contrast to its surrounding stimuli (Itti 
& Koch, 2000, 2001; Parkhurst, Law, & Niebur, 2002). Hence, this form of attention capture is 
often called “saliency capture” (Theeuwes, 1991, 1992, 2010). Theeuwes (2010) states that 
saliency capture occurs at the initial (parallel) stage of visual processing where it is completely 
unsusceptible to goal driven influences. A widely used experimental method to demonstrate 
saliency capture is the additional singleton paradigm (for a detailed overview see Becker, 2007; 
Simons, 2000). In every trial, participants are presented with a number of stimuli that are evenly 
arranged on an imaginary circle. Often, it is the participants’ task to search for a shape singleton 
(e.g., a single diamond among circles) and to give a manual response depending on a stimulus 
that is situated within the form singleton (also called compound search; “identify the letter inside 
the singleton”). A saliency capture effect is interpreted when the presence of an additional color 
singleton (e.g., a red circle among green circles) increases manual response times as compared 
to search trials where it is absent. This method is called additional singleton paradigm because 
the distractor singleton can never contain the target. Usually, participants are informed about the 
anti-predictiveness of the additional singleton. Thus, if it still captures attention, the mechanism 
is often assumed to be purely stimulus driven (e.g., Theeuwes, 1991, 1992, 1994, 2004). 
 
1.2  Contingent capture 
In contrast, goal driven attention capture is postulated to occur contingent on the current 
visual features we are searching for. At first glance, it might be confusing why goal driven 
attention capture matches the criterion of being involuntary. However, experiments show that if 
participants search for an object with a specific stimulus feature like red color, other stimuli with 
red color can capture attention in an accidental manner (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992, 
1993; see also Yantis & Egeth, 1999). In its strongest version, the “contingent capture” hypothesis 
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states that attention is never purely stimulus driven and solely depends on the attentional set of 
the observer. In similar theories, like the dimensional weighting account, it is assumed that 
observers can voluntary increase the weight of a feature dimension (e.g., color), but not the 
weight for a specific feature (e.g., red) within a dimension (Found & Müller, 1996; Müller, 
Reimann, & Krummenacher, 2003; but see also Wolfe, 1994, for “Guided Search”, which 
assumes prioritization of specific features, for instance). 
It has also been proposed that participants can adopt a search mode where they generally 
search for salient stimuli (“singleton detection mode”), regardless of their feature dimension 
(Bacon & Egeth, 1994). Consequently, any salient stimulus receives increased attention as a more 
convenient search strategy. Singleton detection mode has been taken as an alternative explanation 
for the saliency capture account in additional singleton paradigms. Bacon and Egeth (1994) 
prevented participants from using a singleton search strategy by either adding additional target 
shapes to the search display (Experiment 2) or by adding additional non-target shapes, such that 
the target shape was not the only unique shape anymore. With both measures, an additional color 
singleton distractor did not increase manual response times, which further questioned the 
existence of saliency capture.  
 
1.3  Contingent capture vs. saliency capture 
Theeuwes (2004) argued that higher shape variability in the experiments of Bacon and 
Egeth (1994) also resulted in lower saliency of the color singleton distractor, reducing its 
potential to bias attention in a stimulus driven manner. Previous studies showed that the pop-out 
effect of a salient stimulus can be reduced by increasing feature heterogeneity of the remaining 
stimuli (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989, 1992; Nothdurft, 1993) Thus, Theeuwes (2004) further 
pronounced the saliency of the red color singleton distractor by adding additional green stimuli 
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and found increased reaction times in distractor trials. Note that a red singleton is perceived as 
more unique when it is surrounded by 19 green stimuli than when it is surrounded only by four 
green stimuli. 
It becomes obvious that there is a controversy between authors who advocate strong 
versions of either the contingent capture hypothesis or saliency capture hypothesis, which is still 
present today. One problem for the demonstration of purely stimulus driven attention capture is 
that in most experiments the salient distractor is presented repeatedly over several hundred trials 
and thus is highly expected. The expectancy of a salient stimulus makes it difficult to exclude 
top-down explanations, such as singleton search mode. Gibson and Jiang (1998) proposed to test 
the very first presentation of a salient stimulus in order to demonstrate the existence of purely 
stimulus driven attention capture that is not influenced by top-down effects; that is, either top-
down prioritization of salient stimuli but also inhibition. The authors conducted an experiment 
with search displays where several letters of white color were evenly distributed on an imaginary 
circle. Participants had to decide whether the display in a trial contained either the letter H or U, 
one of which was always present. The search display was only shown for 86ms, which is too fast 
to use eye movements to facilitate search. As we will see later, the presentation time is a crucial 
factor for attention capture. The 193rd trial was the critical surprise trial where the target letter 
was shown with a red color without prior announcement (Experiment 1), resulting in a singleton. 
In the following 192 post-critical trials, the red color was presented repeatedly at the target 
position. However, Gibson and Jiang (1998) could not find any differences between pre-critical 
trials and the critical trial, as indexed by the proportion of correct responses. In post-critical trials, 
participants could respond highly correct as the expectation of a red target resulted in an easy 
feature search. Gibson and Jiang (1998) interpreted this result such that pure stimulus saliency is 
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not sufficient to capture attention, whereas an intention to search for salient stimuli is a necessary 
condition.  
However, this result is at odds with studies that investigated the presentation of 
unannounced events from a cognitive-evolutionary perspective. Several studies contained 
experiments where an unexpected change was implemented into a single stimulus choice task 
(Meyer, Niepel, Rudolph, & Schützwohl, 1991; Schützwohl, 1998). In every trial, two irrelevant 
words were presented for three seconds in different rows at the center of the screen. The 
participant’s task wo to indicate whether a dot appeared above or below these two words. After 
a number of pre-critical trials, a critical surprise trial followed where one of the two words was 
presented with a new background color. Results demonstrated an increased manual response time 
in the critical trial. The authors concluded that the attentional focus was involuntary directed 
towards the unexpected stimulus, accompanied by the interruption of the ongoing task and an 
analysis of the unexpected event.  
With respect to the experiment of Gibson and Jiang (1998), Horstmann (2002) argued 
that the presentation duration of 86ms for the search display could have been too short for the 
emergence of a saliency effect if a singleton is presented for the first time. A closer look at the 
experiments of Meyer et al. (1991) with varying stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA) reveals that 
the effect of the new background color on manual response times was stronger when the 
surprising event was presented 500ms before the imperative stimulus (Experiment 1) as 
compared to when they were presented simultaneously (Experiment 4). Horstmann (2002) used 
a similar experimental design to Gibson and Jiang (1998). However, search letters were placed 
within colored squares (e.g., green). Before the search letters appeared, a preview display has 
been presented for 500ms that only contained the squares as placeholders (without the letters). 
In the 49th trial, the square at the target position was presented for the first time with a novel color 
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(e.g., red), resulting in a color singleton.  Attention capture was illustrated by the unannounced 
color singleton as indexed both by the proportion of correct answers (Experiment 1) and the 
reduction of a set-size effect with manual response times (Experiment 3, without preview display 
but with 4000ms presentation time of the search display). Overall, results of Gibson and Jiang 
(1998), Horstmann (2002), and Meyer et al. (1991) demonstrate that without an intention to 
search for singletons, a salient stimulus takes more than 86ms to elicit an attentional bias, whereas 
a period of 500ms is sufficient. However, Horstmann (2002) did not ascribe this effect to purely 
stimulus driven processes but to a specific mechanism where attention is directed towards stimuli 
that induce surprise as the result of violated expectations or schema discrepancy. 
 
1.4  Surprise 
The phenomenon of surprise has already been discussed by Aristotle (cf. Reisenzein, 
Horstmann, & Schützwohl, 2017). From an early emotion psychological perspective, Darwin 
(1872/1965) described that focused attention is universally accompanied by a slight elevation of 
the eyebrows, and that surprise is an even more focused state of attention where the eyebrows 
further increase and additionally the eyes and the mouth are widely opened (although empirical 
support is relatively weak, Reisenzein, Studtmann, & Horstmann, 2013). In the 20th century, it 
could be empirically demonstrated that within a series of letters, a specific one can be 
remembered better if it is presented unannounced with a novel color (Wilcocks, 1928). It was 
inferred, that better memory must have been due to increased attention to a letter with an odd 
color. A similar phenomenon has been described as the orienting reflex (Sokolov, 1963), which 
is elicited when perceived information does not fit into a neuronal model of the environment. 
However, the orienting reflex decreases with repeated presentation of the unfamiliar information, 
which causes an update process of the neuronal model. 
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1.4.1  The cognitive-evolutionary model of surprise 
More recently, a cognitive-evolutionary model of surprise has been formulated that 
integrates several earlier theories of surprise (Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 1997; 
Reisenzein et al., 2017). To explain the basic mechanism that elicits surprise, the model uses a 
cognitive approach basing on schema theory (Mandler, 1984; Rumelhart, 1984; Rumelhart & 
Ortony, 1977). It is assumed that humans are equipped with schemas that serve to understand 
external input and to interact with the environment on both the cognitive and behavioral level. A 
schema represents theories or beliefs about objects, situations and events. For instance, schemas 
for a psychological conference can include colleagues, talks, posters, and snacks. Furthermore, 
these objects and events come along with typical features, which are also represented in schemas. 
Posters are usually printed on white background, and beamer presentations are usually in 
landscape format. Schemas organize information as derived from current situations, but they can 
also be used to predict future states (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). Furthermore, it is assumed that 
schemas are continuously controlled with respect to their functionality to comprehend the current 
input. This proceeds automatically and without conscious intentions. If a discrepancy between a 
current schema and external information is detected, a state of surprise is elicited, and the current 
schema will be revised such that in can comprehend the new information in the future. Crucially, 
if schema discrepancy exceeds a specific threshold, several mechanisms will be activated that 
motivate the observer to reach a state where the strong schema discrepancy is corrected 
(Schützwohl, 1998). The mechanisms include the automatic interruption of ongoing behavior 
followed by the orientation of attention towards the unexpected event (see also Darwin, 
1872/1965). Furthermore, a conscious feeling of surprise is perceived. When attention is focused 
on the unexpected event, it will be analyzed with respect to a) the verification of schema 
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discrepancy, b) its causes, c) relevance for current and future actions, and d) implications for the 
individual’s well-being (Meyer et al., 1997). 
 
1.5  Surprise capture 
The automatic interruption of ongoing behavior followed by the orientation of attention 
towards surprising events seems to match the general criteria of attention capture as described 
before. Furthermore, these processes yield a good explanation for the mechanism that caused 
attention capture of an unannounced color singleton in Horstmann (2002). To establish surprise 
capture as a distinct form of attention capture besides saliency capture and contingent capture, 
Horstmann (2005, 2006) closely investigated the specific conditions of surprise capture. Time 
course analyses with a similar experimental design as described above for Horstmann (2002) 
were conducted. However, the SOAs between the singleton at the target position in the preview 
display and the onset of the search letters were varied (Horstmann, 2006). Results showed that 
the very first presentation of a singleton at the target position could only improve search 
performance with an SOA of 400ms or higher. A later study showed that that the effect of surprise 
capture reduces if the novel singleton is not presented continuously within the SOA (Horstmann 
& Becker, 2008). However, as soon as the singleton at the target position was presented 
repeatedly, participants used a feature search mode where search performance was readily 
improved if singleton and search letters were presented simultaneously.  
A distinction between contingent capture and surprise capture is already obvious for 
theoretical arguments, because it is unlikely that participants have an intention to search for a 
specific feature that is both irrelevant and unexpected. Overall, contingent capture appears to 
play a crucial role for focused attention towards task relevant features without distraction from 
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task irrelevant features. In contrast, surprise capture directs attention towards stimuli that are 
unknown, however can be relevant.  
The results of Horstmann (2006) show that surprise capture and contingent capture 
phenomenally differ by the very slow nature of the former and the relatively fast nature of the 
latter. The results, however, are less clear with respect to the distinction between surprise capture 
and saliency capture. Note that a surprising singleton is both unexpected and salient. Thus, 
attention capture in the critical trials of Horstmann (2002, 2006) could also be explained by 
saliency capture.  
Time course analyses for effects of salient stimuli that have been interpreted as stimulus 
driven suggest a latency of 60-150ms (Kim & Cave, 1999; Theeuwes, 2010). Thus, if a salient 
stimulus always receives the most attention at the initial stage of visual processing (Theeuwes, 
2010), one would have already expected the emergence of a singleton effect in Gibson and Jiang 
(1998) and following replications as in Horstmann (2002, Experiment 2) and Horstmann (2006, 
Experiment 2 with 0ms SOA) since in these experiments, the color singleton was presented for 
86ms together with the target. Possible interpretations would be that saliency capture was either 
absent in these experiments or only exists of the salient stimulus has been presented before, while 
the latter questions the postulated purely stimulus driven nature of saliency capture. 
Attention capture of an unannounced color singleton can occur because of several reasons. 
First, the unexpected feature of the singleton; second, the unexpected presence of salient stimulus 
per se; third, purely stimulus driven saliency capture that does not depend on unexpectedness. 
On principal, these sources of attentional prioritization are not mutually exclusive. Horstmann 
(2005) disentangled these potential sources within a series of visual search experiments, which 
all had the same critical trial with an unannounced color singleton at the target position that was 
either red among green non-singletons or vice versa. The experiments differed, however, with 
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respect to stimulus features presented in pre-critical trials, and thus which expectations were built 
up in advance of the surprise trial. In Experiment 5, for instance, 50% of pre-critical trials 
contained stimuli that were homogeneously green in color, whereas stimuli within the remaining 
trials were all red. Stimulus color randomly altered between pre-critical trials. Thus, the red or 
green singleton in the critical trial had pure singleton novelty without feature novelty. However, 
results suggested that pure singleton novelty is not sufficient to capture attention. An equivalent 
experiment by Becker and Horstmann (2011), who tested a motion singleton instead of a color 
singleton and still yielded the same result. If all search stimuli in 50% of pre-critical trials rotated, 
a single rotating stimulus in the surprise trial did not capture attention (Experiment 2), whereas 
it captured attention if no stimulus rotated in pre-critical trials (Experiment 1). Thus, feature 
novelty seems to be the more decisive factor for surprise capture in contrast to singleton novelty 
(and stimulus driven saliency). Experiment 3 of Horstmann (2005) presented an irrelevant 
singleton of the orientation dimension already in the pre-critical trials. However, the color 
singleton at the target position still captured attention. Thus, specific expectations appear to be 
built up for different feature dimensions and pure feature novelty in the absence of singleton 
novelty is sufficient to capture attention.    
That a feature can capture attention is in line with models of visual attention that assume 
two stages (Neisser, 1967; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 1994, 2007). Within the first stage, 
basic stimulus features in the color, shape or orientation dimension are processed in parallel and 
“pre-attentively”. However, if observers intentionally search for objects that are constituted by a 
composition of several features, these features must be bound at a second stage of visual 
processing, which needs the serial allocation of attention in space. Thus, the expectation-
discrepancy hypothesis for surprise capture states that features, which can be processed pre-
attentively and in parallel capture attention to the degree that they are discrepant from 
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expectations (Horstmann, 2005, 2015). However, complex stimuli whose unexpected aspect 
refers to a combination of basic features cannot capture attention, although they can bind 
attention after they have been selected (e.g., Võ & Henderson, 2009; Võ, Zwickel, & Schneider, 
2010). 
 
1.5.1  Surprise capture and inattentional blindness 
On principal, the repetition-change paradigm used in surprise capture experiments is 
similar to the paradigm that is used in experiments for inattentional blindness (IB, Mack & Rock, 
1998). However, surprise capture experiments are analyzed with respect to attentional 
prioritization of the unannounced stimulus, whereas experiments on IB seem to center on the 
opposite; that is, how often the stimulus was not attended.  
Models of IB consider saliency and target similarity of the unannounced stimulus, such 
that both reduce IB rates (Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005). Horstmann and Ansorge 
(2016) showed that expectation discrepancy likewise reduces inattentional blindness rates in that 
participants had increased awareness of a stimulus with a novel color that deviated both from the 
target and the previous distractors, while saliency was controlled. The authors proposed to 
integrate expectation discrepancy into the model of inattentional blindness. 
 
1.5.2  Unexpectedness of events 
In the literature of visual attention, there is a variety of opinions about when an event or 
a stimulus is described as unexpected. In the studies discussed so far, only the very first 
presentation of a novel stimulus has been interpreted as unexpected. Testing the effect of a novel 
feature solely with a single surprise trial is a safe method to exclude attentional processes that 
could otherwise be attributed to strategical orienting. Some authors refer to unexpected events 
UNEXPECTED FEATURES CAPTURE ATTENTION AND THE GAZE 16 
even if they are presented in 10-20% of search trials (e.g., Brockmole & Boot, 2009; Folk & 
Remington, 2015). However, even rare events can be completely expected. For instance, rolling 
two sixes in a game of dice is a rare event but it is not unexpected. Accordingly, Horstmann and 
Ansorge (2006) showed that participants reacted faster to target letters that were presented in a 
salient fashion with a probability of only 4%, than when the target letter is shown for the very 
first time in a salient fashion (Horstmann, 2006). Another example yields Experiment 6 of 
Horstmann (2005). The pre-critical trials were divided into two sub-blocks. Overall, there were 
48 pre-critical trials. Within the first 24 trials, all search stimuli had the color that was used in the 
critical trial for the singleton (e.g., red). Within the following 24 pre-critical trials, all search 
stimuli had the color that was not used for the singleton (e.g., green). Even though the first 
presentation of the singleton and the last presentation of the singleton’s color were separated by 
24 pre-critical trials, results suggested no surprise capture in the critical trial.  
Furthermore, in the following text, the words novelty and unexpectedness (or surprise) 
will be used synonymously for the sake of simplicity and increased readability. In most cases, a 
novel event is also surprising (Barto, Mirolli, & Baldassarre, 2013). However, differences 
between novelty and surprise will be discussed at a later point of this work. 
 
1.5.3  Inferring surprise capture from manual response times  
The studies described so far inferred attention capture by the proportion of correct manual 
responses and manual response times. If the surprising singleton cues the target position, there 
will be a higher probability to give a correct response (for limited presentation duration) and 
manual response time will be decreased as the target can be found faster (see also Horstmann & 
Becker, 2011, for more on validity effects). In case of manual response times, authors often infer 
attention capture from the reduction of a set-size effect. Basically, a set-size effect emerges if an 
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increased number of search stimuli results in increased search times for the target. However, 
searches for color singletons, for instance, have been found not to increase with display size, 
which has been taken as evidence that the respective target feature can guide attention pre-
attentively and in parallel (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Search times for targets that are constituted 
by a conjunction of features usually increase with higher numbers of distractors. In this case, 
search and attention allocation is assumed to occur in a serial manner. Although the theoretical 
dichotomy between parallel and serial search has been revised in favor of a continuous transition 
from efficient to inefficient searches (see the Guided Search model, Wolfe, 1994, 1998, 2007), 
reductions of set-size effects in trials where target and singleton position coincided can still 
indicate attentional capture and guidance. However, as outlined before in the cognitive-
evolutionary model of surprise, involuntary orienting of attention towards the surprising event is 
immediately followed by an analysis of the present conditions (Meyer et al., 1997). Accordingly, 
results of Horstmann (2005) suggest that even with small display sizes of four items, a surprising 
singleton at the target position can increase manual response times as compared to pre-critical 
trials without a salient target position. This increase can be attributed to processes that occur after 
the first selection of the surprising singleton (Horstmann, 2005). It is assumed that the same 
increase likewise occurs in larger display sizes. Thus, a reduction of a set-size effect in the critical 
trial is still an indicator for attentional prioritization of the surprising singleton (Horstmann, 
2005). However, a better method to disentangle attentional prioritization into processes that occur 
before, at, and after the first attentional selection of a stimulus is given by the analyses of gaze 
behavior. 
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1.5.4  Surprise capture of the gaze 
Within a fixation, only the central region of about 2° of visual angle can be processed 
with high spatial resolution by our visual system (Strasburger, Rentschler, & Jüttner, 2011). We 
compensate this inhomogeneity with eye movements, such that the area of interest in our 
environment is mapped at the center of our retina. Accordingly, studies have demonstrated that 
covert shifts of attention (within a fixation) precede overt shifts of attention in the form of eye 
movements (Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Kowler, Anderson, Dosher, & Blaser, 1995). Therefore, 
gaze behavior is often interpreted as a proxy for visual attention. 
Horstmann and Herwig (2015) conducted similar experiments like in Horstmann (2005), 
where the target letter in the critical trial was singled out by a distinct color. Here, they also found 
that manual response times tended to increase in the critical trial, even though it should have 
facilitated the search for the target. However, the analysis of gaze data revealed that the first 
fixation of the target marked by a surprising singleton in the critical trial had an average latency 
of about 400ms, which replicates the findings of Horstmann (2006), while it was about 760ms in 
pre-critical trials with homogeneous search displays. Importantly, the authors also found that the 
gaze dwelled relatively long at the surprising singleton after its first selection. It could be shown 
that increased dwell time contributed substantially to the increase of manual response time in the 
critical trial. This result was important to confirm whether the increase in manual response times 
in previous studies of Horstmann and colleagues with small display sizes, was actually due to 
effects that occurred after the surprising stimulus had captured attention. Crucially, Horstmann 
and Herwig (2015) demonstrated that surprising singletons do not only capture covert attention 
but also attract the gaze. 
UNEXPECTED FEATURES CAPTURE ATTENTION AND THE GAZE 19 
2  Present studies of the project 
In the following, three present studies of the project are introduced that tie in with the 
previous research on surprise capture. The first study “Pure colour novelty captures the gaze” 
(Ernst & Horstmann, 2018) established a paradigm to test feature novelty in the absence of 
singleton novelty. Furthermore, the study tested an alternative explanation of surprise capture, 
being that the unannounced presentation of a novel feature induces a breakdown of the previously 
acquired attentional set, causing a reorientation towards perceptual saliency. The second study 
“Unexpectedness increases singleton capture of the gaze” (Ernst & Horstmann, submitted) used 
the paradigm of Ernst and Horstmann (2018) to examine whether expectation discrepancy of a 
novel color feature can be varied by manipulating expectation narrowness prior to the surprise 
trial by distinct mechanisms, and proposes an approach to mathematically model expectations. 
The third study “Novelty competes with saliency for attention” (Ernst, Becker, & Horstmann, 
submitted) deals with the question of how surprise capture can be integrated into prevalent 
models for visual attention deployment. The study tests if surprise capture by an unannounced 
singleton with a novel color is attenuated when the remaining non-singletons likewise have a 
novel color, which would be predicted by priority maps with the additional assumption that 
feature novelty always attracts attention, regardless of saliency. Together, these three studies 
focus on the question of how feature novelty in the absence of singleton novelty affects 
attentional prioritization and gaze behavior, and how these effects are mediated by expectations.  
 
2.1  Pure feature novelty is sufficient to attract attention 
 Several previous studies already suggested that for surprise capture by an unannounced 
singleton, feature novelty is the more decisive factor than singleton novelty. In Horstmann (2005), 
an announced singleton captured attention when it had both singleton novelty and color novelty. 
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However, if the singleton color had already been presented in pre-critical trials, novelty in the 
critical trial only referred to singleton status and no surprise capture could be found. Another 
study used displays that included only two stimuli with equal size and luminance, rendering both 
stimuli comparable with respect to saliency (Horstmann & Ansorge, 2016). Participants had to 
perform a target indication task. In the critical trial, the distractor was replaced by a novel shape. 
Inattentional blindness rates indicated that the novel shape was noticed more frequently when it 
was presented simultaneously with a novel color as compared to when it had a familiar color. 
Similarly, Horstmann and Herwig (2016) presented color homogeneous search displays with 
eight stimuli that were evenly arranged on an imaginary circle. In the critical trial, however, four 
adjacent stimuli had a novel color, whereas the remaining four adjacent colors still had the 
familiar color. Thus, the display in the critical trial was divided into a familiar and a novel side 
with comparable saliency. Gaze data showed that the first fixation after search display’s onset 
went equally often to both sides. From the second to the fifths fixation, however, the novel side 
was fixated more frequently. Horstmann and Herwig (2016) did not explicitly label the effect 
attention “capture”, possibly because the novel side had a chance level of 50% to be fixated and 
attentional prioritization was not pronounced enough to clearly justify an interpretation in the 
sense of attention “capture”.  
Ernst and Horstmann (2018) used a different approach to test the effect of pure feature 
novelty. They presented a search irrelevant singleton along with seven non-singleton stimuli 
already in the pre-critical trials. The surprising event in the critical trial was an unannounced 
color change of the singleton (e.g., from red in pre-critical trials to green in the critical trial). A 
similar design was already used in Horstmann (2005), but yielded negative results for surprise 
capture. It was argued that surprise capture in Horstmann (2005) could have been weaker as 
participants in pre-critical trials were already familiarized with two colors (the singleton and the 
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non-singleton color), such that a third color in the surprise trial resulted in lower expectation 
discrepancy. Furthermore, gaze behavior, which has been recorded in Ernst and Horstmann 
(2018), should yield more sensitive dependent variables than set-size effects of manual response 
times. As an additional measure to find weaker effects, Ernst and Horstmann (2018) also used a 
target detection task where participants had to indicate the presence or the absence of a closed 
ring among several rings with a gap. The critical trial was always a target absent trial, such that 
attentional prioritization of the singleton could be measured that was not confounded with the 
presence of a target.  
Results suggested only a slight attentional bias towards the color singleton in pre-critical 
trials, as indexed by a somewhat higher fixation probability for the singleton than on the 
remaining non-singleton stimuli within the first three fixations after search display’s onset. In the 
critical trial where the singleton was presented with a novel color, a strong gaze capture occurred 
as indicated by an average latency of the first singleton fixation of 425ms (average singleton 
fixation latency was 1070ms in pre-critical trials). Thus, there was a similar time course to 
surprise capture effects of previous studies where both singleton and color novelty were present 
(e.g., Horstmann, 2006; Horstmann & Herwig, 2015). It was mainly the second fixation, which 
targeted the singleton with the novel color. Furthermore, the effect of increased dwell times that 
was observed in Horstmann and Herwig (2015), could also be found in this experiment. However, 
not only did the singleton in the critical trial received longer dwell times. Likewise, non-singleton 
stimuli that still had the familiar color were gazed at longer compared to pre-critical trials. For 
the latter effect, it was proposed that participants could have used a more conservative decision 
criterion. However, that any stimulus in a surprise display is inspected more thoroughly could 
also reflect causal analyses of the surprising event as postulated by the cognitive-evolutionary 
model of surprise (Meyer et al., 1997). 
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Ernst and Horstmann (2018) discussed an alternative explanation of surprise capture, 
being that the surprising presentation of a novel feature causes an error signal, which disrupts 
search on the basis of the previously acquired attentional set (see also Folk & Remington, 2015, 
for a similar account). According to this hypothesis, prioritization of a novel object would not be 
due to an active orienting towards unexpected stimuli. Instead, the breakdown of the previously 
acquired attentional set leads to a reorientation towards perceptual saliency. This hypothesis 
could alternatively explain surprise capture in experiments where the novel feature is presented 
by means of a singleton. On principle, however, the attentional control interruption account and 
the surprise capture account are not mutually exclusive. 
Mind that in Ernst and Horstmann (2018), a singleton was already presented in every pre-
critical trial and the data suggested only a very slight attentional prioritization. Thus, it is likely 
that participants inhibited the singleton color at least to some extend as a strong prioritization of 
the search irrelevant singleton would have rather impeded search performance. In line with this 
hypothesis, suppression effects of singleton distractors have been found to increase with more 
frequent presentations of the singleton, and crucially being strongest if a color singleton distractor 
is presented in all trials from the beginning of the experiment (Müller, Geyer, Zehetleitner, & 
Krummenacher, 2009).  
To test this attentional control interruption account in isolation, Ernst and Horstmann 
(2018) conducted a second experiment, which was similar to Experiment 1. However, instead of 
a singleton color change, they presented a novel background color as a novel non-local feature 
in the critical trial, whereas the singleton color remained the same as in pre-critical trials. It was 
assumed that if a novel singleton color would interrupt attentional control, a novel background 
color of the screen would likewise do so. Even though there was a slight descriptive but non-
significant tendency for a somewhat higher singleton prioritization in the critical trial, results 
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clearly suggested that the attentional control interruption account could not explain the strong 
surprise capture effect of Experiment 1. 
 
2.2  The causal role of expectation discrepancy for surprise capture 
Previous studies on surprise capture argued that attentional prioritization of a novel 
feature is caused by its discrepancy to the expectation that was built up in pre-critical search trials. 
However, this has been more an assumption than directly supported from experimental data. To 
that aim, Ernst and Horstmann (submitted) proposed a mechanism about the emergence of 
expectations towards features to derive predictions about the extent of expectation discrepancy 
of a novel feature. Their model based on schema theory (Mandler, 1984; Rumelhart, 1984; 
Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977) and on a previous study by Schützwohl (1998), showing that schema 
strength covaries with the surprise induced interruption of the current task. More precisely, 
Schützwohl (1998) argued that the strength of a schema depends on the feature constraints of the 
schemas content. Feature constraints, in turn, depend on the variability of the schema’s features 
that have been perceived in the past and on the frequency of previous schema activations. For 
instance, schema strength for TV screens should be relatively high for most individuals. Usually, 
TV screens are flat, rectangular, and their bezels are black or grey. For most people, entering a 
living room and encountering a TV screen with a yellow bezel would induce schema discrepancy. 
However, a child that has only seen three TV screens in her or his life that were either black or 
grey would be less surprised about yellow TV screen as compared to an adult who has already 
seen hundreds of screens that were either black or grey.  
Ernst and Horstmann (submitted) tied in with these hypotheses and proposed to model an 
expectation about a color feature with the formula for the sampling distribution of the arithmetic 
mean. According to this model, an expectation about a color feature becomes narrower with 
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lower variability of the previously perceived color feature and with a higher number of sampling 
occasions. If a novel color is perceived, its expectation discrepancy depends on the narrowness 
of the color expectation. Ernst and Horstmann (submitted) tested these predictions with a similar 
experimental paradigm as used in Ernst and Horstmann (2018). A search irrelevant singleton of 
magenta color was already presented in pre-critical search trials. The authors varied the magenta 
color by altering the proportion of red and blue color between search trials, such that in some 
trials the magenta singleton was more blueish and in other trials more reddish. In the critical trial, 
the singleton was either pure red or blue, counterbalanced between participants. Results showed 
that surprise capture of the gaze was attenuated for a group were the singleton color in pre-critical 
trials varied strongly as compared to a group where it varied slightly. This was taken as evidence 
that strong color variation leads to a broader expectation rendering the presentation of a novel 
color less expectation discrepant.  
To test the effect of sampling occasions, Ernst and Horstmann (submitted) varied the 
number of pre-critical trials between groups. In the first experiment, surprise capture after a 
number of 17 pre-critical trials did not differ from surprise capture after a number of 49 pre-
critical trials. It was suspected that a number of 17 pre-critical trials was too high, such that 
expectation breadth had already reached an asymptote. In a second experiment, the authors tested 
a number of 9 pre-critical trials against a number of 41 pre-critical trials and could show that 
surprise capture was stronger after a higher number of familiarization trials.  
Together, the experiments demonstrated that surprise capture covaries with the number 
of sampling occasions and prior feature variability. Thus, the results supported that the intensity 
of surprise capture can be explained by assuming that expectations towards the surprising feature 
behave like the sampling distribution of the arithmetic mean.  
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2.3  Novelty as a source of activation in a priority map 
To further confirm the role of novelty in guiding visual attention, Ernst et al. (submitted) 
tested predictions derived from a priority map that assumes novelty as an additional source of 
activation. A priority map (e.g., Zelinsky & Bisley, 2015) is described as a neuronal spatial 
representation of the visual view field. The amount of activity at different locations in the priority 
map determines attentional prioritization, in that attention shifts follow the gradient of activation. 
Essentially, sources of activation in a priority map are categorized into bottom-up factors such as 
saliency, and top-down factors like the perceived target-distractor similarity (e.g., Moran, 
Zehetleitner, Müller, & Usher, 2013; Wolfe, 1994, 2007). Several sources of activity can 
cumulate to a strong peak of activity. However, empirical data show that indicators of attention 
(e.g., eye movements or search slopes) do not always perfectly reproduce attention shifts as 
predicted from the priority map. Therefore, it is assumed that the priority map is affected by 
random noise (Koch, Müller, Zehetleitner, 2013; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989; Zehetleitner, 
Koch, Goschy, & Müller, 2013). 
Ernst et al. (submitted) designed an experiment to test predictions that were based on the 
assumption that novelty contributes to activity in a priority map– both for high-salient and low-
salient stimuli. In pre-critical trials, two groups of participants were familiarized with color 
homogeneous search displays (e.g., red) that were similar to Ernst and Horstmann (2018), but 
without a singleton. As participants had to search for a specific shape (a closed ring among rings 
with a gap) in color homogeneous search displays, there was no need for participants to either 
prioritize or inhibit a specific color. In the critical trial, both groups were presented 
unannouncedly with a singleton of a novel color (e.g., green). Both groups differed, however, 
with respect to the color of the remaining non-singleton stimuli. In one group (“one-new”), the 
singleton was the only stimulus with a novel color (e.g., a green singleton among red non-
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singletons). In the other group (“all-new”), the non-singletons likewise had a novel color (e.g., a 
green singleton among blue non-singletons). All colors were matched for physical luminance. 
As the pre-critical trials did not induce the need for an attentional set towards a specific 
color and the singletons in the critical trial were unexpected, color prioritization of the novel 
colors in the surprise trial due to top-down factors is unlikely. Thus, attentional prioritization 
should only be driven by saliency and novelty. Given that top-down prioritization for a specific 
color can be neglected, saliency based models (e.g., Itti & Koch, 2000, 2001; Theeuwes, 2010) 
seem to adequately predict attentional prioritization in the critical trial. They would predict that 
early attention is always directed towards the singleton as it is the most salient item in the display. 
Crucially, saliency based models would predict no difference between the one-new and the all-
new group. Priority maps that consider both saliency and novelty as a source for activation would 
likewise predict that early attention should be strongly directed towards the singleton, since its 
position in the priority map receives activity both because of saliency and novelty. However, the 
difference in activation between the singleton location and the non-singleton locations would be 
smaller in the all-new group as the non-singleton locations likewise receive activation because 
of color novelty. Thus, as the priority map is assumed to be noisy, it predicts a lower probability 
for early attention on the singleton in the all-new group than on the singleton in the one-new 
group. 
Ernst et al. (submitted) inferred early attentional prioritization from gaze behavior. More 
precisely, to test their hypothesis, they focused on the destinations of the first three fixations after 
search display’s onset in the critical trial and analyzed whether a fixation targeted the singleton 
or a non-singleton. Due to the binary nature of this dependent variable (stimulus fixated vs. 
stimulus not fixated), the authors used Generalized Estimation Equations (GEE, Liang & Zeger, 
1986). GEEs allow for the implementation of a logit link function, which is commonly used to 
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model binary dependent variables. Furthermore, they control for correlated data due to repeated 
measurements in order to prevent underestimation of standard errors. Overall, results showed 
that a high number of early fixations targeted the singleton. However, within the first two 
fixations, the singleton was fixated less often in the all-new group than in the one-new group. 
Accordingly, results also showed that non-singletons were targeted more often in the all-new 
group than in the one-new group within the first three fixations. Thus, the analyses confirmed the 
prediction that novelty always increases attentional prioritization, regardless of saliency. Overall, 
the result pattern is consistent with commonly used noisy priority maps and the additional 
assumption of novelty as a source of activation (e.g., Moran et al., 2013; Wolfe, 1994, 2007; see 
also Zehetleitner et al., 2013). 
Additional analyses revealed that gaze dwell times were prolonged on any stimulus type 
in the critical trial of both groups. However, dwell times were shorter on the singleton in the all-
new group than in the one-new group, possibly because of a faster disengagement that was driven 
by higher attentional prioritization of non-singletons with a novel color.  
Furthermore, the proportion of revisits was increased on the singletons in the critical trial 
of both groups. The increase of revisits on non-singletons was stronger in the all-new group than 
in the one-new group, which shows that revisits increase specifically for non-salient stimuli with 
novel features. Together, increased dwell times could be driven by interference due to causal 
searches for the surprising event and increased revisits could reflect verification of expectation 
discrepancy in that participants compare several stimulus types with different colors. As 
mentioned before, causal search and verification of expectation discrepancy are postulated in the 
cognitive-evolutionary model of surprise (Meyer et al., 1997).  
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4  Discussion 
All three studies of the project answered several questions with respect to attentional 
prioritization of stimuli with novel features. However, there are further interesting questions that 
could not yet be answered, and other questions raised because of the new insights from these 
studies. Furthermore, there are still alternative explanations, which shall likewise be addressed 
in the present work. 
 
4.1  Attention capture in difficult search paradigms 
As mentioned in the introduction, research on surprise capture often centers on the 
distinction between surprise capture and saliency capture (Gibson & Jiang, 1998; Horstmann, 
2002, 2005, 2006). Both saliency capture (Itti & Koch, 2011; Theewues, 2010) and surprise 
capture predict attentional prioritization of an unannounced singleton. However, pre-cueing 
paradigms revealed that the effect of the first unannounced presentation of a singleton emerges 
at 400ms (Horstmann, 2006), whereas effects due to expected singleton distractors that were 
attributed to saliency capture occurred with a latency smaller than 150ms (Kim & Cave, 1999; 
Theeuwes, Atchley, & Kramer, 2000). 
Previous research on surprise capture did not address the point that pre-cueing 
experiments for surprise capture and saliency capture often differ with respect to target-distractor 
similarity. While surprise capture studies with pre-cueing paradigms included a letter search 
(Horstmann, 2002, 2006), participants in saliency capture experiments usually search for a 
relatively salient target singleton (e.g., Kim & Cave, 1999; Theeuwes et al., 2000). 
According to Theeuwes (2004, 2010), saliency capture can hardly be elicited in a difficult 
search because of a smaller attentional window to allow for better discrimination between target 
and distractors, and several studies supported this hypothesis (Lu & Han, 2009; Proulx & Egeth, 
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2006; but see also Barras & Kerzel, 2017a, 2017b). It is assumed that participants in difficult 
searches direct and focus attention on a specific stimulus location at the beginning of the search 
trial. This prevents saliency capture as parallel processing is only possible within the attentional 
window (see also Belopolsky, Zwaan, Theeuwes, & Kramer, 2007).  
If there is actually a smaller attentional window at the beginning of a difficult search trial 
that does not cover all stimulus positions, the attentional window account also yields a possible 
alternative explanation for the emergence of a singleton effect not before 400ms in Horstmann 
(2006). Given that the attentional window does not remain completely stable at one location at 
the pre-display, but varies its position to some extent randomly, there is a higher probability that 
the singleton in the surprise trial enters the attentional window accidentally with more time that 
elapses before the presentation of the search stimuli. 
In most eye tracking studies on surprise capture, target-distractor similarity is increased 
such that participants are expected to fixate every stimulus (e.g., Ernst & Horstmann, 2018; 
Horstmann et al., 2016). Those studies suggest that it is mainly the second saccade that targets 
the surprising singleton. On the one hand, one could argue that surprise capture at the second 
fixation is too late to call the effect “surprise capture”, as this is relatively slow compared to 
saliency capture and contingent capture, which are usually measured at the first fixation (e.g., 
Geyer, Müller, & Krummenacher, 2008; Theeuwes, De Vries, & Godijn, 2003; Weichselbaum & 
Ansorge, 2018; van Zoest, Donk, & Theeuwes, 2004). Thus, the late effect could also be 
interpreted as an indicator of rather voluntary attention orienting. One the other hand, however, 
one could also argue that involuntary capture can even be elicited at a later fixation. Similar to 
the (covert) attentional window account for surprise capture, it is possible that a smaller 
functional view field (Hulleman & Olivers, 2017) attenuates gaze capture by a novel singleton 
such that it mainly occurs at the second fixation. This hypothesis would be in line with 
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experiments showing that also saliency effects are not restricted to the first fixation (de Vries, 
van der Stigchel, & Hooge, 2018; see also Martin & Becker, 2018).  
In the case of saliency capture, a premise for this hypothesis is that the functional view 
field is still large enough, such that the singleton is sufficiently salient to induce capture. For 
unexpected stimuli, however, previous studies suggest that singleton status is not necessary to 
attract the gaze (Ernst et al., submitted; Horstmann & Ansorge, 2016; Horstmann & Herwig, 
2016). As a consequence, the reduction of gaze capture due to reduced saliency with smaller 
functional view fields should be less dramatic for surprise capture than for saliency capture. In 
line with this hypothesis, gaze capture by surprising singletons can still reliably be demonstrated 
in studies with difficult searches (e.g. Ernst & Horstmann, 2018; Horstmann et al., 2016; 
Horstmann & Herwig, 2015); although somewhat delayed, possibly because of a small functional 
view field. 
To conclude, the relatively late emergence of the surprise capture effect as compared to 
the saliency capture effect can be explained alternatively by higher search difficulty in previous 
surprise capture experiments, given that a smaller attentional window or functional view field 
attenuates surprise capture to some extent. This alternative explanation could be partly supported 
by a study on surprise capture where participants searched for a salient shape singleton (Retell, 
Venini, & Becker, 2015, Experiment 2). According to Hulleman and Olivers (2017) lower target-
distractor similarity should result in a larger functional view field. The first presentation of an 
additional color singleton in the surprise trial of Retell et al. (2015) captured 46% of first fixations 
(in a display containing eight stimuli), which appears to be an earlier effect than in surprise 
capture studies with difficult searches. However, since in Retell et al. (2015) a singleton was 
already presented in pre-critical trials, early capture by the surprising distractor singleton can also 
be interpreted as the result of singleton detection mode (Bacon & Egeth, 1994). 
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Overall, the latency of a capture effect might be no reasonable criterion for whether an 
effect should be interpreted as attention capture or not as the latency can be affected by search 
difficulty. To distinguish saliency capture and surprise capture, another dependent yields more 
consistent support for different forms of capture: A surprising singleton usually receives 
prolonged dwell times on its first fixation as compared to expected singletons (e.g., Ernst & 
Horstmann, 2018; submitted; Ernst et al., submitted; Horstmann et al., 2016; Horstmann & 
Herwig, 2015). This effect has not been reported for gaze capture that was assumed to be stimulus 
driven (Theeuwes, De Vries, & Godijn, 2003). According to Theeuwes (2010), attention is only 
very shortly engaged by salient stimuli and quickly disengaged towards goal relevant stimuli. 
Thus, prolonged dwell times seem to be specific for surprise capture.  
 
4.2  Pure singleton novelty 
In the introduction, it was mentioned that Horstmann (2005, Experiment 4-6) and Becker 
and Horstmann (2011, Experiment 2) did not find an effect of an unannounced singleton if 
participants were already familiarized with the singleton’s feature in pre-critical trials. As the 
pre-critical trials did not include a salient stimulus, the presence of a salient stimulus was the 
only novel aspect of the critical trial. Horstmann (2005) and Becker and Horstmann (2011) tested 
this condition to distinguish between several accounts for attention capture of an unannounced 
singleton. The expectation discrepancy account refers to feature novelty and would predict no 
attention capture as participants were already familiarized with the singleton’s feature in pre-
critical trials. However, the saliency capture account (Theeuwes, 1991, 1992) would predict that 
initial attention is always biased by saliency, regardless of expectation discrepancy and goal 
specific feature prioritization (if present). Yet, results showed no attentional prioritization of the 
unannounced singleton in the critical trial, which was taken as support that feature novelty is the 
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dominant factor for surprise capture, whereas the role of both singleton novelty and saliency per 
se is neglectable in such a surprise condition (Becker & Horstmann, 2011; Horstmann, 2005).  
In Ernst et al. (submitted) it was predicted that within the all-new condition, the singleton 
is highly prioritized (although to a lesser extend as compared to the one-new condition). It was 
assumed that in a priority map, the singleton location receives activation both from novelty and 
saliency, whereas the remaining positions only receive activity due to novelty. However, this 
assumption appears not to be in accordance with results from Horstmann (2005) and Becker and 
Horstmann (2011, Experiment 2).  
As mentioned before, a recent eye tracking study demonstrated that pure singleton 
novelty in a surprise trial can indeed capture the gaze. Horstmann et al. (2016) presented pre-
critical search trials where all of eight search stimuli had a grey color. In the critical trial, seven 
stimuli had a novel color (e.g., green), whereas a single stimulus still had the old grey color as in 
pre-critical trials (“one-old”). Thus, the display of the surprise trial contained a novel color 
singleton that had no color feature novelty. Gaze data like singleton fixation latencies and the 
proportion of singleton fixations within the first three fixations after search display’s onset 
showed a substantial prioritization of the novel singleton within this group. How can this 
divergence between the results of Horstmann (2005) and Becker and Horstmann (2011) on the 
one hand, and Horstmann et al. (2016) on the other hand be explained? Crucially, the studies that 
could not support prioritization of pure singleton novelty inferred attention capture from 
reductions in set-size effects of manual response times. Horstmann (2005) tested a group with 
four and a group with twelve search stimuli. In line with an inefficient search, search times in 
pre-critical trials were longer in the group with a larger set-size  (Wolfe, 1998). Horstmann (2005) 
argued that if the surprising singleton is located at the target position and captures attention, the 
set-size effect should be reduced. He furthermore pointed out that in both set-size conditions, 
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manual response could actually increase if surprise capture is elicited because of effects that 
occur after attention capture and interrupt ongoing behavior as postulated by the cognitive-
evolutionary model of surprise (Meyer et al., 1997). It was assumed that effects after the first 
selection of the unannounced singleton would occur in equal measure in both set-size conditions. 
Thus, a reduction of the set-size effect in the critical trial can still be interpreted as evidence for 
surprise capture. 
Results of Horstmann et al. (2016) showed that the singleton was fixated more frequently 
within the first two fixations after search display’s onset if it had both feature and singleton 
novelty as compared to when it had only singleton novelty. This result can be explained by 
assuming that several sources of novelty can add up to an increased prioritization (Ernst & 
Horstmann, 2018). Following this argument, within the Experiments 4-6 of Horstmann (2005) 
and Experiment 2 of Becker and Horstman (2011), attention capture could actually have been 
present, although to a lesser extent. Possibly, set-size effects as the dependent variable were not 
sensitive enough to detect a weaker effect of pure singleton novelty, such that the reduction of 
the set-size effect could not be revealed by a significant interaction between set-size (4 vs. 12) 
and trial type (pre-critical vs. critical). Furthermore, support for a neglectable effect of pure 
singleton novelty should be interpreted with caution in Horstmann (2005) and Becker and 
Horstmann (2011), as it would rely on the interpretation of the non-significance of the interaction, 
which in general is no reliable support for the absence of an effect (Anderson, Burnham, & 
Thompson, 2000). 
Another reason why set-size effects should be interpreted with caution in surprise 
conditions refers to the assumption that the interruption of ongoing behavior does not differ 
between small and large display sizes. Results from eye tracking data of the present project 
suggest that any stimulus in a surprise trial receives prolonged gaze dwell times and increased 
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revisits (Ernst & Horstmann, 2016; Ernst et al., submitted). This could result in a stronger 
increase of manual response times in a display with a high number of stimuli than in a display 
with a low number of stimuli. On the one hand, a smaller number of stimuli reduces the potential 
for stimuli being revisited. On the other hand, the increase in manual response time is attenuated 
in a display where only four stimuli can receive longer dwell times as compared to a display with 
twelve stimuli. Accordingly, studies demonstrated that dwelling and revisiting of distractors have 
a substantial impact on manual response times in difficult searches (Horstmann, Becker, & Ernst, 
2017; Horstmann, Herwig, & Becker, 2016). Nevertheless, specific experiments are necessary to 
test whether this reasoning is true and whether these effects could have biased set-size effects of 
previous surprise studies in a relevant manner. 
 
4.3  Adaptiveness of surprise capture 
It has been argued that surprise capture is an important complement to contingent capture 
(Horstmann, 2005). Contingent capture is crucial to quickly focus on features that match with 
current goals while it helps to ignore irrelevant features. However, a system that only attends to 
goal relevant stimuli would possibly fail to notice relevant but unexpected information in a 
situation. In contrast to contingent capture, surprise capture can direct attention to highly 
informative stimuli, which may signal the need for adjustment of current goals and behavior. 
However, one premise for surprise capture is that unexpectedness refers to a simple 
feature that is pre-attentively available such as color or orientation (see also Treisman & Gelade, 
1980). Thus, the expectation discrepancy hypothesis for visual attention would predict no 
surprise capture if the unexpected aspect of an object is constituted by a combination of features 
(Horstmann, 2005). Accordingly, it was demonstrated that objects whose unexpectedness refers 
to semantical (e.g., a printer in a kitchen) or syntactical properties (e.g., a floating toaster) do not 
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draw attention spatially (however, they bind attention and the gaze when they are encountered 
by coincidence, Võ & Henderson, 2009; see also Võ et al., 2010). 
Considering this premise and the fast nature of contingent capture, it is difficult to find 
realistic examples for the importance of surprise capture outside the laboratory. For instance, a 
tiger that suddenly jumps out of a bush should be quickly attended to. One could argue that the 
(fast) motion feature of the tiger is salient and can guide attention pre-attentively. Therefore, a 
premise for surprise capture is given. However, tigers usually jump out of bushes within their 
natural habitats. Even though being attacked is possibly a rare event, most observers will still 
fear and anticipate attacks when they are in regions where predators live. Thus, it is more likely 
that observers have an attentional set for features that signal predators and attacks. If so, observers 
would benefit from the faster attention orienting of the contingent capture mechanism (cf. 
Horstmann, 2006; Horstmann & Ansorge, 2006). 
A better example for surprise capture would be a white polar bear that wanders around in 
the German woodlands. Relatively big and white objects are not expected by observers in such a 
region (with the exception of cars near the road) and would probably elicit surprise capture as 
the white color has the potential to preattentively guide visual attention (Treisman & Gelade, 
1980). Crucially, a polar bear in a German woodland would be highly informative and observers 
would analyze the event with respect to its causes and relevance for current actions (Meyer et al., 
1997). Accordingly, neurophysiological studies suggest a hard-wired “novelty bonus” (Kakade 
& Dayan, 2002), which enhances dopamine signals in case a novel stimulus has been encountered 
and thus engages to explore the situation (Knutson & Cooper, 2006; Krebs, Schott, Schütze, & 
Düzel, 2009; Schultz, 1998). 
That being said, automatic orienting towards unexpected stimuli, followed by their closer 
examination seems to be more adaptive in that it engages learning behavior and to constantly 
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update the individual world model of the observer (Itti & Baldi, 2009). Surprise capture would 
be less effective (than contingent capture, for instance) in situations where a fast reaction is 
decisive. 
 
4.4  Novelty vs. surprise 
In the present work, the words surprise (or unexpectedness) and novelty have been used 
synonymously. A precondition for surprise is the presence of an expectation or a belief about a 
specific feature, for instance. The expectation can vary with respect to its certainty; that is, the 
expectation can be either narrow or broad (Ernst & Horstmann, submitted). If a perceived feature 
is unlikely under a given certainty of the feature’s expectation, it elicits surprise. With larger 
expectation discrepancy, there will be also a larger difference between the expectations prior and 
posterior to the surprising event (Itti & Baldi, 2009). 
Novelty tends to center more on the question whether something has been encountered 
before (Barto et al., 2013). For instance, different forms of novelty depend on the time something 
has not been perceived before (short-term novelty vs. long-term novelty vs. complete novelty). 
According to Barto et al. (2013), novelty is detected by searching through memory contents, 
whereas detection of expectation discrepancy does not involve memory. On the one hand, novelty 
is not necessary for expectation discrepancy as the latter can also occur if a known object occurs 
within an unexpected context (e.g., a polar bear in a German woodland). On the other hand, Barto 
et al. (2013) state that a novel stimulus possibly always elicits surprise as a novel item could 
never be predicted. 
With respect to Ernst and Horstmann (2018) and Ernst et al. (submitted), the stimuli with 
deviant colors in the surprise trial should have been unexpected as in pre-critical trials, 
participants were familiarized with different colors, which they anticipated for the following 
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trials. However, it is unlikely that the participants have never seen similar colors to those of the 
surprising stimuli before. Thus, for most participants, the surprising colors would not have been 
detected as completely novel but rather as short-term or long-term novel (see also Berlyne, 1960). 
 
4.5  Selection history  
For some factors of attentional prioritization, it is debated whether they should be 
ascribed to the bottom-up or to the top-down category. Following Theeuwes (2010), attention 
capture is bottom up driven if it cannot be completely suppressed in a top-down fashion. 
According to this criterion, phenomena like inter-trial priming (Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994) 
and reward learning (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006) would be categorized as stimulus driven. 
Inter-trial priming is the increased prioritization of objects in trial N that have the same feature 
as the target in trial N-1 (Pinto, Olivers, & Theeuwes, 2005). This effect can even occur if 
participants know in advance what the target feature will be in trial N (Theeuwes & Van der Burg, 
2011). Similarly, studies suggest that prioritization of a stimulus that was previously associated 
with reward cannot be completely suppressed (e.g., Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011). 
However, as attentional prioritization due to previously selected stimuli depends on 
previous experience, it cannot be purely stimulus driven. Therefore, the factor of selection history 
has been proposed as a distinct source of activity in priority maps (Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 
2012). Expectations discrepancy likewise fits into the category of selection history. In contrast to 
reward learning and inter-trial priming, however, attentional prioritization due to expectation 
discrepancy occurs without prior exposure of the capturing feature (Ernst & Horstmann, 
submitted). Reward learning and inter-trial priming can still be interpreted in the sense of a 
lingering top-down prioritization, whereas the novel feature that induces surprise capture has 
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never been part of the attentional set before (Horstmann & Herwig, 2016). Nevertheless, surprise 
capture is still not purely stimulus driven as it depends on the observer’s expectation. 
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5  Take home message of the three studies 
To sum up, the three studies of the present project demonstrate that color novelty alone is 
sufficient to attract attention (Ernst & Horstman, 2018, submitted; Ernst et al., submitted). 
Furthermore, expectation discrepancy has been supported as the driving factor for surprise 
capture in that expectations become narrower with decreased feature variability and a higher 
number of sampling occasions of the perceived feature (Ernst & Horstmann, submitted). It was 
also shown that expectation discrepancy competes with saliency for attention, which fits into the 
theoretical framework of priority maps that are commonly used to predict attention allocation 
and gaze shifts (Ernst et al., submitted). 
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Pure colour novelty captures the gaze
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ABSTRACT
While it is common wisdom that a salient visual event draws attention, experimental research
provided mixed support for this hypothesis. The present experiment seeks evidence that a
singleton draws attention to the degree that its feature is novel or unexpected. Two visual
search experiments were conducted where an irrelevant colour singleton is presented on each
pre-critical trial to familiarize participants with the presence of the singleton. In the critical trial of
Experiment 1, the singleton was presented in a novel colour without prior announcement. The
singleton was gazed at significantly earlier and longer in the critical trial, as compared to pre-
critical trials. This result is consistent with predictions from the expectancy discrepancy
hypothesis that colour novelty is sufficient to capture attention. Experiment 2 tested the
alternative explanation that a surprising event mainly leads to a breakdown of the previously
acquired attentional set, which in turn causes a reorientation towards perceptual salience. An
unannounced change of the background colour in the critical trial while the singleton colour
remained unchanged did not induce an attentional capture by the singleton like in Experiment
1. This result further confirms that surprising events capture attention in a spatial manner.
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It is common wisdom that a salient visual stimulus
attracts attention even if the stimulus does not
relate to the ongoing task: a bright light in the dark,
a colourful flower on the lawn, a dog quickly
approaching. In experimental research, however, this
proposition has received mixed support. One group
of researchers proposed that a salient event quickly
draws attention even against intention (“saliency
capture”, e.g., Theeuwes, 2010), while another group
argued that apparent evidence for saliency capture
is an effect, or side effect, of intentional processing
(“contingent capture”, e.g., Folk, Remington, &
Johnston, 1992).
The key evidence for the saliency capture hypothesis
comes from the additional singleton paradigm
(Simons, 2000) where a colour singleton – a single per-
ceptually salient object in the colour domain such as a
red object among green objects – is presented as a
distractor, while participants are searching for a
shape singleton – a single salient object in the shape
domain such as a circle among diamonds. Under
these conditions, attention is biased towards the irre-
levant colour singleton even though participants
know perfectly that the colour singleton is never the
target, and that selecting it impedes task performance
(for an overview see Theeuwes, 2010; for a critical view
see Ansorge, Horstmann, & Scharlau, 2010). This effect
is particularly strong when the singleton feature
changes from trial to trial (Becker, 2010; Müller,
Heller, & Ziegler, 1995; Theeuwes, de Vries, & Godijn,
2003).
Evidence for the contingent capture hypothesis –
stating that stimuli are biased for selection if and
only if they share features with the searched-for
target – mainly comes from the cueing paradigm,
where cues near the possible target positions are pre-
sented 150 ms before the target display (Folk et al.,
1992). Here, singletons (e.g., a red cue) sharing the
defining feature of the target (e.g., a red letter) do
capture attention, while singletons that are dissimilar
to the target (e.g., a single onset) do not. Hence, selec-
tion is contingent on the task of the participant and is
thus dependent on intention.
One reason for some impasse in the controversy is
that researchers present salient stimuli recurrently
within an experimental session, usually in every trial.
One consequence of this practice might be that
salient events become part of the intentional
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strategies used by the participants. If so, it is unclear
which of a number of possible strategies are actually
used. Participants might for instance inhibit a task-irre-
levant salient event, thereby reducing the chance of
the researcher to find evidence for attention capture.
Alternatively, they might also use the salient stimulus
in some way to accomplish their task, even though in
some cases the fully rational homo economicus might
not do so. Among the strategies discussed in the lit-
erature on attention capture is singleton-detection
mode (Bacon & Egeth, 1994), contingent capture by
display-wide features (Gibson & Kelsey, 1998), or prob-
ability matching (Remington, Johnston, & Yantis,
1992). The plausibility that one of these strategies is
applied depends on the exact task requirements;
however, it is often difficult to exclude with certainty
any of these strategies in a given task. Another conse-
quence of repeated presentations is that the mechan-
ism that biases attention may be habituated, similarly
as the orienting response is strong for a novel object,
but quickly habituates to repeated presentations,
given that the object is not followed by a reinforcer
(Retell, Venini, & Becker, 2015; Sokolov, 1960). Relat-
edly, Horstmann and colleagues (e.g., Horstmann,
2015; Horstmann & Ansorge, 2016) propose that a
novel feature captures attention to the degree that it
is expectancy discrepant, whereas the same feature
does not capture attention when it is familiar.
There is indeed evidence that attention is reliably
drawn to a novel salient object on its unannounced
first “surprise” presentation, while the response to
the repetitions of that object is governed by its useful-
ness for the task (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, Gilbert, &
Marois, 2010; Becker & Horstmann, 2011; Foerster,
2016; Horstmann, 2002, 2005, 2006; Horstmann &
Ansorge, 2016; Horstmann & Becker, 2008, 2011;
Horstmann & Herwig, 2015, 2016; for a review see
Horstmann, 2015). Such an attentional response
towards a novel feature on its unannounced first pres-
entation will be dubbed surprise capture henceforth.
Surprise capture is examined often in a three-part
experiment, comprising the pre-critical trials, the criti-
cal trial, and the post-critical trials. The pre-critical trials
familiarize participants with stimuli containing a par-
ticular set of features. In the critical trial, a familiar
feature is replaced for the first time with a novel
feature without prior announcement. The post-critical
trials test the novel feature’s intentional processing
when it is repeatedly presented. Results from a
diversity of attention paradigms including classical
visual search (Horstmann, 2002, 2005), detection
(Horstmann, 2002, 2006), cueing (Horstmann &
Becker, 2011), and eye-tracking (Horstmann &
Herwig, 2015, 2016; Horstmann, Becker, & Ernst,
2016) have shown that a novel salient object strongly
attracts attention on its unannounced first
presentation.
The novel salient object has two features: saliency
and novelty. Therefore, surprise capture may be
explained in two ways. The traditional saliency
capture explanation would link this result to the sal-
iency of the novel colour. On this account, saliency
caused an attentional shift, while novelty is not
necessarily an important feature.
The second explanation relates the result to
novelty. On the expectation-discrepancy account, sur-
prise capture is not a direct function of saliency per se,
but rather of the discrepancy between an expectation
built up during the pre-critical trials and the presen-
tation of the novel colour singleton in the critical
trial (e.g., Horstmann, 2015). Similarly, on an orienting
response account, a novel feature will capture atten-
tion to the degree that there is no neuronal model
accounting for that feature, which will, however, even-
tually build up with repeated presentations of the
(previously novel) feature (Retell et al., 2015). We will
not properly distinguish between expectation discre-
pancy and novelty here, as the subtle differences
between these two concepts are not relevant to the
present research.
Several lines of evidence support the expectation
discrepancy explanation for attention to a novel sin-
gleton. First, the time course of surprise capture
differs from the time course proposed for saliency
capture. While saliency capture has been portrayed
to be effective as early as 60–150 ms after stimulus
onset (Kim & Cave, 1999; Theeuwes, 2010), surprise
capture has a later average latency of about 400 ms,
as revealed by a number of paradigms such as effi-
ciency gains with short presentations (Horstmann,
2006; Horstmann & Becker, 2008) and eye-tracking
during a visual search task (Horstmann & Herwig,
2015). Second, experiments showed that a surprise
singleton does not strongly attract attention after a
feature-familiarizing procedure. When the pre-critical
trials presented all-red and all-green displays in the
pre-critical trials, a red colour singleton among green
distractors on its unannounced first presentation did
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not capture attention (Horstmann, 2005). Third, there
is evidence that a discrepant feature draws attention
even though it is not a singleton, either because half
of the stimuli in a multi-element display have the dis-
crepant feature (Horstmann & Herwig, 2016), or
because only two stimuli are presented, rendering
none (or both) of them a singleton (Horstmann &
Ansorge, 2016).
Setting traditional saliency capture accounts aside
and focusing on expectation discrepancy, one might
observe that the critical stimulus in many experiments
on surprise capture had actually two novel features:
colour novelty and singleton novelty. Colour novelty
refers to the fact that the colour has not been pre-
sented before during the experiment. Singleton
novelty refers to the fact that no perceptually salient
singleton had been presented before.
As already reported, colour-familiarizing exper-
iments (Horstmann, 2005) suggested that singleton
novelty (in the absence of colour novelty) does not
strongly capture attention. But what about the comp-
lementary test on whether colour novelty alone is suf-
ficient to drive surprise capture? In a decisive
experiment, a task irrelevant colour singleton (say
red among grey) is presented in every pre-critical
trial, and the singleton is presented with a novel
colour (say green) in the critical trial. In theory, this sin-
gleton-familiarization procedure would render the
presence of a singleton unsurprising (expectancy con-
gruent), leaving alone the novel colour expectancy
discrepant.
Two previous experiments (Horstmann, 2005) used
such a design but obtained negative results. While a
stimulus that was both colour-novel and singleton-
novel at the position of the target led to a strong
reduction of the set size effect in visual search for a
conjunction target, a stimulus that was colour-novel
but not singleton-novel did not influence search effi-
ciency in that experiments.
One obvious interpretation of this result is that
colour novelty alone is insufficient to bias attention.
The implication would be that neither colour novelty
nor singleton novelty alone induces surprise capture,
which is only observed when both novelty types
combine. Recently, however, Horstmann and Herwig
(2016) tested colour novelty in the absence of visual
saliency. Instead of presenting a single stimulus with
a novel colour in the critical trial, they presented half
of the search stimuli with a novel colour, such that
none of them was singled out by saliency. Yet the
novel colour was prioritized for gaze position in the
second and third fixation (Experiment 1) or second–
fifth fixation (Experiment 2). Horstmann and Ansorge
(2016) additionally showed that colour novelty,
without singleton novelty, affected attention, as indi-
cated by inattentional blindness rates in a two-item
display.
We consider two possible causes for the diver-
gence of results between the studies of Horstmann
(2005) on the one hand, and Horstmann and
Herwig (2016) and Horstmann and Ansorge (2016)
on the other hand: (a) the effects are subtle when
testing feature novelty or singleton novelty alone,
and (b) the dependent measures to infer attention
were more sensitive.
There are at least two reasons why the attentional
effects could have been subtle in Horstmann (2005).
First, it is plausible that several sources of novelty
add up for a strong attentional bias to be established
(see Horstmann et al., 2016). Assuming that novelty is
accumulated over different features and dimensions,
the attentional bias would be higher with more discre-
pant features. Second, the expectancy discrepancy
should be highest with low variation of features in
the pre-critical trials (e.g., only one colour), and
decrease when more features (e.g., two or more
colours) are presented (see Schützwohl, 1998). Accord-
ing to Schützwohl, and probably also consistent with
common sense, the expectation discrepancy or
novelty of a colour drops monotonically with the
number of colours presented during the expectation
induction phase.
As to the sensitivity of the task, the singleton-fam-
iliarization experiments in Horstmann (2005)
implemented a between-subjects manipulation of
set size: two groups of subjects saw a search array of
four items or 12 items, respectively. Attention
capture is revealed in this design when the set-size
effect in the pre-critical trials (where no cue to the
target is present and the target can be found only
through inefficient search) is eliminated in the critical
trial (where the novel colour at the target position is
presented for the first time). The between-subjects
manipulation of set size was chosen (instead of a
within-subject manipulation) on the assumption that
the presentation of a novel colour is strongly expect-
ancy discrepant only once. One possible problem
with this design is that the novelty-triggered
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processes could affect search times only if they are
faster than the search processes. In a target present
trial of an inefficient visual search task, however,
search processes are not infinitely long but finish on
average after half of the display items have been
inspected (see also Horstmann, Becker, & Ernst,
2017). If the novelty-triggered process finishes later,
search efficiency is not affected, even if there was a
biasing of attention.
If this reasoning is correct then colour novelty in the
absence of singleton novelty still may bias attention
after a singleton-familiarization procedure, although
possibly to a lesser extent. In addition, if a more sensi-
tive measure is chosen than the reduction of set-size
effects, this effect could be revealed.
The present experiments
The present design used eye tracking to directly
measure gaze fixations, rather than a set-size variation
to indirectly measure covert or overt attentional
deployment. Several studies recently demonstrated
that surprise capture is strongly revealed in an eye
tracking paradigm (Horstmann et al., 2016; Horstmann
& Herwig, 2015, 2016). Moreover, eye tracking can dis-
sociate spatial object selection (gaze shifts) from more
temporal aspects of attention (gaze duration). Horst-
mann and Herwig (2015) found that a novel colour sin-
gleton at the target position both attracts attention to
its position (which would in isolation reduce manual
response times) and binds attention to the object
with the novel feature (which would in isolation
increase manual response times). Thus, as attraction
and binding of attention have opposing effects on
manual response times in a visual search task, eye
tracking is probably more sensitive to reveal surprise
capture.
In order to further increase the sensitivity of our
dependent variables, the present experiment
implemented a target detection task rather than a
target discrimination task. The target was presented
on half of the trials, and the participants had to
respond with a presence versus absence judgment.
A singleton was presented on each trial, and its pos-
ition was stochastically independent from the target
position, if a target was present. The critical trial, in
which the singleton had a novel colour, was always
a target absent (blank) trial. Thus, the potency of the
novel singleton to attract attention can be observed
in isolation, independently from possible attentional
effects of the target.
Experiment 1 is our first test of the proposition that
a novel (expectancy discrepant) colour captures atten-
tion following a colour singleton-familiarization pro-
cedure. Experiment 2 tests a specific alternative to
the expectation discrepancy account, being that sur-
prise itself does not bias spatial attention, but only
interrupts attentional control in a non-spatial
manner, which in turn causes the reorientation
towards perceptual salience.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 tested whether feature novelty alone, in
the absence of singleton novelty, captures attention.
Search stimuli were presented on colour patches in
the pre-critical trials. One of the colour patches had
a colour different from the rest and thus was a
colour singleton. The singleton’s position was uncorre-
lated with the target position. In the critical trial, a new
colour was used for the singleton. If colour novelty
alone, in the absence of singleton novelty, is able to
trigger surprise capture, the singleton should be
fixated earlier in the critical trial than in the pre-critical
trials.
Previous eye tracking studies found that the first fix-
ation after search display’s onset is unaffected by sur-
prising events (Horstmann, 2015; Horstmann et al.,
2016). Because of concerns that such results might
have been influenced by pre-planned eye movements
(see Horstmann & Herwig, 2015), a variable “non-
aging” fore-period was implemented such that partici-
pants could not predict the onset of the search display
(Näätänen, 1971). Thus, the fore-period duration in
each trial was randomly chosen from an exponential
distribution which is characterized by a constant
hazard rate.
Method
Participants
Twenty students or visitors of Bielefeld University (14
female, six male) with a mean age of 21.8 (SD = 2.53)
years participated. All were tested for normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision and for normal colour vision
and gave written informed consent. They received 2
€ for their 10-min service. Studying was approved by
the Ethics Committee of University of Bielefeld (EUB).
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Stimuli
Figure 1 shows the arrangement of the search display
for a target-present trial. The target was a 1.11° diam-
eter ring with stroke of 0.23° (viewing distance 71 cm).
The distractor rings were identical to the target with
the only difference of a small radial gap of 0.09°.
Sixteen different gap positions were used, evenly dis-
tributed between 22.5° and 360°. The rings were black
as was the background. The rings were presented on
circular colour patches with diameters of 1.99°.
Three colours were used: grey (RGB: 106, 106, 106;
CIE: x = .277, y = .286) for the non-singletons, and red
(RGB: 220, 0, 0; CIE: x = 0.605, y = .329) or green (RGB:
0, 133, 0; CIE: x = .281, y = .590) for the singletons.
With the exception of the black background (RGB: 0,
0, 0; CIE: x = 0.280, y = 0.226; 0.114 cd/m2), all colours
had a matched physical luminance of 24 cd/m2 (±1).
Eight compound-stimuli of a colour patch and a
ring were presented in each display. The stimuli
were evenly distributed on the imaginary circumfer-
ence with a radius of 6.4°.
Apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a 19-inch display monitor
(85-Hz refresh rate, 1024 × 768 pixels resolution) at a
distance of 71 cm. Before testing, the monitor was
warmed for at least 30 minutes, to ensure temporal
stability of luminance and colour (Poth & Horst-
mann, 2017). A video-based eye tracker (EyeLink
1000, SR Research, Ontario, Canada) with a sampling
rate of 1000 Hz (monocular) was used to record
eye movements. A chin rest stabilized participants’
head.
Procedure
The experiment comprised one single block of 48
trials: 32 pre-critical trials presented the singleton in
one colour (the familiar colour) and 16 trials in the
second colour (the novel colour). The first trial with
the novel colour was the critical trial, and the remain-
ing 15 were the post-critical trials. The novel single-
ton colour was red or green for half of the
participants, randomly assigned. Randomly chosen,
half of the displays in each condition were target
present trials, and half were target absent trials,
with the exception of the critical trial, which was
always a target absent trial. The participants’ task
was to report the presence or absence of the target
with a corresponding key press. The singleton’s pos-
ition was determined randomly. All eight possible dis-
tances between singleton and target (including their
coincidence) were presented equally often. Each trial
began with a fixation control: participants fixated the
centre of the screen and confirmed fixation with a
key press. This started a variable fore-period during
which a central fixation cross was presented. The dur-
ation of the fore-period was the sum of (a) a variable
time period drawn from an exponential distribution
with an expectation value of 0.5 s (λ = 2) and a
maximum of 2682 ms, (b) a period of 100 ms in
which the cross had to be fixated continuously after
the variable time period has elapsed, and (c) the
possible additional time until the central continuous
fixation was successfully executed for 100 ms. In the
last pre-critical trial (the 32nd), and the following criti-
cal trial (the 33rd), the variable time periods (a) were
fixed to 1000 ms and to 500 ms, respectively. Dur-
ation fixing was done to reduce additional variation
in the critical trial. The interval for the critical trial
was the expectancy value for the chosen distribution.
The interval for the last pre-critical trial was some-
what longer than the expectancy value, based on
the empirical result that a longer fore-period in trial
n-1 than in trial n results in relatively low action readi-
ness in trial n (Los, 2010). Thereby, at the search dis-
play’s onset of the critical trial, we intended to
counteract the execution of saccades which were
already pre-planned before the surprising stimulus
has been presented.
Figure 1. Arrangement of an exemplary target present trial with
green singleton colour.
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Results
Data preprocessing
Eye movement data were parsed into fixations and
saccades using the standard laboratory settings of
DataViewer 2.3.22 (SR research, Ontario, Canada).
The eyes were assumed to fixate when two saccade
thresholds, an acceleration threshold (8000 degrees/
sec2), and a velocity threshold (30 degrees/sec), are
not exceeded for a period of 20 ms or more. Fixations
were assigned to a stimulus when they fell within a cir-
cular region with a radius of 2.41° from the centre of
the stimulus, which is nearly the maximum radius
possible without overlap from adjacent positions.
Further preprocessing and statistical analysis was
done using R 3.3.1. (R Core Team, 2016). Only correct
trials (i.e., trials in which the target present judgment
was correct) were analysed for all dependent variables
but accuracy. The first 10 trials were considered prac-
tice and not analysed.
Data analysis
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections of the degrees of
freedom were applied wherever the sphericity
assumption was violated. This is indicated by report-
ing the Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon; for better read-
ability the uncorrected degrees of freedom are
reported. For those mean differences that are crucial
for the central questions of this study, dz is additionally
reported as an effect size for repeated measurements
where the mean of the difference variable is divided
by its standard deviation. In the case of binomially dis-
tributed response data like accuracy and fixations, we
used dummy coded Generalized Estimation Equations
(GEE) with a logit link function in order to control for
dependencies between measurements. Due to its par-
simony, we used an exchangeable working correlation
structure which assumes equal correlations between
any pair of measurements within a participant. GEEs
yield robust estimates, however, even if the correlation
structure is misspecified (Liang & Zeger, 1986). For
better interpretability of effects, the mean proportions
of the categories which are coded with 1 (vs. 0) are
reported for the tested conditions.
Accuracy and reaction times
Proportion correct was .96, .95, and .98 in the pre-criti-
cal, critical, and post-critical target absent trials. With a
GEE model (logit link function), we regressed trial
responses (1 = correct; 0 = false) on the dummy
coded factor trial type (pre-critical vs. critical vs.
post-critical) with the critical trial serving as the refer-
ence category. Correctness did not significantly differ
between pre-critical trials and the critical trial, Wald
χ2(1) = 0.03, p = .864, or between post-critical trials
and the critical trial, Wald χ2(1) = 0.53, p = .466. For
target present trials, another GEE model found no sig-
nificant difference between pre-critical trials (.91) and
post-critical trials (.92), Wald χ2(1) = 0.12, p = .725. All
further analyses included only correctly responded
trials. One participant with an error in the critical trial
had to be excluded completely from further analyses.
An ANOVA of target absent RTs with the variable
trial type (pre-critical vs. critical vs. post-critical)
revealed a significant main effect, F(2, 36) = 23.77,
εGG = .74, p < .001. The critical trial RT (3621 ms) dif-
fered both from pre-critical (2993 ms) and post-critical
(2805 ms) trials, ts(18) > 4.15, ps < .001. Mean RT in
pre-critical target present trials (2051 ms) was signifi-
cantly higher than in post-critical target present trials
(1846 ms), t(18) = 2.47, p = .024.
Pre-critical trials
For an overall assessment of task performance, fixation
probabilities and latencies for pre-critical trials were
analysed. Target absent trials comprised two stimulus
types: non-singleton and singleton distractors. Target
present trials comprised four stimulus types: non-sin-
gleton targets, non-singleton distractors, singleton
targets, and singleton distractors. Target absent and
present trials are therefore analysed separately.
In pre-critical target absent trials, the probability of
fixating a stimulus was high (.95), with no differences
between singleton (.95) and non-singleton distractors
(.94), Wald χ2(1) = 0.60, p = .440. Singleton distractors
were first fixated somewhat earlier than non-singleton
distractors (1070 ms vs. 1216 ms), yet not significantly,
t(18) = 1.70, p = .112.
In pre-critical target present trials, two participants
had errors in all trials in which singleton and target
coincided. The remaining participants fixated single-
ton distractors almost equally often as non-singleton
distractors (.56 vs. .53), Wald χ2(1) = 0.53, p = .465.
Nearly all non-singleton targets (.99) and all singleton
targets (1.00) were fixated. Here and in the following
analyses for binomial data, we do not report signifi-
cance tests if a category provides homogenous
values as standard errors cannot be estimated
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adequately in this case. There was no difference in fix-
ation latency between singleton targets and non-sin-
gleton targets (1149 ms vs. 1169 ms), t(16) = 0.10, p
= .922. RTs did not differ significantly between single-
ton (2306 ms) and non-singleton target trials
(2012 ms), t(16) = 1.36, p = .193.
The critical trial
The critical trial was always a target absent trial. Per-
formance was therefore compared to target absent
pre- and post-critical trials. In most analyses, singleton
fixations in the critical trial were compared with single-
ton fixations in pre- and post-critical trials. Where
informative, we also included fixations on non-single-
ton distractors.
The proportion of stimulus visits was high with a
mean of .95 (Table 1). Mean latencies for the first
visit on singleton and non-singleton (averaged over
the seven non-singletons per trial) distractors are
shown in Figure 2 (upper panel). An ANOVA of the sin-
gleton fixation latencies with the variable trial type
(pre-critical vs. critical vs. post-critical) revealed a sig-
nificant main effect, F(2, 36) = 30.84, p < .001.
Planned comparisons indicated that the latency for a
singleton visit in the critical trial (425 ms) was lower
compared to pre-critical trials (1070 ms), t(18) = 9.02,
p < .001, dz = 2.07, and to post-critical trials (957 ms),
t(18) = 5.67, p < .001, dz = 1.30. As the singleton fix-
ation latency is the main depended variable for the
hypotheses of this study, we tested whether summar-
izing pre- and post-critical trials in our analyses might
have obscured a trend within the trial course of this
experiment. Therefore, linear trends were tested sep-
arately within the pre- and post-critical trials. Linear
Mixed Models predicting the raw singleton fixation
latencies by trial number while controlling for partici-
pants as random effects, however, did not yield any
significant slopes (|ts| < 0.53).
Next, we asked whether the dwell times were differ-
ent on the singleton and non-singleton distractors in
the critical trial (Figure 3, upper panel). Dwell time is
defined here as the sum of fixation durations on the
first continuous visit of a stimulus (not including poss-
ible revisits). A 3 (trial type: pre-critical vs. critical vs.
post-critical) × 2 (stimulus type: singleton vs. non-sin-
gleton) ANOVA revealed main effects for trial type, F
(2, 36) = 17.50, εGG = .53, p < .001, stimulus type, F(1,
18) = 11.06, p = .004, and a significant Trial type ×
Stimulus type interaction, F(2, 36) = 9.39, εGG = .52, p
= .006. On singleton distractors, dwell times in the
critical trial (439 ms) differed from pre-critical
(227 ms), t(18) = 4.02, p < .001, dz =0.92, and post-criti-
cal trials (244 ms), t(18) = 3.41, p = .003, dz = 0.78. On
non-singleton distractors, dwell times in the critical
trial (252 ms) were significantly higher than in pre-
critical trials (227 ms), t(18) = 2.32, p = .032, dz = 0.53,
and higher by tendency than in post-critical trials
Figure 2. Mean latency of first visits on a stimulus in Experiment
1 (upper panel) and Experiment 2 (lower panel). Error bars indi-
cate the standard errors (i.e., SD / √N ) of the mean.
Table 1. Proportions of fixations on singleton distractors and
non-singleton distractors in Experiment 1.
Trial type Stimulus Mean proportion of fixations SE
pre-critical non-singleton .94 .019
singleton .95 .022
critical non-singleton .94 .025
singleton 1.00 .000
post-critical non-singleton .96 .016
singleton .90 .034
Note: SE = Standard error (i.e., SD / √N ) of the mean proportion with a
sample size of N = 19 each.
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(229 ms), t(18) = 1.95, p = .067, dz = 0.45. To further
clarify the interaction, t-tests on the differences
between dwell times on singleton vs. non-singleton
distractors were run. The difference was higher in
the critical than in the pre-critical or the post-critical
trials, ts(18) > 2.83, ps < .011.
We also examined the cumulative distributions of
the first three fixations on the singleton and the
non-singletons (Figure 4, upper panel). Table 2 sum-
marizes three GEE models with a logit link function
for the binary dependent variable. Predictors were
trial type (pre-critical vs. critical), stimulus type (single-
ton vs. non-singleton), and their interaction. The cell
including singletons in pre-critical trials was set as
the reference category. For simplicity, we did not
include post-critical trials here and only relevant com-
parisons are described in the text.
The first model refers to the initial fixation after
search display’s onset. The significant negative slope
for non-singletons in pre-critical trials indicates that
for the first fixation, a non-singleton visit was less
probable than a singleton visit in pre-critical trials
(.09 vs. .18). The positive slope for singletons in the
critical trial shows that fixation probability increased
somewhat compared to singletons in pre-critical
trials (.37 vs. .18), yet only significantly by trend. The
Stimulus type × Trial type interaction was not signifi-
cant for the first fixation.
The second model analyses the initial and the
second fixations together. The significant negative
slope for non-singletons in pre-critical trials indicates
that fixation probability was lower compared to single-
tons in pre-critical trials (.17 vs. .26). The significant posi-
tive slope for singletons in the critical trial shows a
higher fixation probability compared to singletons in
pre-critical trials (.63 vs. .26). Accordingly, the significant
negative slope for the Stimulus type × Trial type inter-
action indicates that the difference between non-sin-
gletons and singletons in pre-critical trials (.17−.26 =
−.09) got larger in the critical trial (.13−.63 =−.50).
The third GEE model included the first to the third
fixation. For pre-critical trials, non-singleton fixations
were less probable than singleton fixations (.27 vs.
.42) as indicated by the significant negative slope.
The significant positive slope for singletons in the criti-
cal trial shows an increased fixation probability com-
pared the pre-critical trials (.95 vs. .42). The
difference between non-singletons and singletons in
pre-critical trials (.27−.42 =−.15) got larger in the criti-
cal trial (.21−.95 =−.74) which is indicated by the sig-
nificant negative slope for the Stimulus type × Trial
type interaction.
We evaluated the mean index of the first fixation on
a stimulus (Figure 5, upper panel) as an additional
measure of prioritization. An ANOVA with the factor
trial type (pre-critical vs. critical vs. post-critical)
revealed a significant main effect, F(2, 36) = 35.31, p
< .001. The index of the first fixation on a singleton dis-
tractor in the critical trial (M = 2.05) was lower than in
pre-critical trials (M = 4.84, dz = 1.92) and in post-criti-
cal trials (M = 4.55, dz = 1.59), ts(18) > 6.94, ps < .001.
Discussion
The singleton was gazed at earlier when it had a novel
feature (in the critical trial) than when it had a familiar
Figure 3.Mean duration of the first continuous visit of a stimulus
in Experiment 1 (upper panel) and Experiment 2 (lower panel).
Error bars indicate the standard errors (i.e., SD / √N ) of the
mean.
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feature (in the pre-critical or the post-critical trials).
This result is consistent with the assumption that
colour novelty is sufficient to bias attention. Once
the singleton with the novel colour was fixated, it
was also gazed at longer than a familiar singleton in
the pre-critical or post-critical trials.
The mean latency of the first singleton fixation in
the critical trial was 425 ms which is in accordance
with previous studies examining the time course of
surprise capture (Horstmann, 2002, 2006; Horstmann
& Herwig, 2015). This latency is sufficiently different
from a latency of 200–250 ms which has been
measured for oculomotor capture by expected
colour singletons (Theeuwes et al., 2003; but see
Geyer, Müller, & Krummenacher, 2008) to rule out
that the present results are an instance of saliency
capture.
First fixations in pre-critical trials targeted more
probably the salient singleton than a non-salient
stimulus, indicating prioritization of the expected sin-
gleton. The central hypothesis, however, was that
colour novelty alone, in the absence of singleton
novelty, is capable of biasing attention. This colour
novelty effect is revealed as the differences between
the novel and the familiar colour. This effect
emerges with the second fixation. The present result
thus reveals an early saliency effect and a later
novelty effect. Accordingly, an analysis of the fixation
index revealed that in the critical trial, on average,
the second fixation targeted the singleton with the
novel colour, whereas in pre- and post-critical trials,
roughly the fifth fixation targeted the singleton. To
Figure 4. Cumulative fixation proportions on a stimulus from the first to the third fixation after search display’s onset for Experiment 1
(upper panel) and Experiment 2 (lower panel). Error bars indicate the standard errors (i.e., SD / √N ) of the mean.
Table 2. GEE models for stimulus visits within the first three
fixations in Experiment 1.
Fixation b
Wald
χ2(1) p
1st Fixation Intercept: singleton, pre-
critical trials
−1.48 41.79 < .001*
Non-singleton, pre-critical
trials
−0.89 10.11 .002*
Singleton, critical trial 0.94 2.85 .091
Stimulus type × Trial type −1.08 2.25 .133
1–2nd
Fixations
Intercept: singleton, pre-
critical trials
−1.03 23.07 < .001*
Non-singleton, pre-critical
trials
−0.58 4.69 .030*
Singleton, critical trial 1.56 8.70 .003*
Stimulus type × Trial type −1.88 10.47 .001*
1–3rd
Fixations
Intercept: singleton, pre-
critical trials
−0.30 2.81 .094
Non-singleton, pre-critical
trials
−0.70 10.04 .002*
Singleton, critical trial 3.19 9.79 .002*
Stimulus type × Trial type −3.51 11.10 < .001*
Note: GEEs comprised a logit link function. Singletons in pre-critical trials were
set as reference category which is represented by the intercept. Signs of
non-interaction slopes indicate whether fixation probability increases or
decreases compared to the reference category. See text for further
details. *p< .05.
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summarize, while a weak singleton effect occurred
early in the critical trial (e.g., on the first fixation), a
novelty effect occurred later in the trial (i.e., on the
second fixation).
Experiment 2
Our account of surprise capture assumes that novelty
(more precisely, expectation discrepancy) changes the
attentional priorities that guide the deployment of
attention and eye movements. Assuming a central
attentional priority map (see Zelinsky & Bisley, 2015),
this means that novelty is included here in addition
to stimulus saliency (Itti & Koch, 2000), match to atten-
tional-control settings (Folk et al., 1992), and memory
related factors (such as priming of pop-out; Awh, Belo-
polsky, & Theeuwes, 2012).
One might, however, propose a completely differ-
ent account of surprise capture. The attentional
capture by unexpected events might be due not to
an (active) orienting towards the surprising stimulus
but rather to the interruption caused by a general mis-
match between a previously acquired attentional set
and the processing demands of the present trial,
restoring the ability of saliency to attract attention
(for a similar account, see also Folk & Remington,
2015). In Experiment 1, the change appears at the
most salient location in the display. Therefore, it is
not sure which mechanism mainly caused the atten-
tional bias towards the singleton. The expectation dis-
crepancy account would attribute the result to the
active orienting towards the surprising event. The
control interruption account, however, would attribute
the result to a facilitated capture by the most salient
location in the display. With a regular presentation
of a singleton in every pre-critical trial, the attentional
set might have included an inhibition of saliency infor-
mation to the effect that this information does not
affect attention. The surprising event, in turn, might
have interrupted this attentional set, enabling saliency
to attract attention again (see also Müller, Geyer, Zehe-
tleitner, & Krummenacher, 2009, for learned suppres-
sion of colour singletons in visual search).
Note that the control interruption account and the
expectation discrepancy account are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Both effects might have added
up inducing the strong attention attentional bias
towards the singleton with a novel colour in Exper-
iment 1. Thus, in Experiment 2 we tested the control
interruption explanation in isolation by presenting
an unexpected background colour in the critical trial
as a non-local novel feature while keeping the single-
ton’s and non-singleton’s colours constant.
Method
Participants
As in Experiment 1, we recruited 20 students or visitors
of Bielefeld University (five male, 15 female) and
rewarded them with 2€. Mean age was 21.6 (SD =
4.07).
Stimuli
Stimulus sizes and their arrangement were identical to
Experiment 1 as were the colours of the singletons and
the non-singleton distractors. In Experiment 2, two
background colours were used: black (RGB: 0, 0, 0;
CIE: x = 0.280, y = 0.226; 0.114 cd/m2) and blue (RGB:
Figure 5. Mean index of the first fixation on a stimulus in Exper-
iment 1 (upper panel) and Experiment 2 (lower panel). Error bars
indicate the standard errors (i.e., SD / √N ) of the mean.
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70, 70, 240; CIE: x = 0.170, y = 0.102). Once again,
with the exception of the black background colour,
all colours were matched for physical luminance
with 24 cd/m2 (±1).
Apparatus
This was the same as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 except for
three changes. First, the singleton distractor colour
remained the same (red or green among grey distrac-
tors for half of the participants) throughout the exper-
iment. Second, from the 33rd trial on, simultaneously
with the offset of the fixation cross in the pre-
display, the background colour changed from black
to blue. Third, from the 33rd trial on, simultaneously
with the offset of the search display, the background
colour changed from blue to black.
Results
Data preprocessing and analysis
The same as in Experiment 1.
Accuracy and reaction times
Proportion correct was .95, 1.00, and .97 in the pre-
critical, critical, and post-critical target absent trials.
Target present trial performance was lower in pre-criti-
cal trials (.91) than in post-critical trials (.96),Wald χ2(1)
= 5.03, p = .025. An ANOVA of the target absent RTs
with the variable trial type (pre-critical vs. critical vs.
post-critical), revealed a significant main effect, F(2,
38) = 22.88, εGG = .57, p < .001. The critical trial RT
(3621 ms) differed both from pre-critical (2677 ms)
and post-critical trials (2681 ms), ts(19) > 4.69, ps
< .001. For target present trials, mean RTs in pre-critical
trials (1874 ms) and post-critical trials (1981 ms) did
not differ significantly, t(19) = 1.16, p = .262.
Pre-critical trials
The probability of fixating a stimulus in pre-critical
target absent trials was high (.94), with non-singleton
distractors being visited more frequently (.96) than
singleton distractors (.91), Wald χ2(1) = 4.98, p = .026.
There was no significant difference in fixation
latency of non-singleton distractors (1134 ms) and sin-
gleton distractors (1047 ms), t(19) = 1.24, p = .232.
Analysis of the pre-critical target present trials was
performed on the data of 18 participants, as two partici-
pants had no correctly answered trial in which single-
ton and target coincided. The remaining participants
fixated singleton distractors more frequently (.64)
than non-singleton distractors (.51), Wald χ2(1) = 6.82,
p = .009. Almost all non-singleton targets (.99) and all
singleton targets were fixated (1.00). For stimuli
visited at least once, first fixation latency was not signifi-
cantly different for singleton targets and non-singleton
targets (1017 ms vs. 1077 ms), t(17) = 0.39, p = .700.
Also RTs did not differ significantly between target sin-
gleton trials (1863 ms) and non-singleton target trials
(1891 ms), t(17) = 0.16, p = .874.
Critical trial
The mean proportion of stimulus visits was .91 (see
Table 3 for the detailed descriptives).
Mean latencies for the first fixation on a stimulus
were computed as before (Figure 2, lower panel). An
ANOVA of the singleton fixation latencies with the
variable trial type (pre-critical vs. critical vs. post-criti-
cal) revealed no significant main effect, F(2, 38) =
0.65, εGG = .50, p = .472. Unlike in Experiment 1, fix-
ation latencies for singleton distractors in the critical
trial (935 ms) did not differ significantly from the
pre-critical (1047 ms), dz = 0.13, or post-critical trials
(1136 ms), dz = 0.20. As the singleton fixation latency
represents our main depended variable, we addition-
ally ran a cross experiment analysis. An ANOVA with
the variables trial type (pre-critical vs. critical vs.
post-critical) and experiment (Experiment 1 vs. Exper-
iment 2) revealed significant effects of trial type, F(2,
74) = 7.25, εGG = .76, p = .004, and experiment, F(1,
37) = 6.44, p = .016. The interaction was significant as
well, F(2, 74) = 3.58, εGG = .76, p = .046, showing that
the novel background colour in the critical trial of
Experiment 2 resulted in a higher singleton fixation
latency (M = 935 ms) than a novel singleton colour
Table 3. Proportions of fixations on singleton distractors and
non-singleton distractors in Experiment 2.
Trial type Stimulus Mean proportion of fixations SE
pre-critical non-singleton .96 .020
singleton .91 .028
critical non-singleton .85 .037
singleton 1.00 .000
post-critical non-singleton .85 .034
singleton .91 .027
Note: SE = Standard error (i.e., SD / √N ) of the mean proportion with a
sample size of N = 20 each.
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as in Experiment 1 (M = 425 ms), t(22.84) = 2.95, p
= .007, dbetween = 0.92.
For dwell time, a 3 (trial type: pre-critical vs. critical
vs. post-critical) × 2 (stimulus type: singleton vs. non-
singleton) ANOVA (Figure 3, lower panel) revealed a
main effect for trial type, F(2, 38) = 9.90, εGG = .66, p
< .001, a marginally significant effect for stimulus
type, F(1, 19) = 3.63, p = .072, but no significant inter-
action, F(2, 38) = 1.24, εGG = .45, p = .290. The signifi-
cant main effect for trial type was due to longer
dwell times at any stimulus type in the critical trial
(258 ms) both compared to the pre-critical (218 ms),
t(39) = 2.52, p = .016, dz = 0.40, and the post-critical
trials (210 ms), t(39) = 2.93, p = .006, dz = 0.46. The mar-
ginally significant effect for stimulus type was due to
longer dwell times on singleton distractors (241 ms)
than on non-singleton distractors (217 ms).
As in Experiment 1, we examined the cumulative
fixation distribution for the first three fixations
(Figure 4, lower panel). The three corresponding GEE
models are shown in Table 4. As before, singletons
in pre-critical trials serve as reference category.
For the first fixation, there was only a significant
negative slope due a lower probability for fixating a
non-singleton (.09) than a singleton (.21) within pre-
critical trials.
With the first and the second fixation included, the
model still only yielded a significant negative slope
that indicates a lower fixation probability for non-single-
tons (.16) than for singletons (.26) within pre-critical trials.
For the model including the first three fixations
there was a marginally significant negative slope for
non-singletons in the pre-critical trials, due to a
lower fixation probability compared to singletons in
the pre-critical trials (.26 vs. 36). Moreover, there was
a significant negative slope for the Stimulus type ×
Trial type interaction indicating that the difference
between non-singletons and singletons was smaller
in the pre-critical trials (.26−.36 =−.10) than in the
critical trial (.21−.55 =−.34).
The mean first fixation indices are shown in Figure 5
(lower panel). An ANOVA for the index of the first fix-
ation on a singleton with the factor trial type (pre-criti-
cal vs. critical vs. post-critical) yielded no significant
main effect, F(2, 38) = 2.19 (εGG = .43), p = .148. Con-
trary to Experiment 1, the mean first fixation index
for singleton distractors in the critical trial (M = 4.15)
was not significantly lower than in pre-critical (M =
5.11, dz= 0.28) and post-critical trials (M = 5.76, dz =
0.36).
Discussion
The surprising background colour in the critical trial
did not strongly influence the attentional priority of
the singleton item as fixation latencies and fixation
indices did not differ significantly from the pre-critical
trials. This result cannot be attributed to an insuffi-
ciently strong surprise, because RTs indicated
general interference by the surprising change. The
null-result can of course not rule out completely the
control interruption account as the non-significance
could be due to insufficient statistical power.
However, a comparison of the experiments revealed
a significant interaction effect of trial type and exper-
iment, meaning that the capture effect was stronger in
Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. The results thus
further support the hypothesis that stimuli with expec-
tation discrepant features attract attention in a spatial
manner.
While the results of Experiment 2 do not conform
with the strongest form of an interference account, it
seems that a weaker version might well explain the
very late effects for singleton fixations in the critical
trial. Remember that the singleton in the present
experiment had a familiar colour in all trials, including
the critical trial. Thus, the discrepancy account cannot
Table 4. GEE models for stimulus visits within the first three
fixations in Experiment 2.
Fixation b
Wald
χ2(1) p
1st Fixation Intercept: singleton, pre-
critical trials
−1.34 34.36 < .001*
Non-singleton, pre-critical
trials
−1.03 12.86 < .001*
Singleton, critical trial −0.05 0.01 .938
Stimulus type × Trial type −0.39 0.22 .639
1–2nd
Fixations
Intercept: singleton, pre-
critical trials
−1.04 21.09 < .001*
Non-singleton, pre-critical
trials
−0.64 6.74 .009*
Singleton, critical trial 0.63 2.02 .155
Stimulus type × Trial type −0.75 1.87 .172
1–3rd
Fixations
Intercept: singleton, pre-
critical trials
−0.60 7.55 .006*
Non-singleton, pre-critical
trials
−0.44 3.37 .066
Singleton, critical trial 0.80 2.93 .087
Stimulus type × Trial type −1.10 3.99 .046*
Note: GEEs comprised a logit link function. Singletons in pre-critical trials were
set as reference category which is represented by the intercept. Signs of
non-interaction slopes indicate whether fixation probability increases or
decreases compared to the reference category. See text for further
details. *p< .05.
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explain the late effect, and it is well possible that the
interference account provides an adequate expla-
nation. However, it would be a rather late effect, and
later than surprise capture.
Notably, in the critical trial, there were longer dwell
times on any stimulus type, not just on the novel
stimulus. A similar tendency was also present in Exper-
iment 1. As this effect was non-anticipated and not
directly related to the aim of the experiment, proper
control conditions to narrow possible explanations
were missing. The effect might indicate that a surpris-
ing colour change led also to a generalized change in
the processing strategy, for example towards a more
conservative criterion for stimulus processing.
General discussion
The goal of the present study was to test whether
colour novelty alone, in the absence of singleton
novelty, captures attention. To that aim we used a sin-
gleton-familiarization procedure where we presented
a target-uncorrelated colour singleton in all pre-critical
trials to eliminate singleton novelty in the critical trial.
The results show that feature novelty is sufficient to
capture attention. The novel singleton in the critical
trial was fixated earlier than the familiar singletons in
the pre-critical trials. Concerning time course, prioriti-
zation emerged within the first two fixations, and
the latency of the first fixation on the novel singleton
was on average 425 ms. Experiment 2 tested an
alternative account to surprise capture: that what
was observed in Experiment 1 was not an expectation
discrepant colour attracting attention but an expec-
tation discrepant colour that reset an established
attentional set and restored the ability of the singleton
to capture attention. This was tested with a change of
the background colour. There was, however, no signifi-
cant fixation latency gain for the singleton due to a
changed background, which further supports that
the surprising singleton colour in Experiment 1
mainly attracted attention in a spatial manner.
Previous experiments provided inconsistent
support for the hypothesis that colour novelty alone,
without additional singleton novelty, triggers surprise
capture: While newer Experiments using eye-tracking
(Horstmann & Herwig, 2016) and inattentional blind-
ness rates (Horstmann & Ansorge, 2016) to indicate
attention showed that singleton novelty is not essen-
tial for surprise capture, older experiments using a
between-subjects set-size variation in a visual search
task to indicate attention failed to support the hypoth-
esis. That the present study did find evidence in a
visual search task gives support to our contention
that the methods used in the older studies might
have been less sensitive for more subtle effects, and
that presenting a non-informative singleton in each
pre-critical trial might attenuate effects of a novel
colour in the critical trial.
It might be argued that the effects in the present
study do not seem to be subtle, as the mean latency
of the first novel-colour singleton fixation in the critical
trial is very similar to results by Horstmann and Herwig
(2015), where singleton novelty and colour novelty
were confounded. It is of note, however, that the
present experiments implemented, for the first time,
a pre-display with a variable fore-period to discourage
pre-planned eye movements. This measure seemed to
be partly successful, as we found significant saliency
effects on the first eye-movement. Thus, comparisons
of the absolute latencies between studies have to be
interpreted with caution.
The presence of these early salience effects might
be viewed as evidence for saliency capture. We
would, however, contend that these effects could
also be due to top-down effects. As discussed in the
introduction, with a singleton presented in every
trial, participants may have included the singleton in
their top-down strategies, for example, by using the
salient stimulus as a convenient starting point for
their search. Other authors have suggested other
top-down strategies using the salient singleton, such
as contingent capture for display-wide feature
(Gibson & Kelsey, 1998) or probability matching
(Remington et al., 1992). Given these ambiguities, it
is difficult to attribute the prioritization of the salient
stimulus to either bottom-up or top-down
mechanisms.
One possible interpretation of the attention biasing
by the novel colour in the critical trial of Experiment 1
is that the mechanism for bottom-up saliency capture
habituated during the pre-critical trials, but was dish-
abituated by the novel colour. However, the effects
of the novel colour do not match the proposed
time-course of bottom-up selection of salient stimuli:
it emerged later, that is, at the second fixation, and
with an overall mean latency of the first singleton fix-
ation of 425 ms. This contrasts with theoretical propo-
sals assuming early effects both for covert attention
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shifts below 150 ms (Theeuwes, 2010) and initial fix-
ations on the singleton (Itti & Koch, 2000), and for
overt attention shifts which have been measured
with a fixation latency of 200–250 ms (Geyer et al.,
2008; Theeuwes et al., 2003).
We propose that the effects of the novel colour are
not caused by bottom-up saliency capture, but rather
by expectation discrepancy. On this account, the pre-
critical trials induced an expectation of the already
presented colours. This expectation was refined in
the course of the pre-critical trials and ends up
rather narrowly tuned at the end of the pre-critical
trials. The novel colour in the critical trial, in turn, devi-
ates from the narrowly tuned expectations, and it is
this deviation that changes attentional priorities. We
prefer to term this deviation expectation-discrepancy,
while others prefer the concept of novelty (Retell et al.,
2015). We regard these differences in terminology
rather as a matter of taste. The crucial point is that
the pre-critical trials gave rise to a standard which
defines what is expected, or familiar, respectively,
and the novel feature in the critical trial deviates
from that standard. A more important aspect regard-
ing the interpretation of expectation discrepancy is
that some authors refer to a novel or to an unexpected
event in the case of rare events (e.g., Brockmole &
Boot, 2009; Folk & Remington, 2015). However, even
rare events might be completely expected after few
occurrences and their effects seem to emerge earlier
than those of the first occurrence (Horstmann &
Ansorge, 2006).
Experiment 1 also showed that gaze dwelled longer
on the singleton in the critical trial as compared to the
pre-critical or the post-critical trials (see Horstmann
et al., 2016; Horstmann & Herwig, 2015). We interpret
this as a second attentional effect of expectation dis-
crepancy being the capture of central (or internal;
see Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011) attention.
The binding of central attentional resources to the
processing of an expectation discrepant event has
been observed previously in quite different settings,
such as scenes with objects that semantically or syn-
tactically deviate the scene context (Võ & Henderson,
2009), or scenes in which episodic discrepancies had
been introduced (Võ, Zwickel, & Schneider, 2010).
The effect of surprise induced blindness may also be
interpreted in this way (Asplund et al., 2010).
In Experiment 2, we tested whether surprise capture
might also be explained by a failed inhibition of
saliency prioritization. To test this, we changed the pro-
cedure of Experiment 1 in two respects. First, the single-
ton feature in the critical trial was not novel but the
same as in the pre-critical trials. Second, the novel
feature was presented at a different position and as a
spatially distributed feature consisting in a background
colour change. With these modifications, Experiment 2
did not yield the same results as Experiment 1: single-
ton selection latency was not significantly different
from the pre-critical trials, and a prioritization only
emerged if all the first three fixations were taken into
account. These results suggest that the surprise
capture effect in Experiment 1 should mainly be
driven by spatial attentional bias of the novel feature.
Experiment 2 also revealed a general increase in
gaze dwell time in the critical trial. This effect was
also observed in Experiment 1, where the unchanged
non-singletons were gazed at longer in the critical trial
than in the pre-critical trials. These effects might indi-
cate a general shift towards a more conservative
decision criterion in the critical trial.
To summarize, the present experiment sought and
obtained evidence that colour novelty alone is suffi-
cient to bias attention. This was done by using a sin-
gleton-familiarization procedure where a singleton
was presented on every trial before the presentation
of the novel colour. With this procedure, the con-
founding of colour novelty and singleton novelty
was avoided. The present results are compatible
with an expectation discrepancy account of surprise
capture, and emphasize the independence of surprise
capture from other forms of attentional capture, in
particular singleton capture.
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Abstract 
Much of the literature on involuntary attention has been devoted to the conflict between 
goal contingent capture and saliency capture. A further variant has been proposed as surprise 
capture, which is thought as the attraction of attention instigated by expectation-discrepant, 
surprising, or novel stimuli. In a previous study, participants were familiarized with a search 
irrelevant color singleton. Consistent with surprise capture, the irrelevant singleton strongly 
captured and bound the gaze when it was unannounced presented with a novel color. In the 
present study, we used the same experimental paradigm to closer investigate how an expectation 
about a specific color feature emerges such that a novel color can be perceived as more or less 
expectation discrepant. We proposed that an expectation about a feature can be modelled by the 
sampling distribution of the mean and predicted that it gets narrower both with increasing 
sampling occasions and lower variability of the feature. We tested these predictions by inferring 
expectation discrepancy of a novel singleton color from attentional prioritization. Experiment 1 
confirmed that gaze capture in the surprise trial was weaker with higher variability of the 
singleton’s color hue in the preceding familiarization trials. Experiment 2 showed that gaze 
capture in the surprise trial was weaker with a lower number of prior familiarization trials. 
Further approaches to mathematically model expectations are discussed as well as several 
indicators for expectation discrepancy. 
Keywords:  attention capture, surprise, novelty, expectations, singleton, salience 
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Publicity statement  
Outside the laboratory, we regularly encounter novel or unexpected visual stimuli. Inside 
the laboratory, however, the factor of expectation discrepancy is often eliminated because of 
highly repeated presentations of the same stimuli. Specific experiments demonstrated that 
surprising visual features induce capture of attention and the gaze. In the present study, we 
extended our knowledge about the construct of expectations by investigating perceived feature 
variability and the number of sampling occasions as two factors that determine the emergence of 
a narrow expectation. Our experiments show that gaze capture by a novel color is attenuated if 
participants have been previously exposed to intensive color changes. Furthermore, gaze capture 
is weaker if participants have had a shorter familiarization period with the old colors. Overall, 
our study demonstrates how expectations can differentially affect gaze behavior. 
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Unexpectedness increases singleton capture of the gaze 
In attention capture literature, it is debated to which extent capture by salient stimuli is 
attributable to pure bottom-up salience (Theeuwes, 1991, 1992, 2010) and to top-down 
influences like goal contingent orienting (Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 
1992). This does not need to be an either-or decision. For example, the framework of priority 
maps for attention deployment (e.g., Zelinsky & Bisley, 2015) details that both can contribute to 
activity within a spatial neuronal representation that determines attentional priorities (Moran, 
Zehetleitner, Müller, & Usher, 2013; Wolfe, 1994, 2007). However, some authors argue that 
some phenomena, such as inter-trial priming and reward learning, where attention is directed 
towards previously selected stimuli, do not fit in either the top-down or to the bottom-up 
category (Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012; Kristjánsson & Campana, 2010) and selection 
history has thus been proposed as an additional source of activity within priority maps for visual 
attention allocation (Awh et al., 2012). In the present paper, we closer investigate the 
unexpectedness of a stimulus as another aspect in the sense of selection history that so far has 
received limited consideration in visual attention research. Contrary to intertrial-priming and 
reward learning, attention capture due to unexpectedness occurs when there has been no prior 
exposure of the respective stimulus. 
The capacity of unexpected salient stimuli to attract attention, which has been termed 
surprise capture (Horstmann, 2002, 2015), can be induced in a visual search task with a 
repetition-change paradigm. For instance, participants are first presented with a number of pre-
critical search trials that do not contain a salient stimulus and familiarize participants with a 
certain range of stimulus features. It is assumed that during this familiarization, participants build 
up increasingly firm and narrow expectations about the to be presented stimuli and their features, 
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and that they base their expectations on the characteristics of the stimuli that they have seen 
repeatedly. The surprise trial follows the familiarization trials where a feature singleton is shown 
for the first time and without prior announcement. Several studies demonstrated that the novel 
singleton captures attention, as indicated by the reduction of set size effects (Becker & 
Horstmann, 2011; Horstmann, 2002, 2005, 2006), the reduction of inattentional blindness rates 
(Horstmann & Ansorge, 2016), increased performance accuracy with short presentation durations 
(Horstmann & Becker, 2008), validity effects (Horstmann & Becker, 2011), and reduced 
singleton fixation latencies as well as increased proportions of early fixations (Ernst & 
Horstmann, 2018; Horstmann, Becker, & Ernst, 2016; Horstmann & Herwig, 2015; Retell, 
Venini, & Becker, 2015).  
Attention to an unannounced singleton with a novel feature that is presented after a 
number of search trials without a salient stimulus is difficult to explain by top-down factors like 
singleton search mode or goal contingent orienting (Gibson & Jiang, 1998). If so, however, why 
is surprise capture of an unexpected singleton not just saliency capture? One argument is that the 
time course of surprise capture differs from that of saliency capture. Covert and overt attention 
shifts that were attributed to saliency capture have been reported to occur with a latency of 60-
150ms (Kim & Cave, 1999; Theeuwes, 2010; Theeuwes, Atchley, & Kramer, 2000), and 200-
250ms, respectively (Theeuwes, De Vries, & Godijn, 2003; van Zoest, Donk, & Theeuwes, 2004; 
Weichselbaum & Ansorge, 2018). In contrast, surprise capture has been found to occur with a 
mean latency of 400-500ms, for both covert (Horstmann, 2002, 2006) and overt attention shifts 
(e.g., Ernst & Horstmann, 2018; Horstmann et al., 2016; Horstmann & Herwig, 2015). Asplund, 
Todd, Snyder, Gilbert, and Marois (2010) likewise found surprise induced blindness for a target 
in a rapid visual presentation (RSVP) stream to occur around 400ms. Accordingly, it is often the 
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second but not the first fixation after search display’s onset that it biased towards the unexpected 
stimulus. Horstmann (2006) discussed two processing steps in the process sequence that lead to 
surprise capture which could explain the relatively late effect as compared to saliency capture. 
First, some time is needed to detect the discrepancy between the expected and the actual input. 
Second, attention must be directed towards the unexpected stimulus and this process must be 
strong enough to interrupt an already ongoing visual search process. 
Another specific characteristic of surprise capture is that it is followed by increased gaze 
dwell times on the unexpected stimuli (Ernst & Horstmann, 2018; Horstmann et al., 2016; 
Horstmann & Herwig, 2015, 2016; see also Võ & Henderson, 2009; Võ, Zwickel, & Schneider, 
2010, for unexpected real-world objects within natural scenes, which, however, do not capture 
attention). Furthermore, recent studies also suggest a higher number of refixations in a surprise 
trial (Foerster, 2016; see also Horstmann et al., 2016; Retell, Venini, & Becker, 2015). Together, 
increased dwell times and stimulus revisits are in line with the theory that higher-level processes 
follow after the first detection of surprise, such as the verification of the expectation violation, 
the need to understand the causes of the unexpected change in the course of things, and whether 
it is action relevant (Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 1997; see Reisenzein, Horstmann, & 
Schützwohl, 2017, for a review of a cognitive-evolutionary model of surprise).      
However, that surprise capture in visual search occurs because of a violated expectation 
or expectation discrepancy so far has not been tested directly and tends to be more a premise 
underlying the repetition-change paradigm. For instance, if a target uncorrelated singleton is 
shown in all search trials, the singleton only captures the gaze strongly in the critical trial where 
it is presented unannounced with a novel feature, but not in the pre-critical and post-critical trials 
when its feature is presented repeatedly (Ernst & Horstmann, 2018). It is a reasonable 
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interpretation that the expectation discrepancy of the color is the factor that distinguishes the 
critical trial from the other trials and causes attention capture. However, this interpretation would 
be even more convincing on the basis of a model where it is explicitly formulated how 
expectations are built up and which factors determine several extents of expectation discrepancy 
of a novel color in a critical trial. 
As a side note, the latter finding also demonstrates that a singleton must not necessarily 
be presented for the first time in the surprise trial. An unexpected color change of a previously 
presented singleton (“pure feature novelty” as opposed to “both singleton and feature novelty”) 
is already sufficient to trigger an attentional capture. Furthermore, novelty prioritization has also 
been found when the novel feature was not singled out by salience (Horstmann & Ansorge, 2016; 
Horstmann & Herwig, 2016). 
More direct evidence for the effects of unexpectedness comes from a series of 
experiments that did not require visual search but rather a single stimulus choice. Participants 
repeatedly had to indicate whether a dot appeared above or below two irrelevant distractor 
words, which were presented closely to each other in two different rows at the center of the 
screen (Meyer, Niepel, Rudolph, & Schützwohl, 1991). In the critical surprise trial, one of the 
two distractor words was presented with a new background color. Here, the authors found 
increased reaction times as compared to a familiarized control group where one word was 
already presented on a different background color in every pre-critical trial. The increase in 
reaction time was interpreted as an indicator of the surprise induced interruption of ongoing 
processes (see also Meyer et al., 1997). Furthermore, improved recall both for the dot position 
and the irrelevant word, as measured by an unexpected memory test, indicated that the word had 
been attended to and encoded into memory. Schützwohl (1998) more closely investigated the 
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effect of “schema strength”. The term schema has been coined to for organized and structured 
representation of knowledge about objects, scenes, situations, and actions. The theoretical 
construct of a schema is specifically designed such that it best serves the purpose to process and 
interpret mundane, everyday events, which includes in particular the understanding of current 
input as well as the predicting of future input (Rumelhart, 1984; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977; see 
also Reisenzein, Horstmann, & Schützwohl, 2017). If a discrepancy is detected between an event 
and the predictions generated by the schema that exceeds a certain threshold, surprise is elicited 
and the schema will be updated such that it can predict the new information in the future.  
According to Schützwohl (1998), schema strength varies in that the constraints of the 
schema variables that represent the diverse features of the concept can be narrow or broad. For 
instance, schema strength for societally important vehicles should be high as they usually come 
along with specific colors and shapes (e.g., red and spacious for ambulances). Schema strength 
for private vehicles, however, should be low as they can have any color and shape (Hout, 
Robbins, Godwin, Fitzsimmons, & Scarince, 2017). Moreover, a person that has only seen three 
red ambulances in her or his life should have lower schema strength and would be less surprised 
about a green ambulance compared to someone who has already seen hundreds of ambulances 
that were all red. According to this theory, schema strength also increases with more frequent 
instantiations of the schema. Schützwohl (1998) tested these predictions using the same task as 
described above for Meyer et al. (1991). He found that the surprise induced increase of response 
time in the critical trial was attenuated both with a lower number of pre-critical trials and with 
more feature variability within the pre-critical trials. This result was interpreted such that the 
surprised induced interruption of ongoing behavior was reduced because low schema strength 
reduces the potential to detect schema discrepancy for novel events. In the following, we use the 
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terms “expectation” and “schema” synonymously because of their conceptual similarities. 
Furthermore, we do not distinguish between novelty and surprise (or unexpectedness) within the 
present study although there are differences that can be important in other contexts (see Barto, 
Mirolli, & Baldassarre, 2013, for an overview). 
 
The present study 
Within the present study, we investigate whether surprise capture of the gaze can likewise 
be manipulated by inducing different expectations within a visual search task. Following 
Schützwohl (1998), broader expectations are caused by higher feature variability and fewer 
sampling occasions. If surprise capture depends on expectation discrepancy, broader expectations 
should result in weaker attention capture by a novel feature than narrow expectations. 
Furthermore, this study is intended to contribute to a more detailed analysis of the construct of 
expectation in the research field of visual attention, as there is a variety of opinions about when 
an event is characterized as unexpected. In some studies, an event is described as unexpected if it 
occurs in 10-20% of search trials (e.g., Brockmole & Boot, 2009; Folk & Remington, 2015). 
However, one could argue that even rare events can be completely expected. For instance, a train 
that arrives in time when you are traveling to an important meeting might be a rare event, yet you 
anticipate that there is a chance that the train could arrive in time (see also Horstmann, 2015). 
Accordingly, previous experiments have shown that participants can shift attention almost as fast 
to rare salient targets as to frequent salient targets, even if the target is salient only on 4% of the 
trials and non-salient on 96% of the trials (Horstmann & Ansorge, 2006), and much faster than 
typically observed when the salient item is presented for the very first time. Thus, we only refer 
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to the very first presentation as a potentially surprising or unexpected event. Keeping this in 
mind, we will propose and discuss some possibilities of how expectations can be modelled. 
Besides surprise capture of the gaze, additionally revisits and dwell times as indicators 
for surprise induced explorative behavior shall be inspected within the experiments of this study. 
We expect dwelling and revisiting likewise to increase with higher expectation discrepancy. 
However, these variables will be investigated in a rather explorative manner and discussed with 
respect to the cognitive-evolutionary model of surprise (Reisenzein et al., 2017). 
  
Experiment 1 
For the purpose of the present study, we adapted the experimental design used by Ernst 
and Horstmann (2018) which has already been described above. An irrelevant magenta color 
singleton is shown at a random stimulus position in every search trial while participants search 
for a specific shape (a closed ring among rings with a gap). In the critical trial, the surprising 
event is constituted by an unannounced color change of the singleton (i.e. to pure red or blue). 
Between participants, we kept the color change of the critical trial constant and only varied the 
pre-critical trials by two factors: a) The variability of the magenta singleton color, in more or less 
subtly altering the proportion of red and blue color between search trials (resulting more blueish 
or reddish magenta color hues); and b) the number of sampling occasions due to fewer or more 
pre-critical trials. According to previous theories about expectation narrowness (or schema 
strength, respectively; Schützwohl, 1998), we expect attentional prioritization of a novel 
singleton color to be attenuated with a higher variation of the magenta singleton color hue in pre-
critical trials. Furthermore, we expect attentional prioritization to be attenuated with fewer pre-
critical trials. That is, both manipulations should result in broader expectations at the surprise 
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trial, rendering the first presentation of a pure red or blue singleton color less expectation 
discrepant.  
We tentatively propose that an expectation towards a singleton color behaves like the 
sampling distribution of the arithmetic mean with an expectation value (magenta) and a standard 
error, which is the standard deviation of the already presented singleton color values divided by 
the square root of the number of presentations. The distribution becomes broader with higher 
standard deviation of the singleton’s color feature, and with fewer trials which represent the 
sample size. Given that magenta as the “mean” color of the presented color hues in the pre-
critical trials corresponds to the expectation value of the expectation’s distribution, the same pure 
red singleton color in the surprise trial can be either highly expectation discrepant as its color 
value is located at the tail of a narrow distribution (e.g., two standard error units away from the 
expectation value) or hardly expectation discrepant if its feature value lays more centered within 
a broader distribution (e.g., only a half standard error unit away from the expectation value). 
To test these predictions, we tracked gaze behavior as a proxy for visual attention 
deployment (Deubel & Schneider, 1996). In line with our previous eye tracking studies about 
surprise capture, we inferred unexpectedness of the novel singleton color in the critical trial from 
the latency of the first singleton fixation as a measure for spatial attentional prioritization.  
 
Method 
The sample size of each experimental group was oriented on Ernst and Horstmann (2018) 
who used a similar design. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of University of 
Bielefeld (EUB). 
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Participants 
96 students or visitors of Bielefeld University (53 men and 43 women) participated in the 
5 to 10-min experiment. Participants were approached in the central hall of the university main 
building and asked to participate in a short experiment in return for candies. Mean age was 21.28 
(SD = 2.38). After informed consent, all participants were tested for normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and for normal color vision.  
Apparatus 
Stimuli were presented on a 19-in. display monitor (85-Hz refresh rate, resolution 1,024 x 
768 pixels) at a distance of 71 cm. Before testing, the monitor was warmed for at least 30 
minutes, to ensure temporal stability of luminance and color (Poth & Horstmann, 2017). A video-
based eye-tracker (EyeLink 1000, SR Research, Ontario, Canada) with a sampling rate of 1 kHz 
was used for the recording of eye movements. The participants’ head was stabilized by a chin 
rest, and the right eye was monitored in all participants. 
Stimuli 
Eight stimuli (color patches plus search stimuli, see Figure 1) were presented in each 
search display of the experimental trials. The viewing distance was 71cm. Stimuli were evenly 
distributed on an imaginary circle with a radius of 6.4°. The target was a 1.11° diameter ring with 
a line-width of 0.23°. Distractors were identical to the target with the only difference of a small 
radial gap of 0.09° height. 16 different gap positions were evenly distributed between 22.5° and 
360°.  
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Figure 1. Exemplary display of a pre-critical trial with “mean” magenta singleton color in 
Experiment 1. 
 
In practice trials, the rings were grey (RGB: 125, 125, 125; CIE: x = 0.274, y = 0.288; 
28.855 cd/m2) and presented directly against a black background (RGB: 0, 0, 0; CIE: x = 0.298, 
y = 0.290; 0.422 cd/m2) without color patches. In experimental trials, however, the rings were 
black and presented on circular color patches (diameter: 1.99°). In each experimental trial, there 
was one singleton patch at a random position with a unique color, whereas the remaining non-
singleton color patches had a grey color (RGB: 128, 128, 128; CIE: x = 0.277, y = 0.288; 29.884 
cd/m2). Possible singleton colors are shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Singleton colors  
 
sample RGB CIE (x, y, cd/m ) 
     
Low color variation 
(pre-critical trials) 
 
195, 0, 255 0.230, 0.116, 29.960 
 225, 0, 255 0.254, 0.130, 34.875 
 255, 0, 255 0.279, 0.144, 40.338 
 255, 0, 225 0.307, 0.160, 37.491 
 255, 0, 195 0.341, 0.179, 35.590 
     
High color variation 
(pre-critical trials) 
 135, 0, 255 0.190, 0.093, 22.449 
 195, 0, 255 0.230, 0.116, 29.960 
 255, 0, 255 0.279, 0.144, 40.338 
 255, 0, 195 0.341, 0.179, 35.590 
 255, 0, 135 0.429, 0.230, 32.190 
     
Critical trial 
 0, 0, 255 0.152, 0.072, 16.082 
 
255, 0, 0 0.601, 0.329, 29.143 
     
Note. RGB = values in Red-Green-Blue color space; CIE = values in Commission International 
de l’Éclairage 1976 color space; cd/m  = luminance in candela per square metre.  
 
Design 
Between participants, two factors were crossed: a) the number of pre-critical trials (17 vs. 
49), and b) the intensity of the singleton’s color variation in pre-critical trials (low vs. high), 
resulting in four different groups of participants. Within participants, we compared performance 
in pre-critical trials (serving as a baseline) with performance in the critical surprise trial where 
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the singleton color changed to pure red or blue, counterbalanced between participants. 
Intraindividual performance differences were compared between groups. 
Procedure  
The participants’ task was to report the presence or absence of the target with a 
corresponding key press (arrow left and arrow down keys in the lower row of the keyboard, 
operated with the right index and middle fingers), and participants were instructed to perform the 
search task as fast as possible while avoiding any response errors.  
The experiment started with a practice block of 16 search trials without color patches 
which was not recorded. After the practice block, a message at the display informed participants 
that the experimental trials will start and that search stimuli will be presented on color patches. 
Furthermore, participants were explicitly informed about the non-predictiveness of the color 
singleton. Thereafter, a single experimental block of either 18 or 50 trials started. The last trial 
was the critical trial in which the singleton color was either pure red or blue. The singleton color 
both in the first and last pre-critical trial was fixed to the “mean” magenta color. Within every 
single trial of the remaining pre-critical trials, the singleton color was randomly chosen from five 
possible magentaish colors, depending the color variation condition (see Table 1). Randomly 
chosen, half of the displays in each condition were target present trials, and half were target 
absent trials; however with the exception of the critical trial and the last pre-critical trial. These 
were always target absent trials to reduce variance between participants, and in order to measure 
surprise effects unconfounded with the presence of a target (Ernst & Horstmann, 2018). The 
target position was determined randomly. The singleton position was likewise random with the 
restriction that all possible distances between singleton and target (including their coincidence) 
were presented equally often. 
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Each trial began with a fixation control: participants fixated the center of the screen and 
confirmed fixation with a key press. This started a variable fore-period during which a central 
fixation cross was presented. The duration of the fore-period was the sum of (a) a variable time 
period drawn from an exponential distribution with an expectation value of 0.5s (λ = 2), (b) a 
period of 100ms in which the cross had to be fixated continuously after the variable time period 
has elapsed, and (c) the possible additional time until the central continuous fixation was 
successfully executed for 100ms.  
The exponential distribution of the “non-aging” (Näätänen, 1971) fore-periods is 
characterized by a constant hazard rate, rendering the onset of the search display less predictable 
by the time the fore-period already has elapsed. Thereby, we intended to reduce possible pre-
planned eye movements at the onset of the search display. In the last pre-critical trial, and the 
following critical trial, the variable time periods were fixed to 1,000ms and to 500ms, 
respectively. Duration fixing was done to reduce additional variation in the critical trial. The time 
period of the critical trial was the expectation value of the exponential distribution. Thus, the 
interval for the last pre-critical trial was somewhat longer than the expectation value, based on 
the empirical result that a longer fore-period in trial n-1 than in trial n results in relatively low 
action readiness in trial n (Los, 2010). Thereby, at the search display’s onset of the critical trial, 
we intended to furtherly counteract the execution of saccades which were already pre-planned 
before the surprising stimulus has been presented. The search display was presented until a key 
press was registered. An error sound occurred whenever an incorrect response had been 
recorded.  
Finally note that we do not claim that the RGB differences between the singleton colors 
are actually perceived with the same differences, which implies that the “mean” magenta color 
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might not exactly be perceived as the expectation value of the singleton color. However, the 
different color values chosen in each group should lead to an ordinally higher and a lower level 
of singleton color variation, which is sufficient for the purpose of this experiment. 
 
Results 
Following the practice block, the first 10 trials of the experimental block were excluded 
as warm-up trials. Thus, there were 7 or 39 pre-critical trials for the analysis plus the single 
critical trial, depending on the number of trials condition. Raw gaze data were pre-processed 
using the EyeLink Data Viewer (2.3.22), which parses eye position data into saccades and 
fixations according to an acceleration threshold (8,000 degrees/sec2), and a velocity threshold (30 
degrees/sec). Fixations were classified as eye data that exceeded neither of these thresholds for a 
period of 20ms or more. Fixations were assigned to a stimulus when they fell within a circular 
region with a radius of 2.41° from the center of the stimulus. Further preprocessing and statistical 
analysis were done using R 3.4.3 (R Core Team, 2016). All reported p-values are two-tailed and 
compared with a significance level of α = .05, regardless of whether we predicted the direction of 
the effect.  
As the critical trial was always a target absent trial, in the following analyses we only 
considered pre-critical target absent trials for comparisons with the critical trial. 
Accuracy and Manual response times 
Overall, mean accuracy was .96. An ANOVA for the proportion of correct responses with 
the factors color variation (low vs. high), number of trials (18 vs. 50), and trial type (pre vs. crit) 
did not reveal any significant differences, Fs(1,92) <  1.31, ps > .166, ηG2s < .012. In the 
following analyses, we only included trials that were answered correctly. Four participants were 
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excluded completely because of a response error in the critical trial, reducing the sample size to 
92 participants. 
Manual response times are depicted in Figure 2. An ANOVA with the factors color 
variation (low vs. high), number of trials (18 vs. 50), and trial type (pre vs. crit) only yielded a 
significant main effect for trial type, F(1,88) = 31.41, p < .001, ηG2 = .063, with longer response 
times in the critical trial (M = 2,982ms) than in pre-critical trials (M = 2,693ms). The Trial type × 
Color variation interaction just failed to reach significance, F(1,88) = 3.67, p = .059, ηG2 = .008. 
By tendency, the increase of mean response time in the critical trial was more pronounced within 
the low color variation group (2,992ms vs. 2,601ms) than in the high color variation group 
(2,973ms vs. 2,784ms). The Trial type × Number of trial interaction just failed to reach 
significance as well, F(1,88) = 3.34, p = .071, ηG2 = .007. The increase of mean response time in 
the critical trial tended to be more pronounced with 50 trials (3,015ms vs. 2,632ms) than with 18 
trials (2,947ms vs. 2,755ms), other F(1,88)s < 0.62, ps > .434, ηG2s < .006.  
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Figure 2. Mean manual response times in pre-critical trials and in the critical trial, separately for 
the groups with different color variations and numbers of trials. Error bars indicate standard error 
of the mean. 
 
Gaze data 
In most analyses, singleton fixations were compared within and between groups. Where 
appropriate, also fixations on non-singletons were considered. Overall, participants fixated 95% 
of the presented stimuli. The singletons in the critical trial were always fixated. 
Singleton fixation latencies 
Our main dependent variable for attentional prioritization is the latency of the first 
singleton fixation relative to the search display’s onset. Figure 3 gives an overview of the mean 
singleton fixation latencies. An ANOVA with the factors color variation (low vs. high), number 
of trials (18 vs. 50), and trial type (pre vs. crit) yielded a significant main effect for color 
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variation, F(1,88) = 4.12, p = .045, ηG2 = .028, with longer singleton fixation latencies in the high 
color variation group (M = 1,000ms) than in the low color variation group (M = 810ms). 
Furthermore, the predicted Trial type × Color variation interaction was significant, F(1,88) = 
6.91, p = .010, ηG2 = .030. In the low color variation group, there was a lower mean singleton 
fixation latency in the critical trail than in the pre-critical trials (677ms vs. 942ms), t(45) = 2.86, 
p = .006, dz = 0.42. Yet, there was no significant singleton prioritization within the high color 
variation group (1,069ms vs. 931ms), t(45) = 1.16, p = .252, dz = 0.17. The remaining effects of 
the ANOVA were not significant, F(1,88)s < 1.06, ps > .306, ηG2s < .008. 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean latencies of the first singleton fixation in pre-critical trials and in the critical trial, 
separately for the groups with different color variations and numbers of trials. Error bars indicate 
standard error of the mean. 
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Dwell times 
As another specific component of surprise capture, we also analyzed gaze dwell times 
which are defined here as the summed fixation durations of the first continuous visit on a 
stimulus. Mean dwell times are depicted in Figure 4. An ANOVA with the factors color variation 
(low vs. high), number of trials (18 vs. 50), and trial type (pre vs. crit) yielded a significant main 
effect for trial type, F(1,88) = 31.52, p < .001, ηG2 = .137, with longer dwell times at the 
singleton in the critical trial (M = 329ms) than in pre-critical trials (M = 232ms). The Trial type × 
Color variation interaction did not reach significance, F(1,88) = 2.90, p = .092, ηG2 = .014. By 
tendency, however, there was a higher increase of mean dwell time in the critical trial of the low 
color variation group (230ms vs. 356ms) than in the group with high color variation (234ms vs. 
302ms). The remaining effects of the ANOVA were likewise not significant, F(1,88)s < 1.65, ps 
> .203, ηG2s < .011.  
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Figure 4. Mean dwell times of the first singleton visit in pre-critical trials and in the critical trial, 
separately for the groups with different color variations and numbers of trials. Error bars indicate 
standard error of the mean. 
 
Revisits 
We finally analyzed the proportion of stimuli that have been refixated at least once. The 
proportion of singleton revisits are shown in Figure 5. An ANOVA with the factors color 
variation (low vs. high), number of trials (18 vs. 50), and trial type (pre vs. crit) revealed a 
significant main effect for trial type, F(1,88) = 3.50, p < .001, ηG2 = .159, with more revisits on 
the singleton in the critical trial (.62) than in pre-critical trials (.30). Furthermore, there was a 
significant Trial type × Number of trials interaction, F(1,88) = 5.02, p = .028, ηG2 = .026. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, the increase of revisits from pre-critical trials to the critical trial was 
more pronounced in the group with 18 search trials (.29 vs. .73) than in the group with 50 search 
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trials (.31 vs. .51). The remaining effects of the ANOVA were not significant, F(1,88)s < 3.32, ps 
> .072, ηG2s < .020. 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean proportions of revisits on the singleton in pre-critical trials and in the critical 
trial, separately for the groups with different color variations and numbers of trials. Error bars 
indicate standard error of the mean. 
 
Discussion 
We investigated whether manipulating expectation breadth concerning the singleton color 
prior to the surprise trial results in an attenuated surprise capture effect. Based on schema theory 
(Rumelhart, 1984; Schützwohl, 1998), we assumed that both fewer sampling occasions and more 
feature variability result in broader expectations, reducing the expectation discrepancy of an 
unannounced singleton color change in a critical trial. Reduced expectation discrepancy, in turn, 
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should lead to reduced surprise capture, premised by the assumption that surprise capture is 
caused by expectation discrepancy. Predictions were tested in a visual search experiment with an 
irrelevant color singleton that was presented in every trial. Between-group factors were the 
number of familiarization trials (17 vs. 49) and the intensity of singleton color variability (low 
vs. high) prior to the critical surprise trial.  
The main dependent variable to test our predictions was the latency of the first singleton 
fixation, which was reduced in the critical trial of the group with low color variation but not in 
the group with high color variation. Thus, in line with our prediction, surprise capture attenuated 
with high color variation, suggesting broader expectations prior to the surprise trial that resulted 
in lower expectation discrepancy of the novel color. However, singleton fixation latencies did not 
support the predicted effect for the number of trials factor on surprise capture, which will be the 
subject of Experiment 2.  
Gaze dwell times on the singleton in the critical trial were increased for all combinations 
of number of trials and color variation. That is, dwell times on the singleton were also increased 
in the high color variation groups where no surprise capture occurred. Possibly, there are distinct 
thresholds for expectation discrepancy that determine when an unexpected feature elicits 
increased dwell times and when it draws the gaze. Binding of attention on expectation discrepant 
stimuli without prior spatial guidance has already been reported previously (Võ & Henderson, 
2009; Võ, Zwickel, & Schneider, 2010). For instance, a printer in a kitchen scene which is 
semantically expectation discrepant does not draw the gaze but dwell time is increased when the 
printer is encountered coincidentally (Võ & Henderson, 2009). Note, however, that the 
expectation discrepancy hypothesis (Horstmann, 2005) only predicts spatial guidance of 
attention if unexpectedness refers to a visual feature that is pre-attentively available (e.g., 
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Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Accordingly, the lack of attentional guidance towards a printer in a 
kitchen scene can be better explained by the fact that unexpectedness did not refer to a basic 
feature (but to semantic aspects) than by low expectation discrepancy that did not reach a certain 
threshold. 
We expected that the increase of dwell times is more pronounced in groups with higher 
expectation discrepancy. Yet, the difference of the increase did not reach significance for any 
expectation discrepancy manipulation. There was, however, a tendency for a stronger increase of 
dwell times in the critical trial of the group with low color variation than with high color 
variation.  
We also expected revisits to gradually covary with expectation discrepancy. Similar to 
dwell times, there was a general increase of revisits in the surprise trial. A specific increase was 
only present for the number of trials factor. However, the increase of revisits on the singleton in 
the critical trial was higher in the group with 17 pre-critical trials than in the group with 49 pre-
critical trials, which runs counter our expected direction. We will come back to this result after 
the second experiment. 
 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, the number of pre-critical trials was varied in order to manipulate 
schema strength, which however did not have an effect on surprise capture. This raises the 
question whether our manipulation was not successful to induce differences in schema strength 
strong enough to have an observable impact on surprise capture, or whether feature variability 
and the number of sampling occasions do not have the same effect on schema strength. 
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On the one hand, the number of 17 pre-critical trials in the group with few sampling 
occasions was chosen somewhat arbitrary because of technical reasons (16 trials were needed to 
realize all possible target-singleton distances equally often in target present trials). On the other 
hand, based on the literature we were not able to predict how fast an expectation about a varying 
singleton color builds up, such that a strong color change induces surprise capture. Schützwohl 
(1998) tested 2, 12, 22, and 32 pre-critical trials without additional feature variation and found 
that the effect of schema strength did not further increase after 22 pre-critical trials. Possibly, 17 
trials in Experiment 1 were already sufficient to reach an asymptote in expectation narrowness 
about the singleton color such that surprise capture in the critical trial does not differ 
substantially from surprise capture after 49 pre-critical trials.  
In the following experiment, we reduced the number of pre-critical trials in the group 
with fewer sampling occasions to nine and compared the effect of a novel singleton color with a 
group that has 41 pre-critical trials. This time, the singleton color in pre-critical trials remained 
completely stable prior to the color change in the critical trial, as in Ernst and Horstmann (2018). 
 
Method 
We doubled the size of each experimental group as we expected a relatively small effect 
on the basis of Experiment 1.  
Participants 
As in Experiment 1 but with 96 different participants (33 men and 63 women). Mean age 
was 22.50 (SD = 3.40).  
Apparatus 
Same as in Experiment 1. However, monitor refresh rate was set to 100Hz. 
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Stimuli 
Stimulus sizes and arrangement were the same as in Experiment 1. However, in 
Experiment 2 the singleton color was either blue (RGB: 65, 65, 255; CIE: x = 0.165, y = 0.094; 
24.179 cd/m2) or green (RGB: 0, 135, 0; CIE: x = 0.282, y = 0.590; 23.916 cd/m2). The 
remaining non-singleton color patches had a grey color (RGB: 111, 111, 111; CIE: x = 0.278, y = 
0.285; 23.909 cd/m2).  
Design 
Two groups of participants differed in the number of pre-critical trials (9 vs. 41). Within 
participants, we compared performance in pre-critical trials with performance in the critical 
surprise trial where the singleton color was presented with a novel color. Intraindividual 
performance differences were compared between groups. 
Procedure 
Same as in Experiment 1, apart from the following differences. In the critical trial, the 
singleton color changed from either green to blue or vice versa, counterbalanced between 
participants. After the practice block of 16 trials without a color singleton, the group with few 
search trials had nine pre-critical trials. The first eight trials had an expectation value of 50% for 
target presence. Singleton and target positions that were drawn randomly and independently from 
each other. The ninth trial, which was the last pre-critical trial, was always a target absent trial. 
The tenth trial was the critical trial (likewise target absent). 
The group with many pre-critical trials only differed in that the experimental block 
started with 32 search trials, half of which were target present trials with random target position. 
As in Experiment 1, the singleton position was likewise random with the restriction that all 
possible distances between singleton and target (including their coincidence) were presented 
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equally often. This block of 32 trials was followed by ten search trials with the same structure as 
in the group with few pre-critical trials, resulting in a total of 42 search trials. In other words, the 
group with many pre-critical trials only differed from the group with few pre-critical trials by 32 
additional search trials which preceded the last sub-block of 10 search trials (including the 
critical trial), which was present in both groups. Thus, the critical trial was either the tenth trial or 
the 42th trial. All experimental trials were presented to the participants as one single block 
without any interruptions. 
 
Results 
Data pre-processing and statistical analyses settings were the same as in Experiment 1 
with the only difference that for pre-critical trials, only the target absent trials of the last nine pre-
critical trials as a baseline were included (cf. Schützwohl, 1998), which were structurally equal 
in both groups. 
Accuracy and Manual response times 
Overall, mean accuracy was .98. An ANOVA for the proportion of correct responses with 
the factors number of trials (10 vs. 42), and trial type (pre vs. crit) did not yield any significant 
differences, Fs(1,94) <  2.71, ps > .103, ηG2s < .015. In the following analyses, we only included 
trials that were answered correctly. Two participants had to be excluded because of a response 
error in the critical trial, reducing the sample size to 94 participants. 
Manual response times are depicted in Figure 6. An ANOVA with the factors number of 
trials (10 vs. 42) and trial type (pre vs. crit) revealed a significant main effect for trial type, 
F(1,92) = 31.98, p < .001, ηG2 = .066, with longer response times in the critical trial (M = 
3,409ms) than in pre-critical trials (M = 2,925ms). Furthermore, the Trial type × Number of trials 
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interaction was significant, F(1,92) = 6.29, p = .014, ηG2 = .014. The mean increase of response 
times in the critical trial was more pronounced in the group with 42 search trials (2,737ms vs. 
3,441ms) than in the group with 10 trials (3,106ms vs. 3,378ms). The main effect for number of 
trials was not significant, F(1,92) = 0.79, p = .376, ηG2 = .007.  
 
 
Figure 6. Mean manual response times in pre-critical trials and in the critical trial, separately for 
the groups with different numbers of trials. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
 
Gaze data 
As in Experiment 1, we compared fixations on the singleton in the critical trial with 
fixations on the singletons in pre-critical target absent trials. Where appropriate, we also 
considered non-singleton stimuli. Participants fixated 96% of the presented stimuli. 
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Singleton fixation latencies 
The latencies of the first singleton fixation are depicted in Figure 7. An ANOVA with the 
factors number of trials (10 vs. 42) and trial type (pre vs. crit) revealed a significant main effect 
for trial type, F(1,92) = 23.64, p < .001, ηG2 = .094, with shorter singleton fixation latencies in 
the critical trial (M = 736ms) than in pre-critical trials (M = 1,112ms). Furthermore, the predicted 
Trial type × Number of trials interaction was significant, F(1,92) = 4.28, p = .043, ηG2 = .018, 
indicating that the reduction of singleton fixation latencies was higher with 42 search trials than 
with 10 search trials. With 42 search trials, singleton fixation latencies were significantly lower 
in the critical trial than in pre-critical trials (636ms vs. 1,177ms), t(45) = 5.59, p < .001, dz = 
0.82. In the group with 10 trials, there was a smaller reduction of singleton fixation latency in the 
critical trial (831ms vs. 1,049ms) that just failed to reach significance, t(47) = 1.80, p = .080, dz = 
0.26. The ANOVA’s main effect for number of trials was not significant, F(1,92) = 0.12, p 
= .726, ηG2 = .001. 
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Figure 7. Mean latencies of the first singleton fixation in pre-critical trials and in the critical trial, 
separately for the groups with different numbers of trials. Error bars indicate standard error of the 
mean. 
 
Dwell times 
Mean dwell times of Experiment 2 are shown in Figure 8. An ANOVA with the factors 
number of trials (10 vs. 42) and trial type (pre vs. crit) yielded a significant main effect for 
number of trials, F(1,92) = 9.23, p = .003, ηG2 = .054, a significant main effect for trial type, 
F(1,92) = 14.11, p < .001, ηG2 = .062, and a significant interaction, F(1,92) = 14.81, p < .001, ηG2 
= .065. Only within the group with 42 search trials, mean singleton dwell times increased in the 
critical trial (392ms vs. 255ms), t(45) = 4.14, p < .001, dz = 0.61. There was no significant 
difference in the group with 10 search trials (259ms vs. 261ms), t(47) = 0.11, p = .915, dz = 0.02. 
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Figure 8. Mean dwell times of the first singleton visit in pre-critical trials and in the critical trial, 
separately for the groups with different numbers of trials. Error bars indicate standard error of the 
mean. 
 
Revisits 
The proportion of singleton revisits are shown in Figure 9. An ANOVA with the factors 
number of trials (18 vs. 50) and trial type (pre vs. crit) only revealed a significant main effect for 
trial type, F(1,92) = 5.20, p = .025, ηG2 = .025, with more revisits on the singleton in the critical 
trial (.37) than in pre-critical trials (.25), other F(1,92)s < 0.44, ps > .508, ηG2s < .003. 
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Figure 9. Mean proportions of revisits on the singleton in pre-critical trials and in the critical 
trial, separately for the groups with different numbers of trials. Error bars indicate standard error 
of the mean. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 focused on the question whether surprise capture caused by a novel color 
feature can be attenuated by reducing the number of sampling occasions prior to the color 
change. We assumed that participants start with rather broad expectations, that are refined with 
repeated examples of the displays. This process is gradual, and the expectations get narrower 
with each trial. Therefore, with only limited sampling opportunities, the expectation is still 
broad, rendering a novel color feature less expectation discrepant. In other words, as long as a 
participant is not sufficiently familiar with the old color, he or she is not surprised by a novel 
color. Because we could not find empirical support for this proposition in Experiment 1 where 
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we tested 17 vs. 49 pre-critical trials, we suspected that expectation narrowness already reached 
an asymptote after 17 search trials. Thus, in Experiment 2 the number of pre-critical trials was 
reduced to nine for one group and surprise capture was compared with another group that had 41 
pre-critical trials. The singleton color was kept constant in pre-critical trials (e.g., green) until the 
singleton with a novel color was presented in the surprise trial (e.g., blue). 
The results show that in the surprise trial, the singleton in the group with only nine pre-
critical trials was less strongly prioritized than in the group with 41 pre-critical trials, as indicated 
by singleton fixation latencies. Hence, our main hypothesis that expectation discrepancy of a 
novel color feature attenuates with fewer sampling occasions was confirmed. Together, 
Experiment 1 and 2 suggest that an expectation towards a color feature builds up within few 
trials and that after a certain number of trials, expectation narrowness reaches an asymptote such 
that the extent of surprise capture due to a color change does not increase with further sampling 
occasions prior to the critical trial (see also Schützwohl, 1998).    
Gaze dwell times on the singleton in the critical trial only increased in the group with 41 
pre-critical trials, whereas revisits were increased in both groups. On the one hand, revisits could 
be more sensitive to the effects of expectation discrepancy than dwell times. On the other hand, 
dwell times and revisits could also be mediated (at least partially) by distinct mechanisms. 
Revisits may be generally increased within the early phase of an experiment with an irrelevant 
singleton because participants are still suspicious of the singleton’s role and compare it with the 
remaining stimuli (even though participants were explicitly informed about its task irrelevance in 
the present experiments).  
Experiment 2 did not replicate the effect of Experiment 1 with a stronger increase of 
revisits on the singleton in the group with few pre-critical trials than in the group with many pre-
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critical trials. As mentioned before, the extent of increase in a surprise trial could be driven by 
several mechanisms and may not solely reflect the increase of expectation discrepancy. Possibly, 
in Experiment 1 the pronounced increase of revisits on the surprising singleton after few pre-
critical trials in some way interacted with the presence of singleton color variation in pre-critical 
trials, which was not present in Experiment 2.  
From a general perspective, it is of note that dwelling and revisiting have a substantial 
impact on manual response times (Horstmann, Becker, & Ernst, 2017; Horstmann, Herwig, & 
Becker, 2016). For studies which infer attention capture solely from manual response times, it is 
of special interest whether increased revisits and dwell times only occur at the first presentation 
of a novel stimulus or likewise when distractors are presented in a low proportion of search trials 
(e.g., Folk & Remington, 2015; Horstmann & Ansorge, 2006; Müller, Geyer, Zehetleitner, & 
Krummenacher, 2009; Retell, Becker, & Remington, 2016a, 2016b). As the present study shows, 
increased dwelling and revisits can occur even without attention capture, which can be 
problematic if attention capture is solely inferred from manual response times. 
 
General discussion 
In the present study, we tested whether attention capture by surprising stimuli is in fact 
induced by the discrepancy between expectations and the actually perceived input, which 
hitherto has been more an assumption than directly supported by empirical evidence. Given that 
an unexpected color change of an irrelevant singleton strongly captures the gaze (Ernst & 
Horstmann, 2018), two visual search experiments were conducted to test whether gaze capture 
due to expectation discrepancy is attenuated with broader expectations about the singleton color. 
We reduced the number of sampling occasions and increased the singleton’s color variation prior 
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to the surprise trial to interfere with the emergence of a narrow expectation about the singleton 
color. Experiment 1 supported the hypothesis that surprise capture by an unannounced color 
change is attenuated with more singleton color variation in pre-critical search trials as indicated 
by singleton fixation latencies. However, the second hypothesis stating that a similar effect 
would occur when the number of pre-critical trials is reduced could not be supported in 
Experiment 1. Based on the assumption that 17 pre-critical trials were already sufficient to build 
up a narrow expectation, a second experiment was conducted where the group with a low 
number of sampling occasions only had 9 pre-critical search trials. Here, we found an attenuated 
prioritization of an unannounced color change in the surprise trial as compared to a group with 
41 pre-critical trials. 
Overall, our prediction that surprise capture attenuates with a lower number of sampling 
occasions and higher color variability prior to the surprise trial could be confirmed. These results 
yield insights about the conditions for the emergence of expectations and which determine the 
degree of expectation discrepancy of a novel feature.  
 
Possible models for expectations 
We already mentioned the approach to model an expectation in analogy to the sampling 
distribution of the arithmetic mean as a very simple approach. The expectation about a color 
feature, for instance, gets narrower with lower feature variance between sampling occasions. 
Furthermore, the narrowness of the expectation increases with a higher number of sampling 
occasions. As a consequence, a novel color value (e.g., red) can either be more or less discrepant 
from the expectation value (e.g., magenta), which is inferred from previous sampling occasions. 
More precisely, the discrepancy depends on the specific probability the expectation distribution 
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attributes to the novel color. Note that the physical distance between the novel color (red) and the 
mean expected color (magenta) is always the same. What can differ because of the trial history is 
the expectation’s breadth, or its “uncertainty”, and thus how many standard error units the novel 
color value is apart from the expectation value at the center of the distribution; that is, at which 
percentile of the expectation distribution the novel color value is situated.  
However, modelling the expectation towards a singleton color by the sampling 
distribution of the arithmetic mean could be an oversimplification, especially with respect to how 
fast the expectation value and the expectation narrowness adapt after a surprising singleton color 
change. The problem becomes obvious by a closer look at the post-critical trials of previous 
surprise experiments: Results of Ernst and Horstmann (2018) showed that the singleton fixation 
latency in the post-critical trials was comparable to pre-critical trials. Hence, after the singleton’s 
color change in the critical trial, the singleton fixation latency must have returned quickly to 
baseline in the first post-critical trials. Accordingly, Schützwohl (1998) did not find any 
significant differences in manual response times between the first two post-critical trials and the 
last two pre-critical trials in a choice reaction task, whereas the critical trial in between 
significantly differed from both. The author took this as support that expectations (or schemas, 
respectively) can be revised much faster than would be predicted by simple neural network 
models of learning (e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988; Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, & 
Hinton, 1986). Furthermore, Schützwohl (1998) stated that expectations could be revised 
independently of the number of prior sampling occasions which determine expectation 
narrowness (Mandler, 1984). Though it still needs to be demonstrated how quick surprise capture 
in visual search experiments actually attenuates in post-critical trials, empirical data at least 
suggest that modelling expectations by the sampling distribution of the mean underestimates the 
UNEXPECTEDNESS INCREASES SINGLETON CAPTURE 38 
learning rate, and especially how fast expectations adapt to the repeated presentation of a novel 
feature. 
A closely related but more appropriate algorithm to model an expectation could be the 
Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960), which is commonly used in technical domains to reliably predict 
states by the given input (e.g., a car’s position by the GPS with a low signal in a tunnel) but also 
to model behavioral learning in a Bayesian manner (e.g., Dayan, Kakade, & Montague, 2000; 
Kakade & Dajan, 2002; see also Barto et al., 2013). The hallmark of the Kalman filter is that it 
combines several sources of input to reduce its prediction error relatively quickly with every new 
measurement in a linear or linearized gaussian manner (Welch & Bishop, 1995). The Kalman 
filter yields more flexibility in that it considers the variability of its own prediction (or its 
expectation uncertainty) as well as the variability of the measured values in that both are 
combined to the “Kalman Gain” parameter which determines how strongly a new measurement 
changes the following expected value. Basically, if there is higher uncertainty about the expected 
value, a new measurement will have a stronger impact on the subsequent expected value, 
whereas the impact of new measurements on the subsequent expected value will be lower with 
higher variability of the measurements. In other words, as long as there is uncertainty about what 
to expect, the Kalman filter results in a high learning rate (Dayan et al., 2000).  
Regarding the experimental paradigm of this study, the Kalman filter would result in 
higher certainty about the expectation towards the singleton color with more search trials that 
yield a color sample to reduce the prediction error. Variability of the singleton color would 
reduce the influence of every measurement to the subsequent expected value and thus slows 
down the increase in certainty over the trial course. Overall, expectations as inferred from a 
simple version of a Kalman filter algorithm would be in line with the results of the present 
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experiment. Moreover, predictions from a Kalman filter algorithm can be derived about how fast 
expectations adapt after the repeated presentation of a novel singleton color. Expectation 
discrepancy should reduce faster in the post-critical trials if a color change occurred in the 10th 
trial, for instance, as compared to a color change in the 42nd trial. According to the algorithm, 
information of the novel singleton color will have a higher influence on subsequent expected 
color values if there is lower certainty about the expected color value, which however increases 
with every trial. 
However, a simple version of the Kalman filter might still not appropriately deal with the 
adjustment of expectations when it has already reached a high and steady state of certainty, 
which increases monotonically and independently with every new measurement. The algorithm 
needs a priori information about how the measured variable changes in time, that is whether it 
changes linearly or remains constant, for instance. In other words, the Kalman filter might adapt 
inappropriately to a feature change that is not caused by measurement error but by an 
“unexpected” change of the system (like a surprising singleton color that will be presented 
repeatedly). However, advanced versions of the Kalman filter can detect such changes. One 
method would be to constantly control the system with t-tests of the input values (Yu, Watson, & 
Arrillaga, 2005). If the test reaches the significance criterion, a change of the systematic 
conditions is assumed and the Kalman filter can switch into an adaptive mode. A possible 
solution for an adaptive mode would be an adjustment or a complete reset of the Kalman Gain 
parameter. Thereby, the filter returns to a more uncertain state where it tends to rely more on the 
measurements than on its expectation. The challenge for future studies would be to figure out 
fine-grained algorithms such that the Kalman filter that can accurately model the effects of 
surprise. 
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The link between unexpectedness and visual attention 
Another question that still needs closer investigation is how expectations about a 
singleton color can actually be inferred from the singleton’s gaze fixation latency. For instance, 
in behavioral learning it is often assumed that the expectedness of an unconditioned stimulus is 
directly mapped by a specific behavior like the extend of salivation after a bell-ringing 
(Courville, Daw, & Touretzky, 2006). The expectation discrepancy hypothesis for attention 
capture states that surprising stimuli can only draw spatial attention if unexpectedness refers to a 
feature that is available pre-attentively (Horstmann, 2005). As a consequence, only specific novel 
stimuli can be used to potentially measure expectation discrepancy. Another candidate for 
measuring expectation discrepancy could be the gaze dwell time on a stimulus which is also 
increased in the case of syntactically and semantically unexpected stimuli like a floating toaster 
in the kitchen, that cannot pre-attentively draw attention (Võ & Henderson, 2009; see also Võ, 
Zwickel, & Schneider, 2010), as described before. However, it still needs to be demonstrated 
whether these dependent variables covary metrically with expectation discrepancy. Surprise 
capture could also be a binary process that either occurs or not. If so, this must not necessarily be 
obvious from fixation latency distributions as they could be diffused by other random processes 
that together result in a normal distribution; for instance, if within a proportion of participants 
surprise capture could not be elicited but the singleton position is inspected with the first or 
second fixation randomly or only because of an additional saliency capture effect.  
 
Post-selective gaze behavior 
As an additional research question of rather explorative nature, it was evaluated whether 
dwell times and revisits likewise covary gradually with expectation discrepancy in a surprise 
UNEXPECTEDNESS INCREASES SINGLETON CAPTURE 41 
trial. Already a previous study by Horstmann et al. (2016) showed that after a number of color 
homogeneous pre-critical trials, the gaze dwelled longer on an unannounced color singleton 
when it had both singleton novelty and color novelty than when it only had singleton novelty, 
while the singleton’s color was already familiar from pre-critical trials. Different sources of 
novelty could likewise result in different degrees of expectation discrepancy.  
In Experiment 1 of the present study, dwell times generally increased in the critical trial. 
However, group differences of the increase were not significant, although there was a tendency 
for longer dwell times with low color variation than with high color variation. In Experiment 2, 
however, dwell times only increased after a high number of pre-critical trials, which was in line 
with our expectation. Revisits were generally increased in the critical trial of both experiments 
but did not covary with the different expectation discrepancy manipulations as we expected. 
Overall, the result pattern of revisits and dwell times was inconsistent and could not support that 
these variables gradually increase with expectation discrepancy. They only increased generally in 
a surprise condition. 
Foerster (2016) also found increased refixations on a stimulus whose font has been 
unannounced changed after 65 search trials. This effect has been termed “check-after-surprise” 
mode. Meyer et al. (1997) argue that surprise induces higher-level processes such as verifications 
of expectation discrepancy and causal analyses. Possibly, such processes are reflected in 
increased dwell times and revisits in the present study. Revisits on the singleton could be caused 
by comparisons between several stimulus types in the display, which are performed for the 
verification of expectation discrepancy. Increased dwell times could be due to causal analyses 
which interfere with the process of target-distractor discrimination (see also Becker, 2011). 
Likewise in line with increased gaze activity in a surprise trial, neurophysiological studies posit 
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an unconditioned hard-wired novelty bonus (Kakade & Dayan, 2002) that enhances dopamine 
signals and engages humans and animals to actively explore the environment, possibly for 
further reward (Knutson & Cooper, 2006; Krebs, Schott, Schütze, & Düzel, 2009; Schultz, 
1998).  
 
Summary 
As postulated in schema theory, expectations towards a visual feature depend on the 
number of sampling occasions and on feature variability between sampling occasions. 
Accordingly, we demonstrated that surprise capture of the gaze reduces with fewer sampling 
occasions and with higher feature variability before the presentation of a novel color feature. 
These findings support that both manipulations result in broader expectations, rendering the 
same novel color feature less expectation discrepant. 
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Abstract 
A highly debated question in attention research is to what extent attention is biased by bottom-up 
factors such as saliency versus top-down factors as governed by the task. Visual search 
experiments in which participants are briefly familiarized with the task and then see a novel 
stimulus unannounced and for the first time support yet another factor, showing that novel and 
surprising features attract attention. In the present study, we tested whether gaze behavior as an 
indicator for attentional prioritization can be predicted accurately within displays containing both 
salient and novel stimuli by means of a priority map that assumes novelty as an additional source 
of activation. To that aim, we conducted a visual search experiment where a color singleton was 
presented for the first time in the surprise trial, and manipulated the color-novelty of the 
remaining non-singletons between participants. In one group, the singleton was the only novel 
stimulus (“one-new”), whereas in another group, the non-singleton stimuli were likewise novel 
(“all-new”). The surprise trial was always target absent and designed such that top-down 
prioritization was unlikely. Current prevalent models of visual attention usually do not consider 
novelty and would predict that early attention should be equally directed towards the singleton in 
both groups, as it is the most salient item. However, our results show that the singleton in the all-
new group initially captured the gaze less strongly, with more early fixations being directed to 
the novel non-singletons. Overall, the fixation pattern can accurately be explained by noisy 
priority maps where saliency and novelty compete for gaze control.    
Keywords:  attention capture,visual guidance, surprise, novelty, expectations, saliency 
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Novelty competes with saliency for attention 
In the field of visual attention research, many experiments have been conducted to clarify 
whether attentional deployment is driven by bottom-up or by top-down factors– or more recently, 
how they interact (e.g., van Zoest, Donk, & Theeuwes, 2004). An important part of the early 
theoretical and empirical development centers on the question whether it is the bottom-up factor 
of physical saliency (Theeuwes, 1991, 1992, 2010) or goal-driven factors such as the task goals 
and intentions (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992) that primarily drive attentional section. 
Current theories assume that both factors play a role within a priority map that determines the 
deployment of visual attention and eye movements (e.g., Moran, Zehetleitner, Müller, & Usher, 
2013; Wolfe, 1994, 2007; Zelinsky & Bisley, 2015). In the present study, we focus on the 
specific factor of feature novelty (or unexpectedness) and examine how it affects attention and 
eye movements. Several studies already demonstrated that the presentation of a stimulus with an 
unexpected feature captures attention (for a review see Horstmann, 2015).  
The attentional prioritization caused by unexpected simple features has been termed 
surprise capture (Horstmann, 2002, 2015). Note that for the purpose of the present study, we use 
the terms novelty and surprise (or unexpectedness) synonymously, as the differences between the 
concepts are not the focus of the current study (see Barto, Mirolli, & Baldassarre, 2013, for an 
overview), and can be neglected here for simplicity. Surprise capture experiments usually 
comprise a number of familiarization trials, followed by a single surprise trial that contains a 
stimulus with a novel feature (repetition-change paradigm). In the majority of studies, the 
surprising item was a singleton, that is, a salient item with a unique feature (e.g., a red item 
among all green items), not contained in the familiarization trials (e.g., all green items).  
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At a first glance, analyzing the first presentation of an unannounced salient item seems a 
good way to test stimulus-driven attention that is not confounded with goal-directed behavior 
like the strategical prioritization of singletons (Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Gibson & Jiang, 1998). 
Multiple studies showed that surprising singletons attract attention and the gaze at their first 
unannounced occurrence, even in the absence of corresponding goals to attend to it (e.g., Becker 
& Horstmann, 2011; Horstmann, 2005; Horstmann & Becker, 2008, 2011; Horstmann & Herwig, 
2015; Horstmann, Becker, & Ernst, 2016; Retell, Venini, & Becker, 2015). However, attention to 
the surprising singleton was attributed to a distinct surprise capture mechanisms rather than to 
saliency-based mechanisms, because the time course of surprise capture seems to differ from the 
time course of saliency capture (Theeuwes, 2010), which is assumed to be purely stimulus-
driven. Saliency capture has been postulated to occur after 60-150ms for covert attention shifts 
(Kim & Cave, 1999; Theeuwes, 2010; Theeuwes, Atchley, & Kramer, 2000), and after about 
200-250ms for overt attention shifts (i.e., oculomotor capture, Theeuwes, De Vries, & Godijn, 
2003; van Zoest et al., 2004; Weichselbaum & Ansorge, 2018). Surprise capture instead has been 
found to mainly occur after about 400ms for covert attention shifts (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, 
Gilbert, & Marois, 2010; Horstmann, 2006), and 400-500ms for overt attention shifts (Ernst & 
Horstmann, 2018; Horstmann et al., 2016; Horstmann & Herwig, 2015). Once an unexpected 
item is visually selected, further post-selective attentional prioritization follows as indicated by 
longer gaze dwells times (e.g., Ernst & Horstmann, 2018; Horstmann, 2015), and increased 
revisits (Foerster, 2016; see also Horstmann et al., 2016; Retell et al., 2015). With respect to 
dwell times, results of Ernst and Horstmann (2018) showed that within a surprise trial not only 
the surprising stimulus is gazed at longer but that this is also true for the remaining familiar 
stimuli which are not salient. Increased dwell times have also been found for complex 
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unexpected stimuli that do not automatically draw spatial attention but are encountered during 
serial search (Võ & Henderson, 2009; Võ, Zwickel, & Schneider, 2010). Furthermore, Foerster 
(2016) found increased refixations on a stimulus that has been changed in a surprise trial while 
participants performed a manual motor task. Together, increased dwell times and revisits could 
reflect high-level processes like verification of expectation discrepancy, causal analyses and 
action relevance checks, which have been postulated in a cognitive-evolutionary model of 
surprise (Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 1997; Reisenzein, Horstmann, & Schützwohl, 2017; 
see also Horstmann, Becker, & Ernst, 2017, for the impact of dwelling and revisiting on search 
times).      
In most studies, surprise capture was elicited by means of an unexpected singleton with a 
novel feature (e.g., Becker & Horstmann, 2011; Horstmann & Becker, 2011; Retell, Becker, & 
Remington, 2016; Retell, Venini, & Becker, 2015). However, recent studies suggest that surprise 
capture is not necessarily bound to the combination of feature and singleton novelty. For 
instance, Ernst and Horstmann (2018) presented a color singleton already in the familiarization 
trials of a visual search experiment, which was not predictive of the target. This expected 
irrelevant singleton only weakly attracted the participants’ gaze (which could be either because 
of its saliency or a strategy to attend to singletons; e.g., Bacon & Egeth, 1994). However, when 
the singleton was presented for the first time with a novel color, it strongly captured the gaze. 
Yet, other studies suggest that singleton status is not necessary for a surprising feature to attract 
attention: In Horstmann and Herwig (2016), participants encountered a display with half novel 
and half familiar search items on either side of the display (four adjacent search items each of a 
familiar color and a novel color), and the results showed more early fixations on the novel side 
than on the familiar side. As the physical saliency was equal on both sides, and saliency did not 
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single out a particular stimulus, these results indicate that physical saliency is not necessary for 
prioritized selection of novel items. In line with this conclusion, Horstmann and Ansorge (2016) 
also found prioritization of a novel color within a two-stimulus display, as reflected by reduced 
inattentional blindness rates. Together, these studies demonstrate that color novelty alone is 
sufficient for attentional prioritization. 
So far, prevalent models of visual attention have mainly neglected novelty as a factor 
driving attention and eye movements (but see Itti & Baldi, 2009, for an exception), and it has 
even been doubted that novelty plays a role in attentional guidance (e.g., Wolfe & Horowitz, 
2004, 2017). In the present study, we examine how attentional prioritization due to novelty can 
be integrated into the framework of priority maps for visual attention. To that aim, we designed 
an experiment that will show how novelty affects attentional deployment within displays that 
contain both salient and novel stimuli. Moreover, we designed the surprise trials such that 
additional top-down influences like goal driven feature prioritization or inhibition are unlikely 
(Gibson & Jiang, 1998), allowing us to focus on the effects of novelty and saliency on attentional 
prioritization.  
Priority maps (see Zelinsky & Bisley, 2015, for a recent review) are an integrated 
representation of bottom-up stimulus saliency and top-down target information. Saliency and 
task-relevance both contribute to location-specific activation in the priority map, whereby the 
activation signals are higher for more salient stimuli, and higher for target-similar stimuli. 
Attention then serially follows the activation gradient, though not always perfectly as either the 
activation calculation (e.g., Wolfe, 1994, 2007; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989) or the process of 
following the activation gradient itself is assumed to be noisy (e.g., Moran et al., 2013).  
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We propose novelty as an additional source of activation within priority maps. Crucially, 
as previous experiments showed that also feature novelty of non-salient stimuli attracts attention 
(Horstmann & Ansorge, 2016; Horstmann & Herwig, 2016), we conceptualize the novelty’s 
activity contribution such that the novel feature must not necessarily be presented in a salient 
manner in order to increase activation. However, if a stimulus is both novel and salient like a 
color singleton that is presented for the first time, activity due to novelty and saliency can add up 
to induce a strong peak in activity within the priority map, resulting in attention capture of the 
singleton. An implication that is tested within the present study is that the activity peak for such a 
novel salient stimulus can be attenuated if other low-salient stimuli in a display likewise have a 
novel feature.   
To test the assumption of novelty as an additional source of activation in a priority map, 
we conducted an eye tracking experiment with a difficult visual search task and used gaze 
behavior as a proxy for visual attention deployment (Deubel & Schneider, 1996). First, we 
familiarized two groups of participants with search displays only containing stimuli of the same 
single color (e.g., red; see Figure 1). In the surprise trial, one group was presented for the first 
time with a novel color singleton (e.g., one green stimulus) whereas the remaining non-singleton 
distractors were unchanged ("one-new"). The surprise trial of the other group contained likewise 
a singleton with a novel color; in addition, however the remaining non-singleton stimuli also had 
a novel color (e.g., green singleton among blue other items; "all-new"). Thus, the displays of the 
surprise trials only differ with respect to the novelty of the non-singleton stimuli. If novelty acts 
as an additional factor besides saliency within a priority map, in both groups the singleton 
position would still have the highest activation as it receives activity both from saliency and 
novelty information. Consequently, we expect a high number of early fixations on the singleton 
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in both groups. However, if novelty always contributes to activation in the priority map, the 
difference in activation between the salient stimulus’ position and the positions of the remaining 
stimuli would be smaller in the all-new condition as any stimulus in the display is novel and 
activation differences should only be due to saliency information. Assuming a stochastic process 
where fixation probability is a function of the activation in the priority map plus noise (e.g., 
Wolfe, 1994, 2007), there should be fewer early fixations on the singleton in the all-new than in 
the one-new condition. Accordingly, more early fixations should be directed on the non-
singletons in the all-new condition than in the one-new condition. 
As already mentioned before, by using only one critical surprise trial we solely focus on 
saliency and novelty as factors for attentional prioritization. Strategic orienting towards any of 
the stimuli is unlikely, because the pre-critical trials do not induce an attentional set towards any 
color: As the target only has a distinct shape (a closed ring among rings with a gap) but does not 
differ in color from the other items, color is completely irrelevant for selection. Thus, the present 
study allows for a relatively clear-cut discrimination between novelty and saliency effects for the 
color features.  
Given that top-down influences can be neglected, current saliency based models (e.g., Itti 
& Koch, 2000; Theeuwes, 2010) would be first choice to explain attention deployment as 
guidance due to novelty is not commonly accepted or unknown. Yet, saliency based models 
would predict no difference in singleton prioritization between the critical trial of the one-new 
and the all-new group as in both displays the singleton is equally salient. The feature novelty 
account, however, predicts that the singleton in the critical trial of the all-new group will receive 
lower early prioritization than in the one-new group as an increased amount of attention will be 
directed to the non-singleton stimuli with a novel color. To test these predictions, our main 
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dependent variable will be the proportion of fixations that hit singletons and non-singletons 
within the first three fixations after search display’s onset. Other variables like fixation latencies, 
dwell times, and revisits will be analyzed additionally for comparisons with other studies on 
surprise. 
 
 
Figure 1. Exemplary displays of the pre-critical familiarization trials and the critical surprise 
trials for both groups. 
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Method 
Participants 
72 students or visitors of Bielefeld University (18 men and 54 women) participated in the 
10-min experiment. The sample size was oriented on in a pilot study which mainly differed in 
that colors were not counterbalanced. Participants were approached in the central hall of the 
university main building, and asked to participate in a short experiment in return for 2€. Mean 
age was 22.17 (SD = 2.53). Participants gave written informed consent prior to participation. All 
were tested for normal or corrected-to-normal vision and for normal color vision. The study was 
approved by the Ethics Committee of University of Bielefeld (EUB), and was carried out in 
accordance with the Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki). 
 
Apparatus 
Stimuli were presented on a 19-in. display monitor (100-Hz refresh rate, resolution 1,024 
x 768 pixels) at a distance of 71 cm. Before testing, the monitor was warmed for at least 30 
minutes, to ensure temporal stability of luminance and color (Poth & Horstmann, 2017). A video-
based eye-tracker (EyeLink 1000, SR Research, Ontario, Canada) with a sampling rate of 1 kHz 
was used for the recording of eye movements. The participants’ head was stabilized by a chin 
rest, and the right eye was monitored in all participants. 
 
Stimuli 
The target was a 1.11° diameter ring with a line-width of 0.23° (viewing distance 71 cm). 
The distractors were identical to the target with the only difference of a small radial gap of 0.09° 
height. 16 different gap positions were evenly distributed between 22.5° and 360°. The rings 
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were black and presented on circular color patches of 1.99° diameter against a black background 
(RGB: 0, 0, 0; CIE: x = 0.280, y = 0.226; 0.114 cd/m2). Possible patch colors were red (RGB: 
224, 0, 0; CIE: x = 0.606, y = .329), green (RGB: 0, 136, 0; CIE: x = 0.282, y = .589), and blue 
(RGB: 70, 70, 248; CIE: x = 0.169, y = .100). With the exception of the black background, all 
colors had a matched physical luminance of 24 cd/m2 (±1). Eight stimuli (color patches plus 
search stimuli) were presented in each search display. The stimuli were evenly distributed on an 
imaginary circle with a radius of 6.4°. 
 
Design 
The experiment comprised one single block of 33 trials; 32 pre-critical familiarization 
trials in which only homogenous color patches without a salient item were presented, and one 
critical surprise trial with an unannounced salient color singleton. Half of the displays in each 
group were target present trials, and half were target absent trials. On target present trials, the 
target position was determined randomly, with all possible target positions realized equally often. 
The singleton position in the critical trial was likewise random. Furthermore, the critical trial was 
always a target absent trial to allow measuring surprise effects unconfounded with the presence 
of the target (Ernst & Horstmann, 2018). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups, which had the 
same pre-critical trials with only homogenous color patches (e.g., all red) but differed in the 
critical trial (see Figure 1). For the all-new group, the search display in the critical trial consisted 
of a color singleton distractor with a novel color (e.g., green), while the remaining non-singleton 
distractors had another color that was likewise novel (e.g., blue). In the one-new group, the 
critical trial only had a singleton with a novel color (e.g., green) while the remaining non-
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singleton distractors had the same color like in the pre-critical trials (e.g., red). All possible color 
combinations were counterbalanced between participants. 
 
Procedure 
The participants’ task was to report the presence or absence of the target with a 
corresponding key press (arrow left and arrow down keys in the lower row of the keyboard, 
operated with the right index and middle fingers), and participants were instructed to perform the 
search task as fast as possible while avoiding any response errors. Each trial began with a drift 
correction where participants fixated on the middle of the screen and confirmed fixation with a 
key press (left hand). 
The drift correction was followed by a fixation display with a central fixation cross for a 
variable period before the search display appeared. The durations of this pre-display were the 
sum of a) a randomly drawn value from an exponential distribution with an expectation value of 
0.5s (λ = 2), b) a following period of 100ms, in which the eye tracker controlled for a central 
fixation, and c) possible additional time until the central fixation has been successful. To reduce 
variance between participants, within the fore-period of the critical trial we fixed the time at the 
exponential distribution’s expectation value of 500ms. Afterwards the search display was 
presented until a key press was registered. An error sound occurred whenever an incorrect 
response had been recorded.   
The exponential distribution of the “non-aging” (Näätänen, 1971) fore-periods is 
characterized by a constant hazard rate, rendering the onset of the search display less predictable 
by the time the fore-period already has elapsed. Thereby, we intended to reduce possible pre-
planned eye movements at the onset of the search display.  
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Results 
The first 16 trials were considered practice, leaving 16 pre-critical trials for the analysis 
plus the single critical trial. Raw gaze data were pre-processed using the EyeLink Data Viewer 
(2.3.22), which parses eye position data into saccades and fixations according to an acceleration 
threshold (8,000 degrees/sec2), and a velocity threshold (30 degrees/sec). Fixations were 
classified as eye data that exceeded neither of these thresholds for a period of 20ms or more. 
Fixations were assigned to a stimulus when they fell within a circular region with a radius of 
2.41° from the center of the stimulus. Further preprocessing and statistical analysis were done 
using R 3.4.3 (R Core Team, 2016). All reported p-values are two-tailed.  
In order to adequately model binary dependent variables like fixations (our main 
dependent variable) and accuracy without violating the assumption of homoscedasticity (Warton 
& Hui, 2011), we used Generalized Estimation Equations (GEE, Liang & Zeger, 1986). GEEs 
allow for the use of a logit link function while they simultaneously control for correlated data 
(here, due to repeated measurements) in order to prevent underestimation of standard errors. To 
conduct GEEs, an initial working correlation structure must be specified. Due to its parsimony, 
we used an exchangeable working correlation structure that assumes equal correlations between 
any pair of measurements within a participant. GEEs yield robust estimates, however, even if the 
correlation structure is mis-specified, because the empirical correlations are also considered 
(Liang & Zeger, 1986). The basic output and interpretation of GEEs are analogue to those of 
regression models. Note that the raw slopes reported in the table of a logistic model are mainly 
interpretable with respect to their sign. The raw slopes, however, can be transformed into the 
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proportions of the predicted categories which are coded with 1 (vs. 0). For a better 
interpretability, we will report these proportions in the text.  
Because of categorial factors of this experiment (trial type: pre-critical vs. critical; group: 
one-new vs. all-new), dummy coded GEE models were calculated which directly tested planned 
contrasts together with the interaction. In all GEE analyses, we set the critical trial of the all-new 
group as reference category, whose outcome is represented by the intercept of the model. Thus, 
the models tested the following comparisons to the reference category: First, the within group 
difference to the pre-critical trials; second, the between difference to the critical trial of the one-
new group; and third, the interaction which tests whether the trial type difference differs between 
the groups. Note that these comparisons correspond to the ANOVA’s interaction and post-hoc 
tests which are the meaningful comparisons within the present design. 
As the critical trial was always a target absent trial, we only compared with pre-critical 
target absent trials. Target present trials we excluded from all analyses.   
 
Accuracy 
We recoded the response pattern of one participant who exchanged response keys and 
showed 0% correct answers before transformation. Overall, accuracy in pre-critical trials was 
95%. By means of a dummy coded GEE model with a logit link function, we regressed responses 
(1= correct; 0= false) on the factors group (one-new vs. all-new) and trial type (pre-critical vs. 
critical), as well as on their interaction. However, there were no significant differences, Wald 
χ2(1)s < 1.59, ps > .207.  
In the following analyses, only trials with correct answers were included. Two 
participants of the all-new group did not answer correctly in the critical trial and were excluded 
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from all following analyses. Furthermore, we completely removed one participant of the all-new 
group with an extremely long response time in the critical trial (18,377ms; zincluded = 14.74), 
reducing the sample size to 69. 
 
Manual response times 
An ANOVA for manual response times with the factors group (one new vs. all new) and 
trial type (pre-critical vs. critical) yielded a significant main effect for trial type with longer 
response times in the critical trial (M = 3,747ms) than in pre-critical trials (M = 2,531ms), 
F(1,67) = 94.84, p < .001, ηG2 = .33, indicating that the surprising stimulus features disrupted the 
visual search process in both groups. The interaction just failed to reach significance, F(1,67) = 
3.61, p = .062. The average response time difference between pre-critical trials and the critical 
trial tended to be somewhat more pronounced within the all-new group (2,462 vs 3,928ms) than 
in the one-new group (2,594 vs. 3,582ms). The main effect for group was not significant, F(1,67) 
= 0.40, p = .531, ηG2 < .01. 
 
Gaze data 
For the analyses of the gaze data, we compared fixations on the singleton in the critical 
trial with the average gaze behavior on all distractors in all pre-critical target absent trials, 
whereas the distractors serve as a baseline for unbiased attention distribution. Where informative, 
also gaze behavior on non-singletons in the critical trial was analyzed. Note that we use the word 
“distractors” if we refer to stimuli in pre-critical trials, whereas we use the words “singleton” and 
“non-singletons” if we refer to stimuli in the critical trial (though on principle all stimuli in target 
absent trials are distractors). Overall, participants fixated 96% of the presented stimuli. 
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Stimulus fixation latencies 
To assess the time course of the fixations on the different stimulus types, the latencies of 
their first fixation relative to the onset of the search display were examined (see Figure 2). Note 
that this is not necessarily the first fixation after the search display’s onset. An ANOVA including 
the factors group (one new vs. all new) and stimulus type (distractors in pre-critical trials vs. 
singleton in the critical trial) yielded a significant main effect for stimulus type, F(1,67) = 
135.61, p < .001, ηG2 = .49, and a significant interaction, F(1,67) = 4.91, p = .030, ηG2 = .03. The 
main effect for group was not significant, F(1,67) = 3.46, p = .067, ηG2 = .03.  
Pair-wise comparisons revealed that the singleton in the critical trial of the one-new 
group was fixated significantly earlier (M = 433ms) than in the all-new group (M = 604ms), 
t(56.83) = 2.76, p = .034, d = .53. Compared to distractors in pre-critical trials, the singleton was 
significantly prioritized both within the one-new group (433 vs. 996ms), t(35) = 11.54, p < .001, 
dz = 1.92, and within the all-new group (604 vs. 987ms), t(32) = 5.80, p < .001, dz = 1.01.  
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Figure 2. Mean latencies of the first fixation on distractors in pre-critical trials, singletons in the 
critical trial, and non-singletons in the critical trial, separately for the one-new and the all-new 
group. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
 
Early fixation destinations 
In order to inspect the destinations of the very early fixations after search display’s onset, 
we examined the cumulative proportions of at least one visit on a specific stimulus within the 
first three fixations by means of GEE models with a logit link function (see also Ernst & 
Horstmann, 2018; Horstmann et al., 2016). For instance, as shown in Figure 3, the proportion of 
at least one singleton visit in the one-new group within the first, first and second, and the first 
three fixations was .22, .75 and .90, respectively.  
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Figure 3. Proportions of at least one visit on the different stimulus types within the first, first and 
second, and within the first three fixations, separately for the one-new and all-new group. 
 
In the following analyses, the fixations on the singleton in the critical trials of the all-new 
group served as reference category. The first GEE regressed stimulus fixations (1= fixated; 0= 
not fixated) on the factors stimulus type (distractor in pre-critical trials vs. singleton in the 
critical trial), group (one new vs. all new), and their interaction. However, there were no 
significant effects (see Table 1, upper model for detailed statistics). 
If both first and second fixations were regressed on the same factors (Table 1, second 
model), there was a significantly higher proportion of at least one singleton fixation in the critical 
trial of the one-new group than in the all-new group (.75 vs. .39), Wald χ2(1) = 8.50, p = .004, as 
reflected in the significant positive slope for the singleton in the one-new group (see Table 1, 
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second model). Within the all new group, the probability of a singleton visit in the critical trial 
was significantly higher than the probability of a distractor visit in the pre-critical trials (.39 
vs. .18), Wald χ2(1) = 9.43, p = .002. Within the one-new group, the analogue stimulus type 
difference was significantly more pronounced (.75 vs. .19), Wald χ2(1) = 8.07, p = .005, 
indicating a stronger singleton prioritization within the one-new group than in the all-new group.  
The model for the first three fixations (Table 1, bottom model) only showed a significant 
difference between pre-critical distractors in the all-new condition (.29) compared to the 
singleton in the critical trial of this group (.79), Wald χ2(1) = 27.29, p < .001. The non-significant 
interaction suggests that the analogue stimulus type difference within the one-new group was 
comparable. Thus, the stronger singleton prioritization in the one-new group as compared to the 
all-new group mainly occurred within the first two fixations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOVELTY COMPETES WITH SALIENCY 20 
Table 1. GEE models for at least one visit on singletons in the critical trial and distractors 
in pre-critical trials within the first three fixations   
Dependent variable  b Wald χ2(1) p 
1st Fixation 
Intercept: singleton (crit), all-new - 2.74 14.11 < .001* 
Distractors (pre), all-new + 0.57 0.60 .437 
Singleton (crit), one-new + 1.49 3.20 .074 
Stimulus type × Group (one-new) - 1.43 2.97 .085 
1-2nd Fixations 
Intercept: singleton (crit), all-new - 0.43 1.46 .227 
Distractors (pre), all-new - 1.06 9.43 .002* 
Singleton (crit), one-new + 1.53 8.50 .004* 
Stimulus type × Group (one-new) - 1.49 8.07 .005* 
1-3rd Fixations 
Intercept: singleton (crit), all-new + 1.31 9.50 .002* 
Distractors (pre), all-new - 2.23 27.29 < .001* 
Singleton (crit), one-new + 0.77 1.27 .259 
Stimulus type × Group (one-new) - 0.74 1.16  .282 
Note. GEEs comprised a logit link function. Singletons in the critical trials of the all-new group were 
set as reference category which is represented by the intercept. Signs of non-interaction slopes 
indicate whether fixation probability increases or decreases compared to the reference category. See 
text for further details. * p < .05.  
 
To confirm that the lower proportion of singleton fixations in the critical trial of the all-
new group was actually accompanied by an increased prioritization of the remaining non-
singletons, we repeated the previous analyses for non-singleton fixations in the critical trial 
(instead of singleton fixations) and distractor fixations in pre-critical trials. Here, non-singletons 
in the critical trial of the all-new group served as the reference category (the detailed results of 
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the GEE model are depicted in Table 2, and the proportions of at least one fixation on non-
singletons are depicted in Figure 3).  
There were no significant effects at the first fixation (Table 2, upper model). 
If both first and second fixations were analyzed, the all-new group showed a higher 
proportion of fixations on non-singletons than the one-new group (.17 vs .12), Wald χ2(1) = 7.30, 
p = .007, as reflected in the significant slope for non-singletons in the critical trial of the one-new 
group (see Table 2, second model). Within the all-new group, there was no reliable difference 
between fixations on non-singletons in the critical trial and fixations on distractors in pre-critical 
trials (.17 vs. .18), Wald χ2(1) = 0.38, p = .539. However, the analogue comparison was 
significantly different within the one-new group because of fewer fixations on non-singletons in 
the critical trial than on distractors in pre-critical trials (.12 vs. .19), Wald χ2(1) = 8.02, p = .005, 
as reflected in the significant interaction. Thus, there was a higher prioritization of non-
singletons within the all-new group. 
If the first three fixations were analyzed (Table 2, bottom model), within the all-new 
group there were significantly fewer fixations on non-singletons in the critical trial than on 
distractors in pre-critical trials (.22 vs .29), Wald χ2(1) = 14.98, p < .001. The significant 
interaction reflects that the analogue difference between both stimulus types was more 
pronounced within the one-new group with even fewer fixations on non-singletons (.17 vs .29), 
Wald χ2(1) = 4.60, p = .032. Lastly, the direct comparison between both groups reveals that there 
were more fixations on non-singletons in the critical trial of the all-new group than in the one-
new group (.22 vs. .17), Wald χ2(1) = 3.97, p = .046, as indicated in the significant slope for non-
singletons in the critical trial of the one-new group. 
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Table 2. GEE models for at least one visit on non-singletons in the critical trial and 
distractors in pre-critical trials within the first three fixations   
Dependent variable  b Wald χ2(1) p 
1st Fixation 
Intercept: non-singleton (crit), all-new - 2.11 364.78 < .001* 
Distractors (pre), all-new - 0.07 0.32 .573 
Non-singleton (crit), one-new - 0.19 1.15 .284 
Stimulus type × Group (one-new) + 0.25 1.78 .182 
1-2nd Fixations 
Intercept: non-singleton (crit), all-new - 1.56 232.18 < .001* 
Distractors (pre), all-new + 0.07 0.38 .539 
Non-singleton (crit), one-new - 0.44 7.30 .007* 
Stimulus type × Group (one-new) + 0.48 8.02 .005* 
1-3rd Fixations 
Intercept: non-singleton (crit), all-new - 1.29 207.50 < .001* 
Distractors (pre), all-new + 0.37 14.98 < .001* 
Non-singleton (crit), one-new - 0.29 3.97 .046* 
Stimulus type × Group (one-new) + 0.32 4.60  .032* 
Note. GEEs comprised a logit link function. Non-singletons in the critical trials of the all-new group 
were set as reference category which is represented by the intercept. Signs of non-interaction slopes 
indicate whether fixation probability increases or decreases compared to the reference category. See 
text for further details. * p < .05.  
 
Dwell times 
As another component of surprise capture, we also examined dwell times, which are 
defined as the summed fixation durations of the first continuous visit on a stimulus (see Figure 
4). Here, we also considered non-singleton distractors in the critical trial. As the repeated 
measurement factor now includes three levels, p-values were Greenhouse-Geisser corrected 
when the assumption of sphericity was violated (indicated by the Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon).  
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An ANOVA with the factors group (one-new vs. all-new) and stimulus type (distractors in 
pre-critical trials vs. singleton in critical trial vs. non-singletons in critical trial) revealed a 
significant main effect for group, F(1,67) = 5.92, p  = .018, ηG2 = .03, stimulus type, F(2,134) = 
88.94, ɛ = .06, p < .001, ηG2 = .45, and a significant interaction, F(2,134) = 6.53, ɛ = .06, p 
= .012, ηG2 = .06. The main effect for stimulus type reflects that singletons in the critical trial of 
both groups were gazed at significantly longer (M = 495ms) than both distractors in pre-critical 
trials (M = 222ms) and non-singletons in the critical trial (M = 231ms), ts(68) > 9.22, ps < .001, 
dzs > 1.10. Moreover, dwell times on non-singletons in the critical trial of both groups (M = 
231ms) were significantly longer than on distractors in pre-critical trials (M = 222ms), t(68) = 
2.07, p = .043, dz = 0.25, (that is, irrespective of whether they had a novel color or not). 
Dwell times on the singleton in the critical trial of the one-new group (M = 566ms) were 
significantly longer than on the singleton in the all-new group (M = 418ms), t(51.18) = 2.64, p 
= .011, d = 0.62, indicating that the novel color of the non-singletons may have shortened dwell 
times on the singleton in the all-new group.  
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Figure 4. Mean dwell times of the first visit on distractors in pre-critical trials, the singleton in 
the critical trial, and non-singletons in the critical trial, separately for the one-new and the all-
new group. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
 
Revisits 
As an hitherto relatively unexplored component of surprise capture, we additionally 
examined the proportions of at least one revisit on the several stimulus types (Figure 5). 
Proportions were analyzed by means of GEEs with the same settings as previously for fixation 
proportions. The detailed results can be seen in Table 3. For simplicity, we run separate GEE 
models for singletons and non-singletons in which we compared them with distractors in pre-
critical trials. 
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Figure 5. Proportions of at least one revisit on distractors in pre-critical trials, the singleton in the 
critical trial, and non-singletons in the critical trial, separately for the one-new and the all-new 
group.  
 
The first GEE model (see Table 3, upper model) regressed the proportion of revisits on the 
factors stimulus type (distractor in pre-critical trials vs. singleton in the critical trial) and group 
(one new vs. all new) and their interaction. Within the all-new group, there was a significantly 
higher proportion of revisits on the singleton in the critical trial than on distractors in pre-critical 
trials (.58 vs. .12), Wald χ2(1) = 37.65, p < .001. The non-significant interaction indicates that the 
analogue stimulus type difference was comparable within the one-new condition (.58 vs. 13), 
Wald χ2(1) = 0.02, p = .877. 
The second GEE model (see Table 3, bottom model) included non-singletons in the critical trial 
(instead of the singleton) and distractors in pre-critical trials as stimulus types, besides the group 
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factor. Within the all-new group, there was a higher proportion of revisits on non-singletons in 
the critical trial than on distractors in pre-critical trials (.36 vs. .12), Wald χ2(1) = 56.48, p < .001. 
The analogue stimulus type difference was, however, significantly less pronounced within the 
one-new group (.27 vs. 13), Wald χ2(1) = 4.44, p < .035.  
 
Table 3. GEE models for at least one revisit on singletons in the critical trial and 
distractors in pre-critical trials (upper model) and on non-singletons in the critical trial and 
distractors in pre-critical trials (bottom model)   
Stimulus types  b Wald χ2(1) p 
Singleton vs. 
distractors  
Intercept: singleton (crit), all-new + 0.31 0.75  .386 
Distractors (pre), all-new - 2.34 37.65 < .001* 
Singleton (crit), one-new + 0.03 0.00 .949 
Stimulus type × Group (one-new) + 0.08 0.02 .877 
Non-singletons vs. 
distractors 
Intercept: non-singleton (crit), all-new - 0.58 12.09 < .001* 
Distractors (pre), all-new - 1.45 56.48 < .001* 
Non-singleton (crit), one-new - 0.40 3.46 .063 
Stimulus type × Group (one-new) + 0.51 4.44 .035* 
Note. GEEs comprised a logit link function. Singletons (upper model) and non-singletons (bottom 
model) in the critical trials of the all-new group were set as reference categories which are 
represented by the intercepts. Signs of non-interaction slopes indicate whether fixation probability 
increases or decreases compared to the reference category. See text for further details. * p < .05.  
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Discussion 
In this study, it was tested whether novelty competes with saliency for visual attention. To 
that aim, we designed a visual search experiment where we manipulated the color novelty of the 
non-singleton stimuli by contrasting a “one-new” condition, in which only a surprising color 
singleton had a novel color, with an “all-new” condition, in which both a surprising color 
singleton and the remaining non-singleton distractors had a novel color. A competition between 
novelty and saliency within a priority map should result in attenuated capture of the singleton in 
the all-new group as compared to the one-new group because of an increased prioritization of the 
novel non-singleton stimuli in the all-new group. The results strongly supported this prediction. 
Crucially, the analyses of the fixated stimulus types within the first three fixations after 
search display’s onset showed that there were fewer early fixations at the singleton in the all-new 
group than in the one-new group– mainly within the first two fixations. Accordingly, non-
singletons with a novel color in the critical trial of the all-new group were fixated more often 
within the first three fixations than in the one-new group where non-singletons had a familiar 
color. Additional support for a reduced prioritization of the singleton in the all-new group comes 
from the mean singleton fixation latencies, which were shorter in the one-new group, and from 
singleton dwell times which were longer in the one-new group.  
Overall, the results are completely in accordance with the framework of noisy working 
priority maps (Moran et al., 2013; Wolfe, 1994, 2007; Wolfe et al., 1989; Zelinsky & Bisley, 
2015), and the additional assumption of novelty as a source of activity. The activation difference 
between singleton and non-singleton locations within the all-new group should be smaller as the 
color features of both stimulus types were novel and the activation increase of the singleton 
should only be due to its saliency. In the one-new group, however, the singleton position is 
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distinguished from all other locations because of both saliency and novelty, which lead to a 
larger difference in activation between both stimulus types than in the all-new group. Activation 
due to top-down priorities should have been rather constant and low across both groups because 
the pre-critical familiarization trials were designed such that a) they did not induce the need for 
an attentional set towards a specific color (Folk et al., 1992), and b) the novel colors in the 
surprise trial should have been completely unexpected and therefore were unlikely prioritized in 
a strategic manner (e.g., singleton detection mode; Bacon & Egeth, 1994).  
Note that the singleton position in the critical trial of both groups is still expected to be 
marked by the highest fixation probability as compared to the remaining non-singleton 
distractors, which is also supported by the data within the first three fixations. However, a 
deterministic mapping of activation and selection ordering should always have led to the 
singleton being selected as the first item on the critical trial. Yet, the results of the present study 
showed that the first fixation after search display’s onset was (just) not significantly affected by 
our manipulations. Because the most relevant or salient item does not always receive the first 
fixation, but only with a higher probability, it has been argued that the priority map is noisy 
(Noran et al., 2013; Wolfe, 1994, 2007; Zehetleitner, Koch, Goschy, & Müller, 2013). Likewise, 
with a noisy priority map, it is not necessarily the first saccade that is directed to the surprising 
color singleton in the present study. Moreover, it is immediately clear that a smaller activation 
difference between the singleton location and the non-singleton locations in the critical trial of 
the all-new group should also result in a smaller difference in the proportion of early fixations on 
both stimulus types as compared to the one-new group. This is also in line with previous studies 
which suggested that noise within a priority map occasionally caused attentional capture by less 
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salient distractor singletons than the target singleton (Koch, Müller, Zehetleitner, 2013; 
Zehetleitner et al., 2013).  
One could argue that because search is assumed to be serial in this experiment, 
participants could also have adopted strategies like beginning search always at an 
idiosyncratically chosen position (e.g., the top position) which leads to pre-planned first saccades 
that are less susceptible to singleton capture. Yet, this argument could only explain why in 
general the first fixation was not significantly affected by the singleton but not the difference of 
the singleton effect between both experimental groups.  
In line with the time course of surprise capture in previous studies, the surprising color 
singleton in the one-new group was first fixated with an average latency of 433ms (e.g., Ernst & 
Horstmann, 2018; Horstmann, 2006; Horstmann & Herwig, 2015). By contrast, the singleton in 
the all-new group was fixated on average with an increased latency of 604ms. Results in the one-
new group also showed the distinctive pattern of the singleton prioritization emerging mainly 
with the second fixation. This appears to be different from gaze capture that has been attributed 
to pure saliency which is characterized by a latency of about 200-250ms (Theeuwes et al., 2003; 
Weichselbaum & Ansorge, 2018; van Zoest et al., 2004; but see Geyer, Müller, & 
Krummenacher, 2008). However, it should be kept in mind that in the present study, search 
difficulty was relatively high as compared to studies on saliency capture, where the target is 
often a salient stimulus (e.g., Theeuwes, 1991). We will discuss the relevance of search difficulty 
on attention capture in more detail at the following section. 
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Implications for the time course of surprise capture and saliency capture  
While the main aim of this study was to test the effects of novelty, the all-new condition 
in the present experiment can also be discussed with respect to the question whether saliency is 
able to draw attention in a bottom-up manner, which has been questioned by several authors 
(e.g., Ansorge, Horstmann, & Scharlau, 2010; Bacon & Egeth; 1994; Burnham, 2007; Folk et al., 
1992; Todd & Kramer, 1994). It is a general problem of experiments which attempt to induce 
saliency capture that the salient stimuli are completely expected because they are presented 
repeatedly. This renders a possible supporting result vulnerable to several alternative top-down 
explanations. Even prior exposure or expectedness per se have been postulated to change object 
processing (e.g., Bar, 2007; Bar et al., 2006; Di Lollo, 2018; Enns & Lleras, 2008; Herwig & 
Schneider, 2014; Köller, Poth, & Herwig, 2018; Poth, Petersen, Bundesen, & Schneider, 2014; 
Rao & Ballard, 1999; Waszak & Herwig, 2007; Weiß, Schneider, & Herwig, 2014). The surprise 
trial of the present all-new group, however, is a condition in which the color features of all items 
within the display are unexpected and only differ because of their saliency (see also Becker & 
Horstmann, 2011, Experiment 3; Horstmann et al., 2016). This would render a prioritization of 
the color singleton difficult to explain by top-down strategies– at least by those strategies which 
are not specific to surprise. Nevertheless, in the all-new group, the singleton was fixated on 
average after 604ms, and thus much later than in studies examining oculomotor capture by color 
singletons which was assumed to be elicited in a bottom-up manner (e.g., Theeuwes et al., 2003; 
van Zoest et al, 2004; Weichselbaum & Ansorge, 2018). This raises the question to which extent 
singleton prioritization in the all-new group is driven by saliency capture.  
First, it must be considered that the singleton fixation latency in the all-new group was 
prolonged because of the demonstrated increased non-singleton prioritization. Second, although 
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the average latency of the first singleton fixation was 604ms within the all-new group, the 
analyses of the early fixation destinations shows that a prioritization already emerged within the 
first two fixations after search display’s onset.  
Yet, fixation latencies at surprising singletons in “standard one-new groups” of about 
400ms (e.g., Horstmann, 2006; Ernst & Horstmann, 2018; Horstmann & Herwig, 2015; see also 
the one-new group of the present study) are still relatively late compared to fixation latencies of 
expected singletons (e.g., Theeuwes et al., 2003). The question remains why novel singletons do 
not capture the gaze earlier as they are still highly salient which should induce an early saliency 
capture effect (followed by a later surprise capture effect). One explanation could be that most 
surprise studies used a difficult search task. Theeuwes (2004, 2010) argues that saliency capture 
can hardly be induced in difficult searches because the size of the attentional window where 
stimuli can be processed in parallel is adjusted to be smaller (to allow fine-grained 
discriminations within the focus of attention; but see Barras & Kerzel, 2017a, 2017b). Further 
studies supported this hypothesis (Lu & Han, 2009; Proulx & Egeth, 2006). 
Assuming that the participants of the present study actually had a focused attentional 
window and that this window was so narrow that it often did not include the singleton at the 
beginning of the search trial can explain why saliency capture had a lower probability to bias the 
first fixation. However, if search is exhaustive, the singleton must necessarily enter the 
attentional window at a random point in time (if not already at the beginning) and should induce 
saliency capture on the subsequent fixation. Otherwise, it would be at odds with the assumption 
that saliency capture cannot be completely suppressed by top-down control (Theeuwes, 2010). 
Actually, our data show that the singleton is prioritized in both groups, as compared to baselines. 
However, within the all-new group, the singleton only differs by saliency from the remaining 
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non-singleton stimuli. Thus, the singleton prioritization within the all-new group yields 
additional support for saliency driven oculomotor capture within difficult searches, which 
however could be delayed because of the difficult search paradigm. Accordingly, also recent 
experiments without surprise conditions suggest that saliency effects can be found at later 
fixations in difficult searches (de Vries, van der Stigchel, & Hooge, 2018; see also Martin & 
Becker, 2018). 
With respect to surprise capture, one might likewise argue that the usually measured 
fixation latency of about 400ms when a singleton is presented for the first time (e.g., Horstmann 
& Herwig, 2015; or within the one-new group of the present study) is too late to dub this effect 
“surprise capture”; at least in relation to the fast nature of saliency and contingent capture. 
However, as already discussed before, considering that within a difficult search task the 
surprising singleton can also enter the attentional window or the functional view field (Hulleman 
& Olivers, 2017) at a later fixation and elicit oculomotor capture, suggests that the absolute 
fixation latency of the salient stimulus might be a doubtful criterion for attention capture in 
difficult searches. Though it is one reasonable method to test attention capture by focusing on the 
very first fixation after the display’s onset in easy search, it necessarily curtails the range of 
fixation latencies that can be measured (usually about 200-250ms, Geyer, Müller, & 
Krummenacher, 2008; Theeuwes et al., 2003; van Zoest et al, 2004; Weichselbaum & Ansorge, 
2018).  
To conclude, attention capture effects must not necessarily occur at the very first fixation 
in an all or nothing fashion. Attention capture can still fulfil the criterion of being involuntary 
and automatic (e.g., Jonides, 1981) when it is not elicited at the first fixation. 
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Post-selective novelty effects    
Our results revealed longer dwell times on any stimulus in the surprise trial of both 
groups. For non-singleton stimuli in the all-new group, increased dwell times are in line with 
previous studies which found similar effects on singletons with a novel color (Horstmann et al., 
2016; Horstmann & Herwig, 2016). The non-singletons in the one-new group, however, had the 
same familiar color as they have had in pre-critical search trials and yet we observed an increase 
in dwell times (see also Ernst & Horstmann, 2018). From a cognitive-evolutionary perspective it 
has been argued that surprising events are analyzed with respect to validation of expectation 
discrepancy, causes of the surprising event, and action relevance (Meyer, Reisenzein, & 
Schützwohl, 1997; Reisenzein et al., 2017). Accordingly, participants in the surprise trial of the 
one-new condition could have inspected non-salient stimuli more thoroughly in order to check 
for other changes, less salient than the singleton, with potential relevance for the search task.  
However, several studies suggest that dwell times increase with higher target-distractor 
similarity (Becker, 2011; Horstmann et al, 2017; Martin & Becker, 2018). The process of target-
distractor discrimination could also be prolonged because of the surprise induced revision of 
expectations which requires cognitive capacity. Accordingly, Mandler (1984) assumed an 
immediate and conscious expectation revision, which is in line with experiments where surprise 
effects disappeared already in the first post-critical trials (Ernst & Horstmann, 2018; Horstmann 
& Herwig, 2015; Schützwohl, 1998). With respect to the postulated conscious expectation 
revision, it would be interesting to test whether increased dwell times in a surprise trial predict 
higher awareness rates for the surprising event and faster diminishing of novelty effects in post-
critical trials (see Martin & Becker, 2018; for more on how target-distractor similarity, attention 
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capture, and gaze dwell times affect awareness). If so, increased dwell times could reflect that 
conscious expectation revision interferes with the target-distractor discrimination process.  
Another yet relatively unexplored surprise effect is the increase of stimulus revisits. The 
present results show higher rates of revisits on any stimulus type in the surprise trial, and the 
increase is even more pronounced on non-singletons with a novel color compared to when they 
had a familiar color. As in the case of dwell times, this could reflect another component of a 
surprised induced exploratory search mode (also termed “check-after-surprise” mode; Foerster, 
2016), but also to some extend impaired memory for the previously fixated stimulus locations 
(e.g., Woodman & Luck, 2004; but see also Woodman, Vogel, & Luck, 2001) due to more 
cognitive resources spent on expectation revision. It is assumed that three to four previously 
fixated locations can be kept in visual working memory (e.g., Hullemann & Olivers, 2016; 
McCarley, Wang, Kramer, Irwin, & Peterson, 2003). However, this span only appears to be 
reduced if location specific information occupies working memory (Woodman & Luck, 2004; 
Woodman, Vogel, & Luck, 2001). If the expectation’s update process actually increases 
refixations because of impaired memory for previously fixated locations, this could imply that 
the location information of the surprising stimuli is part of the expectation’s update process 
which involves working memory.  
Overall, an exploratory search mode as indicated by increased dwell times and revisits on 
any stimulus in a surprise trial is likewise in line with a “novelty-bonus” that enhances dopamine 
signals when unfamiliar stimuli are encountered (Kakade & Dayan, 2002). The novelty-bonus 
has been described as a hard-wired mechanism that engages animals and humans to actively 
explore the environment for rewards (Barto et al., 2013; Knutson & Cooper, 2006; Krebs, Schott, 
Schütze, & Düzel, 2009; Schultz, 1998). 
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Conclusion 
To sum up, the present study shows that novelty attracts attention, even when presented 
in a low-salient manner and at the cost of saliency effects. Furthermore, novelty can also add up 
with saliency to induce a strong attentional prioritization. We propose novelty (or expectation 
discrepancy) as an additional factor which contributes to activity in a priority map that influences 
gaze behavior. 
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German summary 
 
Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Eine viel debattierte Frage innerhalb der Forschung zur visuellen Aufmerksamkeit ist, in 
welchem Ausmaß visuelle Aufmerksamkeit von Stimulus getriebenen Faktoren (bottom-up) und 
von zielgerichteter Aufmerksamkeitssteuerung (top-down) bestimmt wird. Die vorliegende 
Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit dem speziellen Faktor der Erwartungsdiskrepanz, welche ebenfalls 
die visuelle Aufmerksamkeit lenkt, die aber keiner der beiden Kategorien eindeutig zugeordnet 
werden kann. Häufig wird der Einfluss der Erwartungsdiskrepanz getestet, indem 
Versuchsteilnehmende wiederholt visuelle Suchdurchgänge mit farbhomogenen Reizen an einem 
Bildschirm absolvieren. Dabei findet eine Gewöhnung an die Suchreize und deren visuellen 
Eigenschaften statt, sodass zunehmend die wiederholte Darbietung in den folgenden 
Suchdurchgängen erwartet wird. Wenn nach einigen Durchgängen unangekündigter Weise ein 
einzelner Reiz mit einer neuen Farbe präsentiert wird (ein „Singleton“), zieht dieser automatisch 
die Aufmerksamkeit und den Blick auf sich. Die vorliegende Arbeit demonstriert anhand von 
drei Studien, dass erwartungsdiskrepante Reize nicht zwingend in Form eines neuen Singletons 
dargeboten werden müssen um die Aufmerksamkeit auf sich zu lenken; das heißt, die Neuheit 
einer visuellen Eigenschaft per se ist hinreichend. Die erste Studie zeigt, dass ein 
aufgabenirrelevantes Farbsingleton stark den Blick einfängt, wenn es überraschend mit einer 
neuen Farbe präsentiert wird. Des Weiteren wurde die Alternativerklärung geprüft, dass 
Erwartungsdiskrepanz die attentionale Kontrolle außer Kraft setzt, was zu einer verstärkten 
Priorisierung von salienten Reizen führt. Die Ergebnisse legen jedoch keinen ausschlaggebenden 
Einfluss eines solchen Effektes für unerwartete Reize nahe. Die zweite Studie demonstriert, dass 
die Intensität, mit der die Augen von einer neuen Farbe angezogen werden, davon abhängt, wie 
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eng die Erwartung bezüglich der bekannten Farbe ist. Angenommen wurde, dass die Erwartung 
einer Farbe enger wird, je weniger die wahrgenommene Farbe variiert, und je häufiger die Farbe 
wahrgenommen wurde. Somit sollte die Erwartungsdiskrepanz einer neuen Farbe bei einer engen 
Erwartung groß und bei einer breiten Erwartung gering sein. Experimente mit einem ähnlichen 
Design wie in Studie 1 zeigten, dass der Blick von einem irrelevanten Singleton mit einer neuen 
Farbe schwächer angezogen wird, wenn das Singleton zuvor bereits stärker seine Farbe variierte 
und je weniger Suchdurchgänge es gab. Es wurde ein Ansatz vorgeschlagen, mit dem das 
Ausbilden einer Erwartung mathematisch modelliert werden kann. Die dritte Studie zeigt, dass 
Neuheit mit Salienz um attentionale Priorisierung konkurrieren kann. Genauer gesagt wurde 
dargelegt, dass die Priorisierung eines neuen Singletons mit einer neuen Farbe in einem 
Überraschungsdurchgang abgeschwächt wird, wenn die verbleibenden Stimuli ebenfalls eine 
neue Farbe aufweisen. Letztere werden dabei verstärkt beachtet. Das Ergebnismuster ließ sich 
anhand von probabilistisch funktionierenden Prioritätskarten für Aufmerksamkeitszuweisung 
vorhersagen, indem angenommen wurde, dass Neuheit grundsätzlich zu einer erhöhten Aktivität 
führt. Zusammen tragen die drei Studien zu einer genaueren Spezifizierung des Zusammenhangs 
zwischen Erwartungsdiskrepanz und Aufmerksamkeit bei. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
